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SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIE 
CURRICULUM VIIAE 
FOREWORD 
The research for this thesis and the writing of it has been a long and winding road. There 
are many people I am grateful to for giving me the encouragement to keep traveling along 
the way. 
It all began more than ten years ago while I was working for the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in the Department of Consumer Protection. Thanks to the heads of the 
department P J .M. Bauduin and J. Koopman I came in contact with Professor W.A.A.M. de 
Roos, my first promotor. Then for some reason I cannot remember anymore, call it 
serendipity, I read Hayek's famous article on the meaning of competition—and the world 
was never to be the same again. Realizing that I was no longer the right man in the right 
place, I moved to Leiden University. Very sadly, Professor De Roos died of a heart attack. 
Thanks to Professor J.A.H. Maks I not only began writing my thesis in English, but was 
brought into contact with Professor I.M. Kirzner of New York University. Kirzner's theory 
of the market as a process became the basis of this whole thesis. He invited me to spend 
the spring semester of 1990 at New York University. Articles in part II are the result 
thereof. At Leiden University Professor JJ.M. Theeuwis and B.CJ. van Velthoven became 
my coaches in writing. Articles in part III are the result. My thanks also go to K. ter Horst, 
the secretary of the department of general economics at Leiden University, she is still 
coaching me as far as curing my lack of knowledge of lay-outing the thesis. Being able to 
teach history of economic thought, including Austrian economics, I moved part time to 
Wageningen University, where Professor H. Folmer urged me to finish my thesis. Without 
his encouragement and support I am not sure if I would have done so. WJ.M. Heijman, 
my co-promotor, suggested it take the form of a collection of articles. He also suggested 
the addition of an article on the Austrian perspective on products liability. And so, 
eventually, I finished my thesis. I never thought it would look like this. To my genuine 
surprise it is a collection of articles, partly in English partly in Dutch, and some direct 
photo copies too. 
Without the interest and loving support of my wife and four daughters, I would not have 
been able to complete the work. They encouraged me to siege the chance to travel all over 
the world while working on it, beginning in 1990 with my stay as a research scholar in 
New York for months and ending most recently in 1999 with a stay in the Czech Republic 
for weeks to teach the history of economic thought. In between were visits to dozens of 
cities for lecturing and meetings, mostly in the United States, with on my way nearly 
always a short stop in my beloved New York City. 
To all of you I give my sincere thanks. May God bless you all. 
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INTRODUCTION 1 AND OUTLINE 
L a c k of international competitiveness is often seen as a central problem for the economy. 
Competitiveness, as the Cuomo Commission on Competitiveness says, "is the primary 
determinant of our ability to maintain our standard of living and our traditions of 
opportunity and inclusion" (Cuomo, 1992, p. 5). Whatever competitiveness means, certainly 
it involves entrepreneur ship. So, to rebuild economic strength, a government focuses 
attention on the business sector. But why the businessman, why not the consumer too? In 
the market the consumer matters. James Steuart, a predecessor of Adam Smith, described 
this in 1767 as double competition. "Double competition is what is understood to take 
place in almost every operation of trade; it is this which prevents the excessive rise of 
prices; it is this which prevents their excessive fall. While double competition prevails, the 
balance is perfect, trade and industry flourish" (Steuart, 1767, p. 264). Or, as Smith put it, 
next to competition among sellers there is competition among buyers. "When the quantity 
of any commodity which is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, all those 
who are willing to pay the whole value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid 
in order to bring it thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather 
than want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A competition will 
immediately begin among them, and the market price will rise [...]" (Smith, 1776, p. 159). 
The market in a capitalistic economy is a two-sided process. When producers do not 
compete, it is similar to a planned economy, such as that of the former Soviet Union. 
When consumers do not compete, it is a bit like the old caste society in India. Free entry 
to different groups of consumers is not possible. When one side of the market process fails, 
the economy becomes rigid and less competitive. 
The introduction is part of a paper presented at the International 
Conference of the Global Business and Technology Association, Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, West Indies, April 1-4, 1999. The full paper is published 
in Emerging Global Issues in the Next Millennium, Charles Little, Nejdet 
Delener, Stanley J. Lawson (eds) , St. John's University.' Jamaica, NY, 
1999, pp. 166-176. 
2 
What of the modern Western world? Steuart and Smith wrote more than two hundred 
years ago. Do consumers still compete? I believe producers "attempt to outdo, outprice, 
outproduce, and outmaneuver each other" (Kamerschen et ah, 1989, pp. 47-8). Doubtless, 
producers behave as rivals. But what about rivalry among consumers? I see consumers as 
fellows, not rivals. Rivalry among consumers seems to have disappeared from the 
economic scene. In today's mass markets there is little bidding up of the price of a limited 
supply. The bidding up of prices is confined to buying a house or a piece of antique at an 
auction—something that generally happens only once or twice in a lifetime. Maybe the 
most obvious reason for the absence of competition among consumers is consumer 
sovereignty, a basic normative idea of economics. "[It] is the principle that what is 
produced, how it is produced, and how it is distributed are to be determined by consumer 
preferences expressed through individual choices in a free market" (Penz, 1986, p. 5). 
Compare economic and non-economic competition. What do they have in common? Both 
involve contestants and judges. In non-economic competition, for example, in democratic 
politics, an election is a competition in which the candidates are the contestants and the 
voters the judges. Similarly, "in most markets, the sellers are the contestants—they take the 
initiative in offering bargains—while the buyers act as judges, selecting bargains they 
consider superior and rejecting those believed to be inferior" (Abbott, 1955, p. 105). So, in 
economic competition too, only the contestants, the producers, compete. The judges, the 
consumers, select. In mainstream neoclassical theory the consumer is the sovereign, way 
above all earthly competition. 
But, perhaps the consumer is actually the opposite of a king. This could explain the 
absence of competition among consumers. Lester Thurow suggests that parts of society are 
no longer consumer-driven, but producer-driven. We can no longer speak of consumer 
economics but rather producer economics. The goal is not to maximize consumption. 
"Individuals may rationally decide to have fewer consumption goods in their home 
environment to have more production goods in their work environment. ... A higher 
standard of living at work may even be more important than a higher standard of living at 
home." (Thurow, 1992, pp. 118-9). Men compete at work. "Belonging, esteem, power-
building, winning, and conquering are all human goals just as important as maximizing 
consumption and leisure. Work is where one achieves such goals" (Thurow, 1992, p. 118). 
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In the producer society there is less competition among consumers. Alvin Toffler, however, 
believes that we live neither in a consumer nor in a producer society, but somewhere in the 
middle. We are at the threshold of a "prosumer" society: the reintegration of the consumer 
into production. "And wherever the gap between consumer and producer narrows, the 
entire function, role, and power of the market is brought into question" (Toffler, 1980, p. 
276). Toffler speaks of a trans-market civilization. New forms of competition might arise, 
for instance, between a traditional, licensed electrician producing for exchange and an 
unlicensed prosumer producing for use. The consumer has no role because he no longer 
exists. He has changed into a prosumer. 
Next to these broad cultural notions there are some more down-to-earth market reasons 
for the lack of competition among consumers. Suppose competition has run its full course. 
Prices are then in equilibrium and there is no need to compete. However, when prices are 
above equilibrium, there are surpluses; the layman's impression when walking through a 
supermarket. And whenever there is a surplus, it is the producer who competes—not the 
consumer. However, if there is excess demand, should the consumer compete? This need 
not be so. Even when prices are below equilibrium, thus causing excess demand, the 
producer competes. Why? The consumer is a jack-of-all-trades buyer, the producer a 
specialized seller. Their degree of specialization differs. So, when producers and consumers 
exchange information, the producer "enjoys far more scale economics in the communica-
tion process than the buyer. A single advertisement can get a message to numerous 
potential buyers at a very small cost per recipient" (Heflebower, 1967, p. 179). In contrast, 
who will notice the advertisement of a single consumer for all the goods he wants in the 
middle of the total demand? As a result the search costs are higher for the consumer than 
for the producer. For the consumer they could be too high; the producer searches and 
competes. Moreover, in modern markets, competing products are non-homogeneous. 
Consumer products have changed since the days of Smith. Then they were simple and 
basic, now they are varied and manufactured. Producers have learned to control quality. 
"[I]n the economy of today, at any rate the advanced economies, most of the products sold 
to the consumer ... are largely supplied on customer markets, not the auction markets of 
classical theory or anything like them" (Phelps, 1985, pp. 383-4). The producer has to 
discover the diversity of buyers' preferences. The raw materials producer of the old days 
4 
did not have to do that. Today, producers take the initiative and compete; consumers gain 
by waiting for prices to be formed. 
Finally, not only quality per se, but quality uncertainty is a reason. Goods can be subject 
to contested exchange. "An exchange is contested when some aspect of the good exchanged 
possesses an attribute which is valuable to the buyer, is costly to provide, is contractually 
unspecifiable, and hence requires endogenous enforcement" (Gintis, 1989, p. 68). In 
markets of consumer goods the non-contractual aspect of the good is its quality. How can 
the consumer assure a certain quality? He has the power of non-renewal of exchanges 
through time. For the threat of non-renewal to be effective, the consumer must offer the 
producer an enforcement rent: a premium added to the price paid. Prices of consumer 
goods are above equiUbrium. The price is not bid down and the producer competes again. 
There certainly seems to be ample grounds for there being no competition among 
consumers. But perhaps we are looking for the answer at the wrong place. I began with the 
notion of competition as it is used by the man in the street: active rivalry. I then looked at 
the way a neoclassical economist describes it as perfect competition: a form of nightcap 
competition at best. The approach is reminiscent of the old joke about the man who is 
standing under a street light looking for his keys when another man offers to help him. 
"Where did you drop them?" the helper asks. "Across the street," the man answers. "Then 
why are you looking here?" "The light is better." So, to answer the question of whether 
consumers compete it is better to keep to the notion of competition as rivalry and see 
where it leads. 
In the Austrian tradition in economics, competition (defined as rivalry) and 
entrepreneurship are two sides of the same coin. Looking at competition and 
entrepreneursbip in the Austrian way emphasizes the importance of the specific knowledge 
of time and place. It stresses the importance that every individual—consumer and producer 
alike—can take advantage of them. In other words, Hayek's notion of competition and his 
emphasis on knowledge of time and place is important for the consumer. As far as the 
circumstances of time and place go—the consumer is the expert. But it must be 
remembered that the consumer is very elusive. As soon as he becomes entrepreneurial he 
often changes from an entrepreneurial consumer to an entrepreneurial producer. In other 
words, entrepreneurial opportunities tend to appear within the context of a specific time 
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and place. So a decentralized economy that allows individuals to act on their own 
entrepreneurial insights, and rewards them for doing so, produces an environment in which 
entrepreneurship is stimulated. And since entrepreneurial insights also lay the foundation 
for additional entrepreneurial insights, the growth process of our economy is sustained 
(Holcombe, 1998, p. 46 and 54). This takes us back to the problem faced by the Cuomo 
Commission. So it seems the Austrian tradition is the place to look for an answer. This is 
not quite true however. There is a particular oddity in the Austrian tradition that I have to 
look at first. 
For Austrian economists, classical economists were at fault because they were only able 
to explain the actions of the businessman. Classical economists completely neglected the 
rationality on the part of the consumer. They failed to find the law of marginal utility. 
"The famous formula 'to buy on the cheapest and to sell on the dearest market' makes 
sense only for the businessman. It is meaningless for the consumer" (Mises, 1990, p. 41). It 
was precisely this limitation that the Austrian subjective theory of value was able to 
overcome (Mises, 1976, p. 147 and 175). To a certain extent, however, modern Austrian 
economists, like the classical ones, have also lost sight of the consumer. The consumer is 
conspicuous by his absence in the analysis of the feasibility of economic calculations in 
monetary terms, as well as in the elucidation of the market as a dynamic process of entre-
preneurial discovery. The feasibility of monetary calculations is discussed only for rational 
production. The elucidation of the market process, modern Austrian economics uses the 
methodological makeshift of an entrepreneurial producer and a non-entrepreneurial 
consumer. 
This study has two aims. First, to analyse the role, calculative and entrepreneurial, of the 
consumer in Austrian economics. Second, to show the implication for consumer policy of 
Austrian economics in general and the Austrian consumer in particular. Part I serves as a 
general introduction to older and modern Austrian economics. It especially addresses the 
question of how the role of the consumer became lost in modern Austrian economics. Part 
II analyses the theoretical underpinnings of the calculative and entrepreneurial behaviour of 
the consumer. Part III discusses the question as to what extent the Austrian concept of the 
market process leads to a different judgement of and vision on consumer policy as opposed 
to the traditional neoclassical one. 
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1. AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: WHAT'S IN A NAME? 
In the 1880s German professors attached the epithet 'Austrian' to the economic theories of 
Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser. The pejorative epithet was bestowed by disdainful 
German economists. Why use such an epithet, and what was the reason for their disdain? 
1.1 A geographical and pejorative label 
The theories were first put forward by three Austrians, holding chairs at the universities of 
Vienna, Innsbruck, and Prague. In 1871 Carl Menger published his Grundsätze der Volks-
wirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics), a book usually recognized as the origin of the 
Austrian School of Economics. But until the end of the seventies there was no Austrian 
School: there was only Menger. Later he was joined by two younger economists, brothers-
in-law, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich Wieser. [Böhm-Bawerk married Wieser's 
younger sister Paula in 1890.] Both of whom became enthusiastic supporters of the new 
ideas put forward in Menger's book. 
The pejorative overtone of the predicate Austrian was because new modes of thinking 
were not associated with Austria. "For people who were not familiar with economics, the 
predicate 'Austrian' as applied to a doctrine carried strong overtones of the dark days of 
the Counter-Reformation and of Metternich. To an Austrian intellectual, nothing could 
appear more disastrous than a relapse of his country into the spiritual inanity of the good 
old days" (Mises, 1969, p. 14). 
Part I. The consumer in Austrian economics 9 
1.2 Clash over methods 
German economists attached the smear to Menger and his followers because, for them, 
Austrian economics meant backwardness. The Germans and Austrians both attacked 
classical economics, the former appealing to an alleged modern historical approach. 
Menger, however, although also wanting to rebuild the foundations of economic science, 
retained the abstract, theoretical character of economics. This clash of methods is known as 
the Methodenstreit. In the end, the clash over methods seemed one of precedence and the 
relative importance of historical research over against analytic tools. Later commentaries 
interpreted the whole quarrel as one "of wasted energies, which could have been put to 
better use [...to be] settled by allowing every type of work to find the place to which its 
weight entitled it" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 814). 
For Ludwig von Mises, the founder of modern Austrianism, on the other hand, it was "a 
complete misunderstanding of the meaning of the debates concerning the essence, scope, 
and logical character of economics to dismiss them as the scholastic quibbling of pedantic 
professors. The real issue was the epistemological foundations of the science of human 
action and its logical legitimacy" (Mises, 1966, p. 4). At stake was the value and 
usefulness of economic theory. The real motivation of the "Prussian Historical School, the 
self-styled 'intellectual bodyguard of the House of Hohenzollern'" (Mises, 1966, p. 4), said 
Mises, was to make coercive government intervention in the free market respectable. The 
Historical School could not demolish by means of the abstract methodology of the Clas-
sical School, the latter's conclusions towards laissez faire. It had to resort to another, 
empirical methodology to sustain its toleration of government intervention. Because for the 
Historical School there were no economic laws transcending mere description of the 
circumstances of individual time and place, there were no inconvenient economic laws for 
government to violate. 
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1.3. Subjectivism 
1.3.1 Older Austrians 
What did the German Historical School object to in the Austrian theory? And which the 
modern profession—as far as Mises's methodology is concerned—still does not like. In the 
words of Mark Blaug: "his [Mises, A.L.] later writings on the foundation of economic 
science are so cranky and idiosyncratic that we can only wonder that they have been taken 
seriously by anyone" (1980, p. 93). It does seem that Blaug at least has changed his 
opinion, as he recently declared: "I have come slowly and extremely reluctantly to view 
that they [the Austrians] are right and that we have all been wrong" (Blaug/Marchi, 1991, 
p. 508; cp. Blaug, 1993, p. 1571). 
Menger's theory turned the value theory of the classicals upside down. The classical 
Ricardian theory held that cost of production determines the normal value of consumption 
goods. In contrast, Menger's theory held that the value of consumption goods ultimately 
determines the cost of production. The end gives the means its importance, not visa versa. 
Labor is not the source of value, but a means to value. Value should no longer be seen as 
being governed by past resource costs, but as an expression of judgements concerning 
future usefulness in meeting consumer wants (Kirzner, 1987, p. 146). Menger's theory 
came to be known as the subjective theory of value. The classical objective value theory 
was a second best solution to the problem of how prices are determined. Classical 
economists "were fully aware of the fact that prices are not a product of the activities of a 
special group of people, but the result of an interplay of all members of the market 
society" (Mises, 1966, p. 62). But because of the problems encountered in the famous 
value paradox, they only considered the activities of the producer. 
The puzzle of the value paradox was that in exchange, diamonds are more highly valued 
than water, although the latter is more useful. Because the classical economist were unable 
to solve the puzzle, not utility but labor costs became the kernel of their value theory. 
Goods are not valued for their usefulness. Utility, and so the consumer, was ignored. 
Political economy, as John Stuart Mill said, looks at the production and distribution of 
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wealth, but not at its consumption. "We know not of any laws of the consumption of 
wealth as the subject of a distinct science: they can be no other than the laws of human 
enjoyment" (Mill, 1844, p. 132). This restricted theory led to the misconceptions that (1) 
there is a distinction between production catering the needs of the consumer and production 
guided by the profit motive of the producers, and (2) in the act of exchange goods of equal 
(labor) value are exchanged. The misconceptions were later used by Marx and the Marxists 
in their fight against the market economy. 
The Austrians solved the paradox by suggesting that no individual on the market ever 
faces the choice between water and diamonds as a class. Prices arise in connection with 
definite amounts of goods, and the greater the quantity of a good anyone possesses, the less 
he will value any given unit (the law of diminishing marginal utility). Value has nothing to 
do with broad classes of men or of products. Consequently, the reason water sells so much 
cheaper than diamonds is that the number of liters of water is enormously greater than the 
number of carats of diamonds. The value and the price of a liter of water will be far less 
than that of a carat of diamonds. And if one were in the impossible position of having the 
choice between all water and all diamonds, one would rate water first and diamonds 
second, disproving the existence of the paradox. 
By offering a more satisfactory theory of value, the subjective or marginal theory of 
value was more comprehensive than the classical theory, which last one emphasized the 
activities of the producer. Value is in the mind of the individual, who chooses and maxi-
mizes, for whatever reason, his profit or utility. Market demand flows from the valuations 
of the consumer. The expected demand sets the market supply of the producer. The inter-
action of demand and supply sets the market price. 
1.3.2 Modern Austrians 
Israel Kirzner (1986, p. 134 and 152) describes modern Austrianism as an authentic 
extension of Menger's older static subjectivism: a consequent dynamic subjectivism. In 
modern Austrianism, that post-World War II continuation of the Austrian tradition, the two 
central figures are Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Both authors focus on market adjustment 
processes. Kirzner, building his theory as Mises and Hayek did, believes that one of the 
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greatest failures of neoclassical equilibrium analysis is that it assumes that an equilibrium is 
actually brought about. For instance, in a disequilibrium would-be buyers who have 
returned home empty handed should learn that it is necessary to outbid other buyers, and 
buyers who have paid high prices should discover that they could have got the same goods 
at lower prices (Kirzner, 1973, p. 14). Consequently the real problem for modern Austrians 
is to describe the possible realization of an equihbrium as the result of "the systematic way 
in which plan revisions are made as a consequence of the disappointment of earlier plans" 
(Kirzner, 1962, p. 381). 
Neoclassical equilibrium theory cannot describe endogenous changes in the end-means 
framework. Its maximization scheme is unfit for the task of generating systematic 
modifications of choices. It suffers from a discontinuity in the succession of decisions. 
Only an exogenous change in the data, e.g., in tastes, in technology, or in information can 
generate a new decision; a decision that is unexplainable in the original framework. 
Without exogenous changes there is no 'choice-theoretic' explanation as to why yesterday's 
plans are replaced by today's. 
Mises and Hayek made it possible to describe adjustment as a systematic sequence of 
decisions. Mises's extension of subjectivism was to describe the individual decision unit 
not only as maximizing, but also as finding out the relevant ends-means relationship. This 
opened the way for incorporating learning into our understanding of market processes. 
Hayek's extension of subjectivism was to describe precisely the process as one of learning 
by discovery (Kirzner, 1986, p. 147; cf. Kirzner, 1985, p. 26)). 
Endogenous change in the ends-means relationship is possible with the entrepreneurial 
element in each individual market participant: alertness (Kirzner, 1967, pp. 793 -794 and 
1973, pp. 70-72). Alertness is the propensity of knowing where to look for information 
(Kirzner, 1973, p. 68), "the propensity [...] toward fresh goals and the discovery of hitherto 
unknown resources" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 34). A disequilibrium situation points to market 
ignorance, from which emerge profitable opportunities, entrepreneurial alertness exploits 
(Kirzner, 1979, p. 30). Alertness gives a more realistic image of human action and makes 
possible the description of the market as a unified discovery process. To sum up in the 
words of Kirzner: "What drives the market process is entrepreneurial boldness and 
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imagination; what constitutes that process is the series of discoveries generated by that 
entrepreneurial boldness and alertness" (Kirzner, 1997a, p. 73). 
"[The] 'alertness' view of the entrepreneurial role rejects the thesis that if we attribute 
genuine novelty to the entrepreneur, we must necessarily treat entrepreneurially generated 
market events as not related to earlier market events in any systematic way. The genuine 
novelty [...] attributefd] to the entrepreneur consists in his spontaneous discovery of the 
opportunities marked out by earlier market conditions (or by future market conditions as 
they would be in the absence of his own actions)" (Kirzner, 1985, p. 11). "[These] 
entrepreneurial discoveries are the steps through which any possible tendency toward 
market equilibrium must proceed" (Kirzner, 1985, pp. 11-12). 
1.4 Austrians and neoclassical compared 
Walras and Jevons are the two other well-known contributors to the marginal subjective 
value theory. From the modern Austrian perspective, Menger's writings in embryonic form 
contain insights that have been left out, or lost from mainstream neoclassical Walrasian and 
Jevonsian (Marshallian) economics (Kirzner, 1989a, p. 232). The differences refer to (1) 
the subject of, (2) the place of process analysis in, and (3) the epistemological character of 
economic theory. 
1.4.1 The equilibrium situation or the equilibrating process 
For modern Austrians, the main difference between the neoclassical market model and their 
own is that in theirs, adjustment processes and market disequilibria are central. Adjustment 
copes with dispersed knowledge and lack of it. The central point of their approach is the 
incurable ignorance of most of the particular circumstances which determine the course of 
society. In contrast to the neoclassical, for the modern Austrians, correct foresight, full 
knowledge, is not a precondition for the attainment of equilibrium, but the defining charac-
teristic of the state of equilibrium. "The statement that, if people know everything, they are 
in equilibrium, is true simply because that is how we define equilibrium" (Hayek, 1949, p. 
46). In the modern Austrian market model, action does not—as is mostly the case in the 
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neoclassical model—primarily follow from an optimal choice in a given ends-means 
relation. At the centre of the modern Austrian market model is the process of conceiving 
the ends-means relationship. In the words of the modern Austrians, the change in market 
model contains a change "from a 'mechanical' Robbinsian [after Lord Robbins, 
neoclassical] economizer to Mises's [modern Austrian] homo agens" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 72). 
"[Homo agens] is not merely engaged in computing the patterns of means allocation that 
will most faithfully reflect the hierarchy of given ends [like Robbins's calculating agents]. 
Homo agens is actively seeking out the best course of action, he is venturing, innovating, 
exploring, searching" (Kirzner, 1967, p. 792). 
The discontinuity in the succession of decisions in the neoclassical market model shows 
that the neoclassical maximizer does not choose at all. "[T]he replacement of one set of 
given ends by a second set occurs before (or at least outside) [... neoclassical] choice itself 
(Kirzner, 1986, p. 142). "The very circumstance that the 'chosen' course of action is seen 
as already inexorably implied in the given configuration of preferences and constraints, of 
ends and means, makes the choice 'mechanical' or 'automatic' - and thus not a true choice 
at all. True choice surely requires the realistic possibility of more than one alternative" 
(Kirzner, 1986, p. 139). Choices are not only concerned with merely selecting the highest 
out of an array of given and ranked alternatives, but also embrace the perception and 
evaluation of the alternatives identified as relevant (Kirzner, 1989b, p. 18). 
There is a sharp distinction between neoclassical search theory and discovering relevant 
means and ends. In neoclassical search "[t]he searcher knows what he is looking for, and 
he knows where to look for it. [...] In the case of discovery, on the other hand,] the 
discoverer discovers something he did not know existed, or something, the ready 
availability of which he had not realized" (Kirzner, 1989b, p. 27). Search wipes out known 
ignorance. Discovery wipes out utter ignorance—one is unaware one does not know.B u t 
the process of discovery is not completely unpredictable. For modern Austrians the 
outcome "may emerge as a result of the alert grasping of a hitherto unnoticed opportunity." 
In neoclassical equilibrium theory, on the contrary, the outcome is "either the fully 
expected result [...] of deliberate plans, or the fortuitous expression of pure luck" (Kirzner, 
1989b, p. ix and 30). 
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The central point of the Austrian approach is man's incurable ignorance. "Thus 
entrepreneurial activity [...] undoubtedly involves uncertainty and the bearing of risk" 
(Kirzner, 1973, p. 78; cp. Kirzner, 1985, pp. 40-67). This point is emphasized in the last 
chapter on product liability. 
1.4.2 Processes: the start or the end of the analysis 
The neoclassical economist often starts with a simplified static model. Processes are studied 
as the outgrow of some higher order of (mostly) technical sophistication. For modern 
Austrians, however, the distinction between process and situation is not a choice between 
two independent subject matters of economics. For them the process elements "are central 
and essential for understanding markets and not merely refinements to our knowledge" or 
matters of embarrassment (Kirzner, 1989a, p. 234). Process, discovery, and uncertainty are 
essential for everyday economics. "It is not that markets work in spite of the open-ended 
uncertainty surrounding human action, but rather that they work precisely because of this 
quality of human action. The open-ended uncertainty of the environment itself provides the 
scope and possibility for an entrepreneurial process of competitive discovery" (Kirzner, 
1989a, p. 234). 
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2. PRAXEOLOGY 
Subjectivism characterizes not only, the substance, but also the method of Austrian 
economics. The subjectivistic method, first explicitly written down by Mises, and to a 
lesser extent by Hayek, is called praxeology. A name, the logic of action, introduced by 
Mises that characterizes the verbal axiomatic-deductive method of Austrian economics 
(Lachmann, 1976, p. 56). 
2.1 The older roots of praxeology 
The term praxeology itself is a very old one (for a historical overview see Jan 
Zieleniewski, 1971). Today the term is used next to the Austrian of a Polish school of 
praxeology. This last school built on ideas from the first half of this century of its founder 
Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and was further develop by Oskar Lange. Later I give some of the 
differences between the two schools. 
Mises found the ideas for the praxeological method in the writings of some classical 
economists and older Austrians (Rothbard, 1980, p. 29). In fact, it is claimed that the 
praxeological method was the implicit one of the economic profession until the 1950s 
(Hoppe, 1988, p. 9 and 11). Think of such economists as Jean-Baptiste Say, Nassau W. 
Senior, and John E. Cairnes. What unites them is (1) that they distinguish between the 
natural and human sciences; (2) that they do their economic theorizing with verbal logic 
from certain self-evident premises; and (3) that they are reluctant to use mathematics and 
statistics in their economic theories. In the words of Cairnes: "The economist starts with a 
knowledge of ultimate causes. He is already, at the outset of his enterprise in the position 
with the physicist only attains after ages of laborious research" (1875, p. 87). And as Say 
says: "Political economy [...] is composed of a few fundamental principles, and of a great 
number of corollaries or conclusions, drawn from these principles [...] that can be admitted 
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by every reflecting mind" (1964, p. xxxvi). Also: " Such persons [...] have not been able to 
enunciate these [economic, A.L.] questions into analytical [mathematical, A.L.] language, 
without divesting them of their natural complication [...] of which the consequences [...] 
always essentially change the condition of the problem, and pervert all its results" (Say, 
1964, p. xxxvi). And finally, as Senior says: [The science of economics, A.L.] "depends 
more on reasoning than observation [...]. His [of the economist, A.L.] premises consist of a 
few general propositions, the result of observation, or consciousness, and scarcely requiring 
proof, or even formal statement, which almost every man, as soon as he hears them, 
admits, as familiar to his thoughts" (Senior, 1872, p. 5 and 3). 
Bohm-Bawerk, too, follows the same method in his famous paper of 1914 'Control or 
Economic Law'. In answer to the question whether human laws or human coercion of any 
kind permanently and successfully neutralize or overwhelm economic law, he says. "I shall 
have to start with self-evident trivialities which are close at hand. I shall merely present 
them in a certain connection and lead them into certain conclusions, equally so manifest 
that they merely need to be formulated with full clarity and purpose" (1962, p. 153). 
2.2 The modern Austrian roots of praxeology 
Praxeology starts from the fundamental, self-evident axiom that men act by virtue of their 
being human. It is based on a form of introspection shared by everyone and on the same 
form used for logical and mathematical truths. Human beings try to exchange a poor 
situation for a better one. Things that do not act purposefully are not classified as human 
beings. A human being that does not act, in other words does not behave rationally, 
changes into a plant, vegetates. "Human action is necessarily always rational. The term 
'rational action' is therefore pleonastic [...] The opposite of action is not irrational 
bahavior, but a reactive response to stimuli on the part of the bodily organs and instinct " 
(Mises, 1966, p. 20 and 19). "Scientifically, the only people who are irrational are people 
who are out of their minds, people who are crazy" (Greaves, 1984, p. 14). For the same 
reason we distinguish purposeful and reflex behaviour. The last does not imply human 
choices. It can be interpreted through the natural sciences. 
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To say that animals act, that they have an instinct, is not based on knowledge but on a 
lack of it. We can only know the world around us in two ways: causally or teleologically. 
If we see animal behaviour that we are unable to explain causally, we use teleological 
notions suitable for describing human behaviour. The quasi-teleological way is the only 
way left to us. But nothing is said of the cause of the action (Mises, 1940, pp. 29-30; 
Rothbard, 1962, p. 435, note 5). 
As a Kantian, Mises describes the fundamental axiom as a priori to all experience. It is a 
part of "the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind" 
(Mises, 1966, p. 34). "Our science considers only the essential. It views action [...] as for-
mal construction" (Mises, 1976, p. 13). In this respect, praxeology is like logic and 
geometry. To find the essence of a phenomenon we need concepts that will guide research 
and can be used for the analysis of results. In the words of the German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger: "Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding 
beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its 
theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. [...] Laying the 
foundation for the sciences in this way is different in principle from the kind of 'logic' 
which limps along after, investigating the status of some science as it chances to find it, in 
order to discover its 'method'. Laying the foundation, as we have described it, is rather a 
productive logic—in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of Being, 
discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arriving at the 
structure within it, makes these available to the positive sciences as transparent assignments 
for inquiry" ([1927] 1962, pp. 30-31). Or as Mises said: "It is not at all clear what the 
obstinate denial of the apriori is to achieve. [...] What sense does it make to assert that we 
gained this category [for instance the categories of negation or means-ends, A. L.] by 
experience if we do not know to what other results other experiences could have led?" 
(1978, p. 126). 
For Rothbard as an Aristotelian, however, the fundamental axiom is "so broadly based in 
common human experience that once enunciated [...it becomes] self-evident and hence do 
not meet the fashionable criterion of 'falsifiability'" (Rothbard, 1976, p. 25). "The fact that 
men act by virtue of their being human is indisputable and incontrovertible. To assume the 
contrary would be an absurdity" (Rothbard, 1962, pp. 1-2). 
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Praxeology has a few broadly empirical axioms, such as that individuals vary in tastes 
and abilities, that human beings find leisure as a valuable good, and that people learn from 
experience (cp. Dolan, 1976, p. 7). The axiom that people learn from experience is of 
fundamental importance to the description of the market as a systematic sequence of 
economic states. Its broadly empirical character is based on the general inclination man to 
be alert to opportunities. "The process by which facts are hammered into human 
consciousness is not wholly ungoverned by the logic of human action" (Kirzner, 1979, p. 
30). Although we recognize that people err, we assume that man tends to notice those facts 
that constitute possible opportunities for gainful action. "The market process emerges as the 
necessary implication of the circumstances that people act, and that in their action they err, 
discover their errors, and tend to revise their actions in a direction likely to be less erron-
eous than before" (Kirzner, 1979, p. 30). 
Praxeology consists in the verbal elaboration of the logical implications of the funda-
mental and subsidiary axioms of human action. It has the following form: 
1. Suppose A - the axiom of human action. 
2. If A, then B; if B, then C; if C, then D and so on - the rales of logic. 
3. That is why we state the truth of B, C, D, and so on (Rothbard, 1962, p. 63). 
The only test of an economic theory is the truth of the evident premises and the logical 
analysis build on it. Praxeology is based on the fundamental fact that individuals act. We 
deduce, save logical errors in the deductive process, true conclusions from a true axiom. 
To sum up, the apriori postulates are (1) all men seek to improve their situation from 
their own point of view; (2) the factors available for improving men's situations are scarce; 
and (3) men make mistakes (Greaves, 1884, pp. 10-12). Some deduced postulates, to be 
explained further on, are (1) all men are rational beings; (2) all human action takes time; 
(3) all human actions have consequences; and (4) men choose actions they believe will best 
improve their situation (Greaves, 1984, pp. 14-16). 
2.3 Praxeological concepts of action 
Time permeates every action in the real world. If all wishes could be instantly satisfied, 
there would be no reason to act. The moment one decides to act, to reach to a certain goal, 
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the goal can only be reached later in time. Everyone that acts must necessarily distinguish 
the time before and the time after his act. Logic, mathematics, and praxeology are all 
examples of apriori sciences. What distinguishes praxeology from the other two is time. 
The last are based on a timeless world, while praxeology cannot do without it. (Mises, 
1940, pp. 76-77). 
To act implies a belief that actions will make a difference and that the situation after the 
action will be better than the one before. It also implies that het actor has no full 
knowledge of the future, for if he did, none of his actions would make a difference. To act 
also implies that the means are scarce in relation to the goal. They are limited in relation to 
the possible ends they can serve. If they were abundantly available, there would be no 
reason to act. Abundantly available means, such as air, though indispensable, are no true 
means, because they are not the object of action. They do not, like time, have to be 
allocated. The distinction between free goods like in most cases air and economic goods is 
irrelevant to the praxeologist (Mises, 1940, p. 66; Rothbard, 1962, p. 6). 
This all sounds similar to the definition of economics Lional Robbins gave in his book 
An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. "Economics is the science 
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses" (1935, p. 16). No wonder, for Robbins tells us in the preface of the 
book (p. xvi) of his indebtedness to Mises, although Murray Rothbard called Robbins's 
methodology "a watered-down version of Misesian praxeology" (1989, p. 53). However, in 
the course of time, the conditional sale of method and object of economic science has been 
lost. Nearly all (text)books recall Robbins's definition, but hardly any his aprioristic 
method. 
2.3.1 Valuation 
Every human being has his preferences; he is not indifferent towards his environment. 
Every time he acts, he chooses, he prefers one thing to another. He must choose, make 
valuations, because things are scarce. Man lives in a world of quantities: the relations 
between cause and effect are quantitative. If this were different, if certain things could 
deliver unrestricted services, they would never be scarce and be valued as a mean. As 
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Rothbard said: "Individual valuation is the keystone of economic theory. For, fundamental-
ly, economics does not deal with things or material objects. Economics analyzes the logical 
attributes and consequences of the existence of individual valuations" (1956, p. 224). The 
individual valuations of the consumer permeate the whole production process. First they are 
related to the direct satisfaction of means, then to the consumption goods themselves, and 
later to the production goods. [Without money, however, this valuation process is 
impossible. This was Mises's starting point of the famous socialist calculation debate I 
examine later] 
Individual valuations show themselves in the acts of choice. The scale of valuations of 
the ends is transposed to those of the means. Austrians have a so-called "demonstrated 
preference" concept. The difference with Samuelson's "revealed preference" notion is not 
that his notion is based on a given scale of preferences that lies at the basis of action, but 
that Samuelson's scale stays the same as action unfolds in time. It can be reconstructured 
from the revealed actions. For the praxeologist, the scale of preferences exists only at the 
moment of choice. Choice demonstrates preferences, but will never contradict them, or be 
measured by them. It is absurd to "attempt to arrive at a consumer's preference scale not 
through observed real action, but through quizzing him by questionnaires" (Rothbard, 1956, 
p. 228; cf. Lachmann, 1966, p. 161). There is no guarantee that he is telling the truth. 
There is a difference between talking about values and actually choosing values. 
2.3.2 The marginal unit 
In a transaction, that is the change of a poor situation for a better one, we value the things 
we exchange. The value we give to a certain thing is purely subjective. What is relevant 
are the units at the margin. For human action marginal does not mean a very small amount 
but the relevant amount. Every relevant unit for a certain action is the marginal one. If 
speaking about eggs, for instance, the relevant unit is one egg. For boxes of six eggs, 
however, it is a box. In both cases we can speak of a marginal utility. Both utilities are 
marginal, but in no way is the utility of one the sum of the other. A praxeologist sees no 
total utilities; all utility is marginal. The core concept is the variable marginal unit, the 
relevant unit for the situation looked at. From this it follows that marginal utility is 
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immeasurable. If someone says the opposite, for the praxeologist this is a typical example 
of mathematical techniques taking over from economic content and going along the wrong 
track. The mathematician, implicitly supposes that "marginal" in marginal unit equals 
"marginal" in differential analysis. There, indeed, the total of something is the integrand of 
the marginal units of that something, which implies that the value of a sixth unit is equal 
to the difference between the value of six minus that of the preceding five units (Rothbard, 
1956, p. 233). 
To sum up, valuation always relates to the supply in a certain unique situation. The 
supply, by definition, consists of homogeneous units every one of which can be exchanged 
for every other. The law of decreasing marginal utilities holds. Marginal utility is a 
subjective valuation and has no relation to the objective qualities of goods. If the latter 
should be the case, then it is possible that the marginal utility increases or decreases if the 
number of units increases. Take again the example of eggs. Suppose for baking a cake you 
need five eggs. Then it could be that if we increase the number of eggs of one to four 
marginal utility decreases. It would increase, however, as we add the fifth egg. 
2.3.3 Indifference curves 
John Hicks, who popularized Francis Edgeworth's invention of the indifference curve in 
economics, describes an indifference curve as follows. Two commodities and their related 
utility can be illustrated graphically, by measuring the amounts of the first commodity 
along one axis and the amounts of the second commodity along the other. An indifference 
curve connects all points that represent goods combinations having the same total utility 
([1939], 1946, p. 13). 
Austrians are unhappy with indifference curves. I think there are two reasons. One of 
them is found in modern Austrianism. The other one is almost forgotten, but can be found 
in older Austrianism. Austrians describe economics as a science of human action. Action 
entails two things. (1) "Acting man chooses between various opportunities offered for 
choice. He prefers one alternative to others" (Mises, 1966, p. 94). (2) "Action is an attempt 
to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. We call such a 
wilfully induced alteration an exchange" (Mises, 1966, p. 97). So the two sides of the one 
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coin of human action are preference and exchange. The modern-Austrian reason for 
denouncing indifference curves is expressed in terms of preference. The forgotten reason is 
expressed in terms of exchange. 
2.3.3.1 Indifference and preference 
Rothbard gives the most elaborated denunciation of indifference curves in terms of 
preference (1956, pp. 236-238; 1962, pp. 265-268; cp. Salin, 1996). Economic action 
involves choice: given preference. So, when an individual values two things equally, "they 
cannot be alternatives for choice, and are therefore not relevant to action" (Rothbard, 1962, 
p. 267). The reason is based on Mises's first characterization of human action: preference. 
If someone is really indifferent to two alternatives, he is unable to choose. No one acts in a 
choice that cannot be demonstrated. In human action, however, every action is based on a 
choice in which something is valued above something else. "What distinguishes the 
Austrian School and will lend it immortal fame is precisely the fact that it created a theory 
of economic action and not of economic equilibrium or non-action" (Mises, 1978, p. 36). 
I distinguish between what interests a psychologist and what a praxeologist. The 
psychologist is interested in how and why preferences are formed. For him it is of interest 
to know if someone is very certain or almost indifferent to two alternatives. But 
praxeology, a logical science, is based on the existence of human action. The praxeologist 
wants to understand the universal form of human action, not its concrete content. He is 
interested in preferences as far as they show themselves in human choice. He is 
uninterested in the psychology, the intensity, of it. It is unimportant whether the choice is 
made by flipping a coin in the air or whether it is based on a strong preference. The 
praxeologist looks at human action. He ignores the psychological states that lead up to an 
action. "In the praxeological terminology the proposition: man's unique aim is to attain 
happiness, is, tautological. It does not imply any statement about the state of affairs from 
which man expects happiness. [...] [T]he incentive of human activity is always some 
uneasiness and its aim always to remove such uneasiness as far as possible, the is, to make 
the acting men feel happier" (Mises, 1966, p. 15; cp. 1940, p. 68). Economics starts where 
psychology stops. Action is a formal construction. This pure form—what Hayek called the 
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ground for the existence of human science (Hayek, 1942, p. 288)—gives the laws of 
economic science. 
For a praxeologist, the fable of Buridan's ass proves neither the relevance of the notion 
of indifference for human action nor that indifference shows itself in action. In the fable 
the ass cannot choose, between two equally attractive bales of hay. It has, however, not 
two but three options. It can choose one or other of the bales of hay, or choose neither and 
die. This last option will certainly be valued lower than the other two. He sets the choice 
for the two bales of hay in a random fashion (Rothbard, 1962, p. 267). The last also 
answers Robert Nozick (1977, p. 370) who claims Austrians need indifference. They need 
it to prove for example the law of decreasing marginal utility. I spoke just of a 
homogeneous supply of goods and implied that since all goods are the same, man is 
impartial about them. Walter Block (1980, p. 424) solves the problem as follows. The 
situation before and after the action must be separated. Before the action all units of a 
certain supply are homogeneous. They can be substituted for one another and are of equal 
value. But in that situation, indifference is no praxeological concept but a psychological 
one. However, for an act to take place, a choice has to be made, and so the units are no 
longer equal. This is the first, modern Austrian reason against the notion of indifference. 
Now the second, older Austrian one. 
2.3.3.2 Indifference and exchange 
Between the wars there were several economic circles in Vienna. One was a circle around 
Mises's Privatseminar, another was one around Hans Mayer. One member of the Mayer 
Circle was Leo Schonfeld-Illy. Both Mayer ([1932], 1994, pp. 206-217) and Schonfeld-Illy 
disliked indifference curves. What interests me is the reason Schonfeld-Illy gave for 
opposing indifference curves. His analysis of indifference curves focuses on the problem of 
whether such curves reflect the basic characteristics of an economic exchange. Our world is 
one of scarcity. At the moment of exchange, we compare the utilities of the goods attained 
with the utilities of the goods given up (1924, p. 44-45; 1948, p. 51). Exchange entails that 
to get one thing (1) something else has to be given up, (2) at the same moment. In an 
indifference curve, total utility, U, is a function of all the goods, i.e., x and y, one 
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possesses: U = F(x,y). Marginal utility is the change in total utility brought about by the 
smallest change in the quantity of one of the goods, given the quantity of the other good. 
(They are the first partial derivatives SF/dx and 8T/8y; Hicks, [1939], 1946, p. 305). This 
leads to the following (somewhat outdated) mathematical formulation of an indifference 
curve 
# d x + Mdy = 0 
dx 3y 
What are the arguments—and that interests us—of the two marginal utility functions, 
dF/dx and 3F/dy? Both marginal utilities are functions of the quantities of the goods the 
consumer possesses and can use later. Consequently, both functions show a decreasing 
slope. The greater the quantity of each good, the smaller its marginal utility. Sch8nfeld-Illy 
is dissatisfied with this description of the act of exchange; it is illogical. To describe action 
(exchange) the objects being exchanged need to be compared. This is not the same as 
describing the final result of the exchange. No indifference curve shows action to be 
sequential and non-synchronic. The arguments in the marginal utility functions must be 
those quantities that are the objects of the action. At least one of the goods should be the 
cost of the exchange, i.e., the quantity of goods to be given up (Schonfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 73 
and 79). "The value of the price paid is called costs. Costs are equal to the value attached 
to the satisfaction which one must forego in order to attain the end aimed at" (Mises, 1966, 
p. 97). For those discarded goods, the marginal utility functions must show an 
increasing—not a decreasing—slope, and its arguments are the quantities of goods given 
up, not the one gained by the exchange (Compare Chapter 5.3). There are also two sorts of 
marginal utility: positive ones, what is gained, and negative ones, what have been given up, 
what it costs (Schflnfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 52). 
However, there is more. To state the partial derivative of, for example x, the other 
variable, y, must be held constant. Functions c.q. experiments in physics satisfy this 
precondition of partial derivation. In the function v = f(t,p), expressing the dependence of 
the volume, v, of a substance, the dependent variable is a function, f, of temperature, t, and 
pressure, p. The method of a scientific experiment, changing the temperature, while 
holding pressure, p, constant, equals the logical principle of the differential method 
(Schonfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 83). But physics gives an inadequate description of economic 
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exchange. For in exchange every performance demands, in one form or the other, a 
compensation at the same time. In economics, an individual does not increase his economic 
goods without at the same time decreasing some other (Schonfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 84). Every 
economic act is conditional on "the instant of the transaction and under the conditions 
which this instant offers him" (Mises, 1966, p. 204). 
What I have said applies also for the ceteris paribus condition: it is an unworkable 
notion for exchange. Exchange cannot be split up in time by way of partial derivatives. If 
one thing changes, other things change too. What the mathematical representation of an 
indifference curve expresses is like someone who first finds something and then loses 
something else. He compares in his "action" the marginal utilities of the goods he possesses 
after the "transaction" has taken place. As Mayer said: "In essence there is an immanent, 
more or less disguised, fiction at the heart of mathematical equilibrium theories: that is, 
they bind together in simultaneous equations, non-simultaneous magnitudes operative in 
genetic-causal sequence as if these existed together at the same time. A state of affairs is 
synchronized in the 'static' approach, whereas in reality we are dealing with a process. But 
one simply cannot consider a generative process 'statically' as a state of rest, without 
eliminating precisely that which makes it what it is" ([1932], 1994, p. 92). To state the 
partial derivatives, the marginal utilities, with the help of the ceteris paribus condition is 
invalid. 
Moreover, most goods are related goods, they are the complements or substitutes of one 
another. This is something that an indifference curve, as opposed to Marshall's utility 
curves for one good, was supposed to show in the first place. Consequently, only the full 
marginal utility of a good is relevant for consumer demand. The consumer never looks at 
the marginal utility of a car alone, but always at the complementary necessary gas too. 
This also holds, mutatis mutandis, for the goods the consumer has to give up (SchSnfeld-
Illy, 1948, p. 90). As Hicks concludes: "It is a very curious consequence [...] that the 
indifference diagram, which Pareto took up as a means of throwing light upon the problem 
of related goods, proves to be of little direct use for the particular problem" (Hicks, [1939] 
1946, p. 45). 
To conclude, partial differentiation is an unworkable description of economic exchange. 
The differentiation in two phases, exemplified in the indifference curve equation, is no real 
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possibility. Meanwhile, for the mathematical economist it is hardly possible to resort to 
total differentiation. For him partial derivatives are necessary for stating the prices of the 
different goods. This is done by using the formula that equates the price ratio to the 
marginal utility ratio (Schfinfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 88). For Mayer, when "all wants differing in 
kind or quality are not reciprocally present to one another, then the postulate of the law of 
equal marginal utility becomes impossible in the real world of the psyche" ([1932], 1994, 
p. 81). He compares the forced synchronization of utility estimations with the situation of 
"It is as if one were to express the experience of aesthetic value of hearing a melody—an 
experience determined by successive experiences of individual notes—in terms of the 
aesthetic value of the simultaneous harmonization of all notes of making up the melody" 
([1932], 1994, p. 83). 
If I want to describe human action, i.e., action at the one moment of exchange, then 
indifference curves are irrelevant. Exchange entails that: (1) benefits and costs are to be 
compared, and (2) they are to be compared at the same moment in time. What has to be 
compared in exchange are the marginal utilities of the goods received with those given up. 
Logically, it is contradictory in exchange to compare the marginal utilities of the goods we 
posses (though not for a description of the equilibrium situation after the exchange has 
taken place). 
2.4 Praxeological laws 
For the praxeologist, economic science implies laws. Laws implied by the relation between 
means and ends, e.g., the law of decreasing utility, and by the use of money as an 
intermediary with the exchange of goods, e.g., Gresham's law. Mises had no problem with 
the idea first, of the existence of eternal and universal laws, and, second, that these laws 
cannot be deduced from historical facts. For him the great question was how these laws 
were possible. In other words, how economic science is possible (Meyer, 1981, p. 37)? 
All economic laws are implied by the existence of human action and our notion of it. 
The opposite of an economic law, if correctly deduced from self-evident axioms, is 
unthinkable. Of course we can say it, just as we can say that one plus one is three. But we 
cannot think it. And, since the Austrians consider the praxeological not the logical apriori, 
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as far as their laws of human action go, the opposite cannot be done in action either. In 
other words, to disprove a praxeological law means moving in a circle. What is seen is the 
character of a self evident axiom. This is called the boomerang principle. Suppose someone 
wants to refute the axiom of human action: man employs means to attain chosen ends. "For 
doing so, he is ipso facto a person making a conscious choice of means in attempting to 
arrive at an adopted end: in this case the end, or goal, of trying to refute the notion of 
action" (Dolan, 1976, p. 28). 
"Laws of physical nature," as Kirzner says, "are inferred from the observation of 
sequences of physical events. Economic laws [...] are founded on our understanding of the 
influence that a given event will have upon the actions of individuals" (1963, p. 4). They 
refer "to the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind" 
(Mises, 1966, p. 34; Cp. 1940, p. 16). 
2.4.1 The law of decreasing returns 
As an example of what a neoclassical and an Austrian economist say of laws I want to 
look at the law of decreasing returns. Economists consider the law of fundamental 
importance. "One of the most fundamental economic theories—and one on which many 
other major theories depend—is the well-known law of Diminishing Returns" (Katouzian, 
1980, p. 56). Hicks ([1939] 1946, p. 84) says that if we are deprived of this law "the 
threatened wreckage is that of the greater part of general equilibrium theory", and Stigler 
(1966, p. 122) says that "The discovery of this law [...] was one of the heroic advances in 
the history of economics." 
First I give the content of the law and the neoclassical proof of it. This is followed by 
the praxeological which shows the law is used whenever man acts. The proof needs no 
empirical verification. 
2.4.1.1 What the neoclassicals say 
The law holds that when one or more factors are held constant, there will come a point 
beyond which the extra output from additional units of the variable factor will diminish. In 
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other words—stated not in marginal but average terms (cp. Stigler, 1966, p. 130)—if the 
amount of a certain complementary factor is held constant the variable one will always 
have an optimum: the highest average return. 
How does a neoclassical verify the law? It is a law based on experience; daily 
experience and empirical research suggest the law. Take for example, the combination of 
labor and a certain capital good. One way of explaining the law is to point at the 
advantages at the beginning of specialization (efficient work organization and better 
adaptation of the labour factor on the capital good) and later at the effect of overcrowding. 
Of course it can also be look at the other way around. Instead of starting with experience, 
starting with theory. Axioms and conditions for equilibrium, including the law of 
decreasing return, can be postulated and then examined to see if they make sense. "So far 
we are taken by geometry; but now it is necessary to inquire whether the equilibrium 
conditions thus arrived at are in fact plausible conditions" (Hicks, [1939], 1946, p. 82; cp. 
p. v). This recourse is impossible for the praxeologist. As I hope to show for the 
praxeologist every statement makes sense for itself. The mathematician, however, often 
interprets a statement later on. Then there is Joan Robinson. She describes the law as a 
tautology (1954, pp. 330-331). Production factors are different by definition: they are 
imperfect substitutes. This gives us the content of the law: the extent to which we can 
substitute one factor for the other has a limit. If the law does not apply, the production 
factors are wrongly classified. The same reason is used to prove the law of demand for 
instance when goods are non-homogeneous. When the price increases, and there is also an 
increase in the quantity demanded, then the goods are non-homogeneous. The higher priced 
good was, in the eye of the beholder, of a better quality—and that is what counts. 
Stigler concludes his proof of the law by saying that the law of decreasing returns is an 
empirical law, not a tautology (1966, p. 129, and 138). To prove it, however, is 
impossible. Examples that demonstrate the law, prove nothing. How many instances would 
confirm the law? Moreover, if an example should ever be found to disprove it, then it can 
always be said the law speaks about ultimately decreasing returns. For Stigler the most 
convincing proof of the law is that until now no economist has ever been able to prove the 
opposite—and became famous in doing so (Stigler, 1966, p. 23 and 138). For the praxeo-
logist, however, if this last were possible, the economist would have proven the non-
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existence of human action: human beings. So the one Stigler is looking for would not gain 
immortality but just the opposite (compare the end of Chapter 12). Why is this so and what 
does a praxeological proof looks like? The law is neither a disguised definition nor an 
uncertain hypotheses. There is a third possibility; it is a self-evident proposition. 
2.4.1.2 What the Austrians say 
Praxeology has nothing to do with psychology (why and how people adopt ends) or 
technology (how to achieve ends). Just as the law of decreasing utility needs no 
psychological proof—for instance that the tenth cup of coffee tastes less pleasurable than 
the ninth: Gossen's law of the saturation of wants—the law of decreasing returns needs no 
technological proof. 
Men act. They try to exchange a poor situation for a better one. For this they make use 
of whatever they find around them. Some goods satisfy directly. Others need preparation 
before they can be used. For the production of these last, more than one good is necessary. 
Suppose the good in question is a cup of coffee in my hand, while sitting behind my desk. 
If the cup of coffee is in the kitchen then, to produce the good, I need (1) the cup of 
coffee; (2) the transport to the desk; and (3) time. If all I need is one factor, the cup of 
coffee, I would have to suppose that the cup of coffee moves from the kitchen to the desk 
in some magical way and in an instant. Such a situation would be a paradise on earth; 
action would no longer be necessary. 
Let me take a closer look at the concept of means. Means are found in the world around 
us, and involve the notions of quantity and quality. For human action this is a given. 
Because everything has only a limited action, things can become scarce, thus becoming a 
mean. Because the actions of different things are unequal, they can be classified in 
different quality classes. Think of the classification of the factors of production: nature, 
labour, and capital. For human action itself, however, the concepts of quantity and quality 
have only a limited meaning. If man acts, he places a value on the world around him. He 
either prefers it or rejects it. But this is done ordinally not cardinally. Satisfaction comes 
always from one sort or quality. Coffee, a visit to Disneyland, and a painting of Rembrandt 
are all valued on one scale of value. Action knows different degrees of importance, but no 
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quantity or quality. Hence, as far as the world around us is concerned there is the marginal 
and total return of the law of decreasing returns. This cannot be said of the law of 
decreasing utility. In a world without quantities, adding or subtracting (as if total utility is 
the sum of the marginal utilities) is useless. Only the notion of marginal utility can be 
used. 
The just-said implies the law. If the quantitative action of goods is recognized before we 
see a good as an economic good, this implies that the combination of complementary 
goods must have an optimum (Mises, 1940, p. 96). In other words, because there is more 
than one factor of production, this implies that the average return of every production 
factor must have a maximum or a minimum (Rothbard, 1962, p. 30). Take a product P that 
can be produced with three complementary factors of production: X, Y, and Z. The supply 
of the goods can be given quantitatively and leads—in nature—to quantitative measurable 
results. So it can always be said that x units of X, together with y units of Y and z units of 
Z, give p units of P. Now if units y and z are held constant, then units x and p can vary. 
The value of x which gives the maximum of p/x, the largest average return, is the 
optimum. The law says that if the amounts of the complementary factors are held constant 
then the variable production factor always has an optimum. 
Let me as a thought experiment think of the opposite of the law. "The specific method 
of economics is the method of imaginary constructions. This method is the method of 
praxeology. [...] The main formula for designing of imaginary constructions is to abstract 
from the operation of some conditions present in actual action. Then we are in a position 
to grasp the hypothetical consequences of the absence of these conditions and to conceive 
the effects of their existence. [...] It is, to be sure, a method difficult to handle because it 
can easily result in fallacious syllogisms. It leads along a sharp edge; on both sides yawns 
the chasm of absurdity and nonsense. Only merciless self-criticism can prevent a man from 
falling headlong into these abysmal depths" (Mises, 1966, p. 236 and p. 237; Cp. 1940, p. 
227 and 228). If there is no optimum then, if X rises, the average product will rise 
infinitely. But if p/x can rise indefinitely, because x increases, this means that every 
amount of P is made possible just by increasing X. Every decrease in Y and Z can be 
substituted by X. This means that X is a perfect substitute for the factors Y and Z. As long 
as X is plentifully available, the scarcity of these factors is of no concern. There would 
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also be only one production factor. But as in the example of a cup of coffee, production 
needs more than one factor of production. In other words, the action of the production 
factors Y and Z is unlimited. Even the smallest amount of Y and Z would be sufficient. Y 
and Z would no longer be economical goods. However, something that has an unlimited 
effect is, for instance, our knowledge of a causal connection, e.g., the recipe for making 
coffee. It does not loose its utility, its use is unlimited and for that reason, no object of 
human action. It resembles air. A human being does not ever have to choose between a 
known recipe and the utility of a certain good (Mises, 1940, p. 96; Rothbard, 1962, p. 9). 
But if he acts, if he behaves rationally, keeps the amount of a certain complementary factor 
constant, then the variable factor has always an optimum. 
2.5 The different parts of praxeology 
Economics is the most developed part of praxeology, which contains the apodictically true 
axiom of human action that is enough to deduce a large part of economic theory. A small 
number of subsidiary axioms, such as there are a variety of human and natural resources, 
and leisure is a consumer's good, are necessary to deduce the rest of economic theory. 
Rothbard (1951, pp. 945-946; cp. 1962, p. 80) describes the various types of human 
action. 
A. The theory of the isolated individual (Crusoe Economics) 
B. The theory of voluntary interpersonal exchange (Catallactics, or the Economics of the 
market) 
1. Barter 
2. With medium of exchange 
a. On the unhampered market 
b. Effects of violent intervention with the market 
c. Effects of violent abolition of the market (Socialism) 
C. The theory of war-hostile action 
D. The theory of games 
E. Unknown. 
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Economics, war, and games all are examples of human action. The way men approach each 
other, however, differs. In war, men are enemies, and in games too, the intention is to 
defeat the other player, sometimes in cooperation with other players, according to rales. 
Psychologically, it is possible to see economic competition as a battle too. But the 
praxeologist sees great differences. For him, competition is a social process of cooperation. 
In it the tasks of society are divided. Not a dictator but the consumer decides who best will 
fulfil his wishes. How to serve someone best, that is the question. (Mises, 1966, p. 117 and 
1976, pp. 89-90). The term catallactics in economics hints at this cooperation. It not only 
means to exchange, but also to become a part of the community: to change from an enemy 
into a friend (Hayek, 1982, II, p. 108). 
Parts A and B (economics) in Rothbard's scheme are the most developed parts of 
praxeology. Part C was developed by the Polish praxeologist Kotarbihski. I give an 
example of this Polish praxeological thinking. It illustrates the principles of economics and 
the art of warfare and brings them back to general praxeological principles. Historically the 
different ways of using money as a means of payment continuously improve. First there 
was direct barter, then coins, then paper money and so on. Instead of someone getting the 
actual possession of something, he gets the assurance that he can posses it. Applying the 
praxeological principle of potentiality, a specific activity is substituted by the potentiality to 
do it. For warfare this means that instead at attacking the enemy directly, one tries to per-
suade him to give up his position by the threat of attack. One replaces a specific action, 
with the same result—but cheaper—by the showing it can be done (Kotarbinski, 1964, pp. 
304-305). The Polish praxeologists emphasize the differences between the Austrian ideas of 
praxeology and their own (Zielenieuwski 1971, p. 359). For them, praxeology is the 
science of efficient human action. The praxeologist gives utility maximizing principles 
(Kotarbinski, 1964, p. 298). They do not recognize the apriori character of the praxeologic-
al theorems. For Rothbard, however, Oskar Lange, in his later work shows great similarity 
with that of Mises. 
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2.6 Praxeology versus the natural sciences 
For Austrians, economic theory is absolutely true; testing is meaningless. The Austrian 
methodology stands against the logical positivist one that is inspired by the natural 
sciences. Again, as was the case in the clash with the Historical School, the Austrians are 
accused of being unscientific. This time, however, the criterium is not that there can be no 
economic laws transcending the mere description of the particular circumstances of time 
and place, but that economic laws can only be established tentatively, by testing 
empirically (verifying or falsifying) the consequences. But "[b]ecause this [Austrian] view 
of the analytical basis for economic theory places so much emphasis on an 
unobservable—the purposefulness held to actuate human behavior—it follows that the 
epistemological character of the discipline, and hence the method appropriate to it, differs 
sharply from those relating to the physical sciences" (Kirzner, 1982, p. 3). In the natural 
sciences one explains the known with the unknown, in the social sciences one explains the 
unknown with the known (Hayek, 1967, p. 5 and 9). In other words, in the natural 
sciences, after the observation of known facts hypotheses are formulated. The hypotheses 
are verified (falsified) by predictions made on the bases of the hypotheses. This method fits 
the physical facts, facts that are homogeneous, replicable, and controllable under laboratory 
conditions. The social sciences begin with the explaining axioms. Human beings are the 
explaining causal factors. "If molecules acted purposefully, no physicist would dare ignore 
the information which he could derive from this fact alone. Because molecules do not, as 
far as the physicist is aware, act purposefully, the physicist is at liberty to confine his 
inquiries to the explanation of empirical phenomena" (Kirzner, 1962, p. 385). 
The foundation of Austrian economics is the existence of individual human action: the 
primary fact of human consciousness. It is possible to see if something is or is not based 
on purposeful human action. A physical event is seen in a different way from a purposeful 
human action. Explanations of the difference between the natural and the social phenomena 
cannot be dismissed on apriori grounds. 
Formerly, anthropomorphism, the understanding of the world ex analogia hominis, went 
too far in its ideal of explanation. For instance, when a stone rolls off a mountain, it is not 
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moved by gravity, but by its own will: it wants to do it. It is also unnecessary to make the 
mistake the other way around, as the natural sciences (the model for present day 
neoclassical economics) tend to do. There is a fundamental methodological dualism. 
Because of the complexity of the facts, social scientist cannot verify theories in the same 
way as natural scientists can. Historical facts are heterogeneous, not replicable, and are the 
result of complex causes. 
What then is the relation between economics and reality? The modern Austrian answer is 
threefold. First, Austrian economics is concerned with purposeful human action, a reality 
not touched by the natural sciences. Second, to pose the question is itself the result of the 
preoccupation in modern economics with the method of the natural sciences. The natural 
sciences distinguishes between thoughts and the outside world. But in the social world 
actions are planned. To understand human action means looking at the praxeological 
thought that lies at the basis of it. The reality that is the object of economics, human 
action, comes from the same source as human thinking. Action and reason are congeneric 
and homogeneous. They can even be seen as two different aspects of the same thing 
(Mises, 1966, p. 39). Third, the predictions, says Mises, of the modern Austrians are not 
that much different from the ones of the natural scientist. The latter is not a fortune-teller 
either. Successful predictions do not tell what will happen, but say what will happen if 
certain preconditions are satisfied (Mises, 1961, p. 131). The natural scientist can explain 
that if H and 0 are combined in certain proportions the result will be water. But he cannot 
predict how many scientists will combine H and O at a certain point in the future. In the 
same way, the Austrian economist predicts, with absolute certainty, that if the demand of 
butter rises and the supply stays the same, the price of butter will rise ceteris paribus. But 
the theoretical economies cannot predict if the price of butter will rise. 
Economic theory, "where relevant, is applied to help to explain the facts. The facts 
thereby illustrate the workings of the law" (Rothbard, 1976, p. 36). In order to explain 
complex historical facts, however, the economic historian must use more than just econ-
omic theory. He must, for example, use technology, physics, and psychology too. I will 
give another example related to prediction. Suppose the praxeological law: "If the supply 
of a medium of exchange increases; and if the demand for that medium remains the same; 
then, the purchasing power of that medium will decline." How can an economic historian 
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apply this law? First, he must determine if there has been a rise in prices. Then he has to 
try to explain it by using this praxeological law, asking whether there has been an increase 
in the supply. If the answer is positive, then he can assert three truths. 
"A. It is a historical fact that the purchasing power of the medium X has declined to such 
and such an extent. 
B. It is an historical fact that the supply of the medium X has increased to such and such 
an extent. 
C. The praxeological law just mentioned. It is therefore concluded that a significant cause 
of the decline, A, was the increase in supply, B" (Rothbard, 1951, p. 944). 
The work of the historian is to give the relevant application of the theory. This applies also 
to the art of prediction. Historical facts are the complex result of many causes. Many 
sciences can also be used. But the historical facts neither corroborate nor test the laws. 
They only illustrate them. 
2.7 Praxeology versus quantitative economics 
You do not have to be a praxeologist to question the usefulness of mathematics and 
econometrics for economics. For now I want to focus on the arguments used by 
praxeologists, although the arguments he uses can also be used by others—however, with a 
twist in the tail. For instance, recognition of the complexity of historical facts and the 
consequences of it for carrying out experiments, allow different conclusions to be made. 
One conclusion is that it is not a science; it is only possible to describe historical and 
institutional facts. However, since an aposteriori science of economics is impossible, it is 
also possible to conclude—as the praxeologist does—that economics is an apriori science. 
2.7.1 Mathematical economics 
What is the main objection of the Austrians to the use of mathematics in economics? For 
Walras and Jevons, marginal utility, income, and price influence each other simultaneously. 
This interdepence can be studied with equations. Menger in his economics had no use for 
equilibrium and functional relations. He used genetic-causal relations. The needs of the 
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consumer determine the value of the consumption goods which, in their turn determine the 
value of the producer goods. The individual valuation of the consumer permeates the whole 
production process, first the direct satisfaction of needs, then consumer goods and later the 
producer goods themselves. Order in the variation of certain magnitudes needs to be 
established as do explainations of the phenomena. The first case involves the natural 
sciences, the second the social sciences. In the first, the entities themselves are not the 
cause of their behaviour. The objects are determined by the discovery of quantitative laws 
and the interaction between them. But as far as human behaviour goes, free will and 
human choice are fundamental. The universal aspects of this sort of behaviour must be ana-
lyzed logically. There are no functional quantitative relations between variables. The 
human mind causes certain actions that cannot be traced back to other forces (Rothbard, 
1960, p. 166 and 1962, p. 279). 
The use of mathematics in economics began with the introduction of marginal utility. It 
seemed particularly suitable for the use of differential calculus. At the same time, however, 
it showed up a difference between the three founders of marginalism: Menger on the one 
hand and Walras and Jevons on the other. Why would it be more general and precise—two 
of the acclaimed advantages of the mathematical form (cf. Niska, 1959)—to use 
mathematics instead of common language? As example I use the notion of marginal utility, 
put forward by Karl Menger (1973), the mathematician son of Carl Menger. 
(I). Using verbal logic, the Austrians say that for every good the utility of a larger 
quantity is larger (or, at any way not smaller) than the utility of a smaller quantity. The 
marginal utility of that larger quantity is smaller (or at anyway not larger) than the 
marginal utility of the smaller quantity. 
(II). Using mathematical terminology, the neoclassicals say that if q is the quantity of a 
good and fa its utility, then 
fi = f(q), d/i/dq = f '(q) > 0 and d^/dq 2 = f "(q) < 0 
Comparing I and II shows that the mathematical formulation gives less information than 
the Austrian. The mathematical formulation needs to make the additional supposition of 
differentiability: individuals have to find infinite small changes relevant. A supposition that 
clearly has nothing to do with the reality we live in. "Action does not deal with physical or 
metaphysical units which it values in an abstract academic way; it is always faced with 
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alternatives between which it chooses" (Mises, 1949, p. 120). The Austrian formulation is 
more general, and can be applied to situations where the mathematical can not. 
Comparison of I and II also illustrates the point that it is not necessarily true that the 
mathematical form reveals hidden assumptions. In fact it is the opposite (cp. Dolan, 1976, 
p. 23). The Austrian form is of the same "mathematical" precision as the mathematical one. 
To say that "every arbitrary real number plus one equals one plus that number" is fully 
equal to saying that "x + 1 = 1 + x". Karl Menger says that one has compared "expressions 
in formulae to a trip across America by railroad, and verbal formulations to a 
transcontinental walk" (1973, p. 19). He, however, concludes "Thus if one wants to 
compare the two methods to crossings of a continental, then [...] one must not say that the 
first is by foot and the second by train, but rather that the first is unencumbered while the 
second is a crossing with unnecessary and obnoxious baggage" (1973, p. 20). 
So again, what are the advantages of substituting symbols for plain words in economics? 
(Egger, 1978, p. 28). There is the economy of fewer words, the exactness in the definition 
of symbols, and the rigor of proof. For this last the whole package of mathematical 
theories available at this moment can be used. When is it an advantage to have this? To 
answer the question I compare the proofs of the praxeologist and natural scientist. In the 
natural sciences the argument is generally that some words at the beginning and at the end 
of the article are needed, with pages of symbols in the middle. Indeed mathematics has its 
use if only the result counts. The premises are hypothetical and it is pointless to make 
every step meaningful in the process towards the conclusion. If nature has a mathematical 
structure, then mathematics is the key to it. The book of nature can be read if its language 
is understood: mathematics. In the natural sciences, the axioms and deductions from them 
are formal and receive their interpretation operationally as far as they can explain and 
predict the facts. But for the praxeologist it is the opposite: axioms are known and 
meaningful. Every step in the verbal deductive process has meaning. Verbal propositions 
have a meaning of their own, mathematical formulations do not. The language of 
economics is verbal. Of course, mathematics is a language too. But there is a difference 
between "x - y = z" and assets minus debs is capital. It is a problem of order here (Egger, 
1978, p. 38, note 25). The advantage of verbal language is that it can express the essence 
of an economic phenomenon. Mathematical formulations are always quantitatively precise, 
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but unable to portray qualitative differences. Every step in the market process depends on 
human decisions which are mental, qualitative and immeasurable. 
I want to take a closer look at verbal deduction. One of the most important models for 
the deduction of logical implications is the so-called thought experiment. For the economist 
it equals the laboratory experiment of the natural scientist. Since the variables in the social 
world cannot be held constant, the economist uses his imagination to do it. Economic laws 
have a ceteris paribus character. For instance, if we have an image of what it means not to 
act, we can form an image of what it means if we do. If the former, the individual is 
completely satisfied or does not see how the means he has can change the unsatisfying 
situation. But the comparison between a thought and a laboratory experiment is inadequate. 
The experiments of the praxeologist can never be opposed to reality or be measured by it. 
They aim at a level of thinking that reality says nothing about. If thought experiments and 
reality are brought into contact with each other, it is the thinking that must be investigated, 
not reality. The question is not whether the picture represents reality but whether the 
assumptions of the picture are identical to our understanding of the human action. 
For the most part, however, the ceteris paribus clause is a way of escape for every test. 
The conclusion must be that the clause is a useful abstraction in the deductive chain of 
economic reasoning as exemplified in a thought experiment. But it is impossible to 
formulate ceteris paribus falsifiable hypotheses which relate to reality. Other things being 
equal, no one observes the law of demand. 
To conclude, first, for Austrians the most important objection to the use of mathematics 
in economics is the fear that economic phenomena are treated analogously to natural ones. 
If man becomes a complicated machine and machines start thinking, market processes as 
they happen in the real world tend to get lost. Entrepreneurial creativity is noticeably 
absent. Mathematics ignores the most essential characteristic of human beings—the alpha 
and the omega of the social market process. Second, for the praxeologists, mathematical 
economics must at best, either be cut away by Ockham's razor (Rothbard, 1963, p. 65 and 
1976, p. 22), or judged by the words of Mises "Vestigia terrent": mathematical 
formulations puts people off (Mises, 1976, p. 116). As Bohm-Bawerk says, if you start 
with d/dx cp(x) dx + d/dy i|/(b-y) dy, the reader does not understand it anymore and puts 
the book away (Kauder, 1957, p. 412). "But, "as Rothbard says, "the really important thing 
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is not that nonmathematicians cannot understand them; the cruxial point is that 
mathematicians cannot contribute to economic knowledge" (1962, p. x). 
2.7.2 Praxeology versus econometrics 
The econometrist fills empirically and tests the mathematically expressed hypotheses. He 
tries to discover economic laws and solve problems of human action by the use of 
statistical data of the past. According to praxeological thinking the econometrist makes two 
mistakes. First, economic theories do not need empirical testing. Economic theories are 
necessary true because they are deduced, using verbal logic, from self-evident axioms. 
Second, the econometrist assumes, at least for the moment, a stable relationship. A stable 
relationship, however, can only be seen with hindsight, but by then it is a historical fact! f 
this is the situation, the mathematically expressed hypotheses loses much of its charm. In 
physics the preference for its use is based on the existence of certain constants. But what if 
there are only variables: historical data, and no constants? The use of a system of 
equations, so convenient with many variables, loses its use. To speak of variables when 
there are no invariables makes no sense. The popular notion that statistics can prove 
anything is inapplicable to human behavior. In fact, you cannot prove anything about 
human behavior with it. All statistics are history, sometimes economic history, but never 
economics (Mises, 1977, p. 97). 
The reason for the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative method in the 
natural and social sciences is based on its distinctive objects. The objects of the first do not 
act, choose or change their opinion and choose again. The research can be repeated time 
and again with increasing quantitative precision. For the praxeologist, however, economics 
is a qualitative science. Economics is a science based on the ideas, valuations, and actions 
of individuals. The subject of economic science is not the tangible world around us; it is 
human action based on individual valuations. Valuation does not measure anything, it only 
subsumes in a scale of value. Human action has no standard of valuation; no measuring 
can be done. Prices are not measured with money but are only expressed in it (Mises, 
[1912], 1971, p. 15). If this were not true, there would never be human action. If the 
valuation places A equal to B, then no trade takes place. Production and exchange do not 
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happen because valuations are equal, but because they differ. In the prospective judgements 
of both buyer and seller, every exchange creates new additional value. The econometrist 
focuses on the objects exchanged; for him the market consists of endless sequences of 
exchanges. "From the subjective perspective, however, it becomes possible (if indeed not 
imperative) to recognize the market process as involving processes of mutual discovery [...] 
on the part of the market participants. It becomes possible to recognize scope for superior 
entrepreneurial vision into the future [...]" (Kirzner, 1998, p. 585). 
In economics, theory is often stated in statistical quantities based on monetary values, 
e.g., price indices and the measure of the Gross National Product. For the description of 
human action, however, these are unfruitful. Human behavior based on individual 
valuations has no common measure. Macro economic measures ignore the application of 
the subjective and marginalist theory of value to money. "It is a relapse to the thinking of 
ages in which people failed to comprehend praxeological phenomena because they were 
committed to holistic notions. [...]. Modern economics does not ask what 'iron' or 'bread' 
is worth, but what a definite piece of iron or bread is worth to an acting individual at a 
definite date and a definite place" (Mises, 1966, p. 400). There is another reason why 
Austrians do not value quantification. Menger believed that economics does not investigate 
quantities but essences, e.g., the essence of value, rent, or profit. Verbal language has the 
advantage over mathematical language in that the former can express the essence of 
economic phenomena. For Mises economics looks at the pure form of human action. 
As well as quantities, econometrics also aims at prediction. I have already said why the 
traditional way of prediction is invalid in economics. But why should prediction be 
desirable in the first place? In the positive science of economics of the Chicago school, 
testable predictions take the centre of the stage. As the positivist says "The meaning of a 
statement is given by the method of its verification." A notion can only be understood if it 
is somehow related to sensory experience. To speak of essences, as the Austrians do is also 
very problematical. How can essences be tested by sensory observation or have any 
meaning at all? But for Austrians, the aim of science is not to predict, but to grasp the 
meaning of necessary connections. A prediction with the help of a black-box, e.g., macro-
economics without a micro-economic foundation is unsatisfactory. Economics enables men 
to predict the qualitative effects to be expected form the adoption of specific policies. But 
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such predictions cannot be quantitative as there are no constant relations in the valuation 
which determine, guide, and alter human relations. 
This also sheds light on the proper role and value of the economist. If, for example, the 
government does not intervene in the market, the role of the economist is to explain why. 
The businessman is much better equipped to predict the future demand for something like 
butter than the economist. The theoretical concepts and laws of the praxeologist allow him 
to interpret reality. He can act with a greater chance of success. But if the government does 
intervene in the market, the practical use of the economist increases. For then, for example, 
the rise in the demand for butter is certain and its consequences are looked for (Rothbard, 
1960, p. 257). 
To conclude, for the praxeologist, econometrics is at best a useful form of economic 
history. But it is of no use for economic theory. As Hayek said, "[...] we know so much 
detail about economics, our task is to put our knowledge in order. We hardly need any new 
information. Our great difficulty is digesting what we already know. We don't get much 
wiser by statistical information except by gaining information about the specific situation at 
the moment" (Hayek, 1994, p. 145). 
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3. THE MISSING CONSUMER: THE SOCIALIST CALCULATION DEBATE 
consumer is not for modern Austrian economics. The consumer became lost somewhere 
between Menger's contribution to Austrian economics (the way in which all value springs 
off from the final valuation of the consumer), and the modern Austrian contribution (the 
process through which the consumer's valuation translates in production decisions). 
From the beginning Austrian economists were polemical writers. Menger fought the 
Historical School, BShm-Bawerk fought the Marxists, and Mises and Hayek had their own 
clash with the Socialists. And, today, modern Austrians fight the mixed economy (cp. De 
Soto, 1998, pp. 88-89). No wonder Austrians say the "debate over economic calculation 
under socialism [... was] a catalyst in the development and articulation of the modern 
Austrian view of the market" (Kirzner, 1988, p. 1; cf. Rothbard, 1980, p. 27). The socialist 
calculation debate in the interwar period began with Mises's denial of the feasibility of 
calculating costs rationally or of allocating factors of production efficiently in a socialist 
economy. For most economists the debate ended with the answer of Lange and Lerner to 
'play at' market prices: centrally promulgated given prices. 
The calculation debate brought to the fore two modern Austrian insights (Taylor, 1980, 
p. 23). First, without market determined monetary prices, rational calculation is not 
possible in a centralized economy. Subjectivism entails the contention that values should 
not and cannot be calculated or measured directly. They are calculated with the results of 
individual valuations: money prices. They do not measure value but they express it. 
Consequently, the pivotal point is the necessity of a market for the means of production. 
"For a long time, the misconception that costs determined prices prevented economists 
from recognizing that it was prices that operated as the indispensable signals telling 
producers what costs it was worth expending on the production of the various commodities 
and services, and not the other way around" (Hayek, 1978, p. 2). Second, without market-
determined monetary prices, a centralized economy lacks ability to promote discovery. 
the consumer was central to Menger's thought, (cf. Menger, 1923), the 
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"The most impressive aspect of the market system is the tendency for [...] opportunities to 
be discovered" (Kirzner, 1985, p. 30). Prices expressed in money show price discrepancies. 
Through the possibility of monetary profits, they stimulate the discovery of valuable 
concrete information. 
I do not plan to go into whether one or both insights was the crucial point more than 50 
years ago, in the calculation debate. Rothbard (1988, p. 37) and Salerno (1990, p. 45) 
represent the calculation insight; Kirzner, (1985, p. 129; 1989b, p. 66) and Lavoie (1985a 
and 1985b) the discovery insight. Though both insights are theoretically compatible they 
differ in their consequences for the feasibility of a socialistic system. The calculation 
insight believes socialistic calculation to be fundamentally impossible. A socialist system 
has no markets, so calculation cannot be based on market prices (Rothbard, 1988, p. 37). 
The discovery insight, believes socialist calculation to be fundamentally flawed. The scope 
for entrepreneurial decisions is available only for the central planner. In a market economy 
with its decentralized decision-making, however, entrepreneurial decision-making has a 
widespread scope (Kirzner, 1989b, p. 94; cf. Rothbard, 1988, p. 78, note 28). 
I suggest that a direct consequence of the focus on the central planner in the calculation 
debate is that modern Austrians discuss both insights from the point of view of the 
producer. They discuss the first insight, (that in a socialist society rational calculation is 
impossible), explicitly as a problem of the calculation of the means of production (Salerno, 
1990, p. 439). How can a central planner rationally calculate costs or allocate factors of 
production efficiently? The modern Austrians discuss the second insight, (a socialist society 
lacks ability to promote discovery), by way of the methodological makeshift of an 
entrepreneurial producer and a non-entrepreneurial consumer (Mises, 1966, p. 253; Kirzner, 
1973, p. 41). Though alertness is in principle present in every action, in their elaborations 
the modern Austrians give it to the producer (cf. Rothbard, 1985, p. 282; Ekelund & 
Saurman, 1988, p. xx; Pasour, 1989, p. 95). So alertness is called the entrepreneurial 
element. Consumers are passive, non-alert, Robbinsian maximizers. See for instance how 
Austrians look at advertising. One of the roles of advertising is "getting the Robbinsians 
[the potential consumers] to see the availability of [...] opportunities" (Kirzner, 1973, 
p. 148). Advertising differs from changing the consumer's taste or providing information 
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(non-entrepreneurial knowledge) for him. Advertising (an entrepreneurial device) makes the 
consumer aware of available opportunities, regardless of his level of alertness. 
Just as Mises did before him (1966, pp. 251-256), Kirzner motivates the identification of 
alertness with the role of the producer in the market process as "purely for simplicity for 
analysis" (Kirzner, 1967, p. 797 and 1973, p. 18 and 41). In addition, he says that the 
identification makes sense if we consider the "near-inevitability of an entrepreneurial role's, 
being filled by the producer" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 72). Although I do not discuss whether or 
not the identification makes the analysis less complicated, I do ask if it makes 'sense' to 
give the entrepreneurial element to the producer? Kirzner looks for the answer in the roles 
of the market participants. He distinguishes consumers, resource owners, and producers. 
Producers, converting resources into commodities are alert to price discrepancies between 
the price paid for a product on the resource markets and the price got for it on the final 
product markets. Alertness to price discrepancies, however, is a form of entrepreneurial 
behaviour. In society, there is 'a built-in group of entrepreneurs' (Kirzner, 1973, p. 18). 
Otherwise, the essential difference between consumers and resource owners on the one 
hand and producers on the other is that producers do not have to possess any means. The 
pure producer gains are caused by a certain alertness to price discrepancies. We can think 
of all consumers and resource owners as pure Robbinsian allocators, something which is 
unthinkable for all producers. For a pure producer, alertness is a conditio sine qua non 
(Kirzner, 1973, p. 39). 
3.1 But what about the consumer? 
In the modern Austrian discussion about calculation and entrepreneurship, the sovereign 
consumer—the one who determines by his buying or abstention from it what should be 
produced in what quantity and of what quality—moves backstage as the personification of 
the ends. But if the market is a competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery there is 
more to be said of him. Something that is of relevance to subjectivistic notions of the 
market process. Is there no relevant distinction between the calculations of the producer 
and those of the consumer? And, perhaps the methodological makeshift of a Misesian 
entrepreneur and a Robbinsian consumer, both used for the elucidation of the market 
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process, is spun out too long? See the way Kirzner introduces his reason for focusing on 
the entrepreneurial producer. He speaks of men who "are able to see where a good can be 
sold at a price higher than that for which it can be bought" (1973, p. 14). Which is exactly 
the position the older Austrians challenged in the first place; the actions of the businessmen 
the classical economist could already explain. Therefore I suggest giving 
entrepreneurship—the alertness towards new means and ends—to the consumer too. The 
one whose behaviour, for the first time in the history of economics, the Austrians explain. 
This consumer is a real living human being seen from the point of view of consumption. 
He is the market's sovereign king. 
I think Kirzner's idea of entrepreneurship as a process of error correction suits the 
consumer, even more perhaps than it suits the producer (cp. Part n, Chapter 4, note 10). 
Why? Buchanan and VanBerg distinguish a cross-sectional from an intertemporal 
divergence between different parts of the market (1991, p. 321). But, if the creativeness of 
the human mind is emphasized they believe it is difficult to ascribe error correction to an 
intertemporary world. "What sense does it make [If the market is an open-ended process. 
A.L.] to describe today's failure to possess tomorrow's knowledge as error!" (Buchanan 
and VanBerg, 1991, p. 321). Human choices, if real, that is inherently creative, could have 
been different and have had different effects. For a cross-sectional situation, however—the 
world of ignorance the consumer of final products faces—it is legitimate to say we correct 
an error of what is already out there, what is waiting to be discovered. 
This is not to say of course that discovery of intertemporal "errors" is not important. The 
point is "Can we, without stretching the use of language too much, describe this situation 
as an error?" However, to conclude with the words of Kirzner, in an interview in the 
Austrian Economics Newsletter (1997b, pp. 3-4), "Philosophically, all this may be so. But 
it doesn't matter for the sake of the metaphor I have chosen. Ex post we have to recognize 
that when an innovator has discovered something new, that something was metaphorically 
waiting to be discovered. "[I]n a more fundamental sense, he is correcting an already 
existing discoordination. He is redirecting resources that are already misplaced." 
I resume my argument and programme for the following studies on the consumer in 
Austrian economics and the Austrian perspective on consumer policy. What I think is 
unperceived in modern Austrian economics is the entrepreneurial consumer. Who is he? 
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First, he is the final consumer who tends to buy or not to buy according to the valuations 
he places on the offered commodities. But, second, final consumers are entrepreneurs too 
"in that they search for better trade possibilities" (Reekie, 1984, p. 54). "This is the same 
as saying that as long as there is ignorance in the economy there will be profit 
opportunities: there will be trades available at more convenient terms, there will be 
arbitrage opportunities, there will be different goods to produce, better technologies to use, 
more efficient organizational forms to adopt, and so on" (Thomsen, 1992, p. 17). As the 
Austrians always say, market phenomena—each and every market transaction, each and 
every real world market decision—reflect the entrepreneurial activities of all market 
participants. Entrepreneurship refers to those who are alert to the existence of previously 
unknown profit opportunities. 
Of course, like resource owners and consumers, entrepreneurs are an abstraction of 
economic theory too. In that usage the entrepreneur is a businessman who plans, organizes, 
and directs an enterprise. But what interests me here is that, to some extent, all individuals 
are entrepreneurial. I follow this idea up in Part II, where I examine entrepreneurship, and 
in (Part III), where I look at what consumer policy , the government policy to improve 
consumer position on the market does to the consumer's entrepreneurship. 
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Bohm-Bawerk's Goods Goods Characteristics 
Characteristics Reactivated for 
Modern Austrians 
It is not just a hackneyed formula but the heart of modern-Austrian economicsfl] 
to describe "Austrian" economics as the "less-known themes of the Austrians". 
Ask any economist to explain this characterisation and he is likely to answer 
"subjectivism" and "market processes". By this he probably has in mind the 
two contentions that an economic theory "systematically recomposes market 
phenomena in terms of typical structural components of everyday decision making'' 
(O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1986, p. 252) and that "the appropriate starting point for 
a theory... is... the pattern of market adjustments set in motion by conditions 
of disequilibrium" (Kirzner, 1967, p. 788). In this contribution* I analyse one of 
the less-known, almost forgotten, themes from the subjectivistic Austrian tradition 
and show its implications for modern Austrian ideas on market processes. 
After an introductory section, I state and interpret Menger's and Bohm-Bawerk's 
characterisation of goods in the second and third sections. This consists of nry 
' 'less-known theme'', taken from the subjectivistic Austrian tradition. In the fourth 
and fifth section, I state and interpret the theories in modern Austrian thought 
about market processes. Section six shows how useful the less-known theme 
actually is for the solution of a paradox that arises. The last section contains a 
summary and a conclusion. 
Less-known Themes of the Austrians 
Let us first consider subjectivism. Perhaps our first thought is the often-quoted 
statement of the present mentor of modern Austrianism, Friedrich Hayek, "that 
every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was 
a further step in the consistent application of subjectivism" (Hayek, 1952, p. 31). 
Thus formulated means, of course, that the Austrians' greatest enemy was 
"objectivism", i.e. the objective theory of value. According to a remark made by 
Carl Menger, which is also often quoted, this fault was even made inside the 
Austrian camp in the works of Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 
847, note 8). Though, according to Ludwig von Mises, for Bohm-Bawerk this was 
probably only a question of stylistic habit, inherited from Bohm-Bawerk's own 
"objectivistic" economic childhood; stylistic faults to which even Menger 
sometimes fell prey (Mises, 1928, pp. 167,171). So — again according to Mises — 
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it is better to turn to the more clearly stated views of the epigones (Mises, [1928] 
1981, pp. 174, 178). One of my aims, however, is to prove exactly the opposite. 
In a way there is still something to be learned from Austrian founding fathers like 
Böhm-Bawerk. 
Let me therefore extract from the subjectivistic tradition in general and from 
Böhm-Bawerk's writings in particular the point that I want to discuss. One of 
the first questions encountered in economics is, according to Menger, what makes 
a thing a good (Menger, 1950, p. 48). The answer, from a subjectivistic point of 
view, reads like this.'' [G]oods-character is nothing inherent in goods... but merely 
a relationship between certain things and men" (Menger, 1950, p. 52). In his 
magnum opus, Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre ([1871] 1950), Menger gave 
four essential characteristics of goods. In this way he was trying to define the 
essence of a good. Ten years later Böhm-Bawerk, in his Habilitationsschrifi, Rechte 
und Verhältnisse vom Standpunkte der wlksunrtschafllichen Güteriehre ([1881] 1962), 
added a fifth characteristic; the condition that individuals must possess knowledge 
of how to utilise the thing {Gebrauchskunst). Böhm-Bawerk's additional, essential 
characteristic of goods is our "less-known" theme of the Austrians. 
In the history of economic thought the difference between Menger's and Böhm-
Bawerk's characterisations of goods, like Böhm-Bawerk's book itself, has almost 
been forgotten. In most cases the difference is not even noticed (e.g. Amonn, 
1911, p. 266). If mentioned it is characterised as a sign of Böhm-Bawerk's 
objectivism at its worst (Endres, 1987, p. 294), perhaps one of those slips of the 
pen in the old objectivistic habit, mentioned earlier by Mises or, probably at its 
best, only a passing remark. Böhm-Bawerk himself, in a remark characteristic 
of his general attitude towards Menger, said that he supplemented Menger's 
findings ' 'only in one minor respect'' (Böhm-Bawerk, 1962, p. 41). In his magnum 
opus, Kapital und Kapitalzins, of 1884, he did not make the explicit distinction 
any more. In this essay I want to investigate if Böhm-Bawerk's own and other 
people's negative verdict on this is correct. Or have I come across a "new" 
forgotten theme of the Austrians? 
To answer this last question positively the theme from the Austrian tradition 
should be of value to modern Austrian thought. Does it solve problems which 
might otherwise remain insoluble? Does it throw a different light on the facts? 
These questions implicitly ask for a fundamental idea because it explains so much 
and has been used in nearly all economic theories (Mayer, 1927, p. 1272). 
Fundamental ideas make the basic characteristics of the subject matter under 
investigation intelligible. All subsequent investigations have been based on it and 
have made use of these basic characteristics. No wonder the goods concept is, 
for the Austrians, often the starting point of their investigations. 
The second characterisation of modern Austrian thought is the central position 
of market processes in their economic theories. Some preliminary reflection will 
show that on a fundamental level there is at least a certain unexploited subject 
matter which leads to a lack of balance in Austrian Üiinking on this point. In market 
processes, "the drive and alertness needed to identify which ends to strive for 
and which means are available" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 68) is of central importance. 
This element is called the entrepreneurial element, an element present in all 
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decision making. Still, when it comes to the point, the Austrians impute the (j-OOQS 
entrepreneurial role only to the producer (Kirzner, 1973, p. 72), in spite of the Characteristics 
fact that the ultimate king of the Austrians in market processes is without doubt 
the consumer. If this king rules he must also occupy the centre stage in market 
processes. Although in theory the Austrians give the consumer all the power, 
in practice they deny him this authority and delegate the fundamental market role m 
to the producer. The central question of this essay is therefore what light Bohm-
Bawerk's subjectivistic goods concept sheds on the untouched subject of the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. As, I hope to show, this situation can 
be seen as a lack of balance, even as a paradox inside Austrian thought. 
Menger and Böhm-Bawerk on Goods Characteristics 
Menger, in his Principles, gave four characteristics of goods. He described them 
by stating the standard ends-means relationship of economics as follows. People 
have needs. The only way in which these needs can be satisfied is by means of 
a causal process. What things, to be called useful things (Nützlichkeiten), can satisfy 
the needs in such a causal process? Two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) a human 
need must exist and (2) the thing must have useful properties, to satisfy this need. 
If this causal process is recognised and if there is control over these useful things, 
the thing is not only useful but also a good. This leads to two further conditions: 
(3) knowledge of the causal relationship and (4) the power of disposal over the 
thing (Verfügungsmachf) (Menger, 1950, p. 52). 
These four characteristics were the culmination and more or less the end|2] of 
a lively discussion in economic thought about the goods character of a thing. However 
the parallel discussion about the categorisation of goods continued. In that discussion 
the question was which things are to be subsumed under the goods concept[3]. Böhm-
Bawerk in his Rechte stated five goods characteristics. In comparison with Menger's 
four conditions he added a fifth[4], that individuals should also know how to utilise 
the useful thing (Gebrauchskunst, Böhm-Bawerk, 1962, p. 42). 
Why did Böhm-Bawerk add this fifth condition? He must have had good reasons 
for it. Austrian thinking is not usually very lighthearted about essences. Goods 
characteristics belong to the Austrians' essentialism. Böhm-Bawerk himself played 
down his divergence from Menger by only stating his reasons in a footnote. In 
this he said that the knowing-how condition cannot be included in both Menger's 
and his own condition relating to the command of the thing. He gave two reasons 
for this: (1) the knowing-how condition is too subjective and (2) it would stretch 
language usage too much to include knowing-how as a part of the condition on 
the command of the thing (Böhm-Bawerk, 1962, p. 42, note 2). 
How do we classify and what light can be shed in this classification on the 
difference in goods characterisations between Menger and Böhm-Bawerk? To 
answer these questions I have made use of the second reason, or actually hint, 
in Böhm-Bawerk's explicative footnote. The first reason, here considered as an 
extension of the second, is discussed in the sixth section. 
The best way to explain Böhm-Bawerk's fifth characteristic is first to differentiate 
it from the third, common characteristic. Second, to use the stated classification 
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Journal of for analysing Menger's implicit concept of knowing how to utilise a thing. Put 
Economic differently, this means how must Menger's fourth characteristic be interpreted 
Studies to include the whole or part of Bohm-Bawerk's fifth characteristic? I have called 
16?2 Menger's knowing-how condition' 'implicit'' because in the posthumously published 
(second) edition of his Principles there is a remark that the knowledge of how 
-j 1 0 to utilise a thing should be classified under the power of disposal condition (Menger, 
_ 1923, p. 17). 
Both Menger and Bohm-Bawerk put forward the condition, in their third 
characteristic, that people must have knowledge of the causal connection between 
a useful thing and a need. They must have the knowledge that such a situation 
exists. The knowledge of how to use a thing on the other hand refers to a form 
of knowing-how. This knowing-how aspect states what it is for someone to have 
the know-how to be able to perform certain tasks. It refers to the possession 
of certain skills. So we get the difference between a theoretical knowing that 
something is the case and a practical knowing how to do things. 
Interpretation of the Goods Characteristics 
At this point I want to make use of the famous elucidation of these two concepts, 
as made by the British language philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1945,1949) [5]. According 
to his views the two concepts ought to be clearly distinguished in view of their 
appropriate logical uses. If rids is not done, then what is called a category-mistake 
is made. A mistake which is comparable to the mistake by somebody who asks 
where the university is after a tour of the grounds of the university in which he 
has been shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields and museums. "He 
was [by asking the question] mistakenly allocating the University to the same 
category as that to which the other institutions belong" (Ryle, 1949, p. 18). 
Why are these two logical spheres, the supposed appropriate logical uses of 
these two concepts, so completely different? For Ryle, knowing-how referred to 
a certain observable regularity in the behaviour of a person. The concept does 
not refer to a certain possession of knowledge-that, neither does it signal the 
occurrence of special (theoretical) internal acts of thought. We do not have to know-
that before we know-how. "The crucial objection to the [what Ryle called] 
intellectualist legend[which means trying to reassimilate knowing-hpw to knowing-
that] is this. The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution 
of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation 
to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed 
and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to 
break into the circle" (Ryle, 1949, p. 31). Knowing-how has the character of a 
disposition and not the character of a certain occurrence. Compare the disposition 
of "speaking loudly" which is in itself not "loud". 
This distinction that Ryle made in the use of the different kinds of categorical 
concepts is of foremost interest in expanding on Bohm-Bawerk's concern that 
it would stretch language too much if one included knowing-how as part of the 
condition which states command of the thing. Bohm-Bawerk's fifth characteristic 
of knowing-how, in the light of Ryle's classification[6], cannot, as an extrapolation 
of the difference between knowing-how and knowing-that, logically be put under 
Part H. The consumer: entrepreneurial and calculative 59 
the condition which states factual command over the thing. In language we make Goods 
a distinction between a (physical) state of things and a mental disposition. The Characteristics 
condition of command as used by Menger clearly refers to a certain entity at our 
disposal. 
Nevertheless, in the second edition of his Principles, Menger said that knowing-
how can be classified under the command of a thing. So we can ask the question jj3 
as to how to interpret the command condition to make this happen. To answer _ 
this it is necessary to look at how Menger used the command condition. For 
Menger the command of a thing appeared in the description that he gave of the 
production process of goods, the process of converting higher into lower order 
goods. Menger's first law on goods character concerned the causal connection 
between goods: "The goods-character of goods of higher order is dependent on 
command of corresponding complementary goods" (Menger, 1950, p. 58). If the 
command condition was to "include" a form of knowing-how, then, for Menger, 
it had to be that aspect of knowing-how which stated a capacity or skill, of the 
producer. The producer could bring off certain things, he could actually produce 
the goods. He had control over the necessary complementary goods. 
To illustrate the explicit condition of knowing-how in the context of a production 
process would be completely out of the question for Bôhm-Bawerk. According 
to him, in a second and, for our problem, very ifluminating footnote, the possibility 
of multiple uses of higher order goods and especially the existence of barter in 
our society, both change the order of a good, the place a good occupies in the 
causal nexus of goods, for a concrete individual who has control over the good. 
Like the conditions of need and knowing-how the essential prerequisites for a 
thing to become a good, show themselves precisely in these situations, in a very 
watered-down version (Bôhm-Bawerk, 1962, p. 101, note 2)\7\ 
Producer and Consumer, the "Austrian" Paradox 
The second characteristic of the modern Austrians mentioned above concerns 
their vision of the workings of the market. To explain this let me compare the 
standard Neoclassical, Walrasian market model with the, barely standard, neo-
Austrian model. The main difference between these models, according to the 
Austrians themselves, is that in the neo-Austrian market model, market processes 
and not market equilibria occupy a central position. In these market processes, 
dispersed knowledge and lack of knowledge are of fundamental importance. In 
the Austrian market model, action does not follow primarily from an optimal choice 
in a given ends-means relation, as is mostly the case in the Neoclassical market 
model. At the centre of the Austrian market model stands the process of conceiving 
the ends-means relationship. This gives us the fundamental idea of alertness in 
Austrian economic flunking. Alertness is the propensity of knowing where to look 
for information (Kirzner, 1973, p. 68), "the propensity... toward fresh goals and 
the discovery of hitherto unknown resources" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 34). Stated in 
neo-Austrian terminology, the change in market models contains a change "from 
a 'mechanical' Robbinsian[8] [Neoclassical] économiser to Mises' [neo-Austrian] 
homo agens" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 72). "\Homo agens] is not merely engaged in 
computing the patterns of means allocation that will most faithfully reflect the 
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Journal of hierarchy of given ends [like Robbins's calculating agents]. Homo agens is actively 
Economic seeking out the best course of action, he is venturing, innovating, exploring, 
Studies searching" (Kirzner, 1967, p. 792). 
16,2 We are now able to describe the earlier mentioned, unexploited subject in neo-
Austrian thinking, somewhat forcefully as follows. Although human action is a 
114 property of every human being and alertness is theoretically a function of every 
=— — — action, not everyone has the same alertness. In practice, the neo-Austrians assign 
alertness to the producer, calling it the entrepreneurial element. Kirzner speaks 
of "the near-inevitability of an entrepreneurial role's being filled by the producer" 
(Kirzner, 1973, p. 72) [9]. The consumer is a Robbinsian maximiser. This is rather 
startling in the light of the interpretation by Mises of the core of Austrian thinking. 
Mises claimed that Classical economists were at fault because they "were able 
to explain only the action of businessmen and were helpless in the face of everything 
that went beyond it" (Mises, [1928] 1981, p. 175). Classical economists completely 
neglected rationality on the part of the consumer. This role was taken over by 
the producer. It was precisely this starting point of Classical economics, from the 
actions of the businessmen, that the Austrian theory was able to overcome. Yet, 
is this not the same failure, only in a modern, disguised form? 
How can this situation be explained? First of all it is possible that I have 
overstressed the situation. Kirzner (1973, p. 72) says that it is only "an analytical 
convenience" or "an analytical device" to give the producer the fundamental 
market role. If these reasons are valid, then we have yet another unexploited subject 
in Austrian thought, the entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. Still it is a 
rather odd result in relation to the historical starting point of Austrian thought. 
But, second, Kirzner also speaks about the fact "that the analytical treatment 
of consumers... as Robbinsian is not wholly unrealistic" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 184) 
or, "the lack of alertness of the other market participants". Also are not his policy 
conclusions, e.g. in the case of advertising (Kirzner, 1973, p. 148), based on this, 
in Mises' words, "methodological makeshift" (Kirzner, 1973, p. 39, note 6). It 
appears then that we have found a paradox in Austrian thought. The Austrians, 
on the one hand, have never disputed that the central leading role in the market 
is played by the consumers (Mises, [19281 1981, pp. 175-6)[10], but, on the other 
hand, they have assigned a unique dynamic market role to the producer. But is 
not competition fundamentally a two-sided process, not only between producer 
and producer but also between producer and consumer and among consumers? 
In the rest of this contribution I deal with the solution of this paradox. The 
discussion incidentally also gives a possible answer to that unexploited subject 
of Austrian thought, the entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. 
Ryle and the "Austrian" Paradox 
To solve this paradox I first interpret the concept of alertness by means of what 
I have already said in the third section about the goods characteristics. In that 
section I elucidated the differences between knowing-how and knowing-that. The 
fundamental concept of alertness has been described by Kirzner as "knowing 
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where to look for knowledge rather than knowledge of substantive market Goods 
information'' (Kirzner, 1973, p. 68). Alertness,' 'the elusive analytical category'', Characteristics 
then clearly becomes a form of knowing-how, a mental .quality. Alertness, the 
"propensity to know where to look for information", is a disposition which 
expresses itself in practice as the capacity or skill of the producer to bring about 
certain things. Alertness and the capacity aspect.of the command condition are ]_j5 
two sides of the same coin. They both bring about.or create the ends-means _ _ _ _ _ _ 
relationship as far as it depends on the category of knowing-how. 
After interpreting the alertness concept with what should by how be the familiar 
classification of knowing-how and knowing-thatfll], I am in a position to give two 
possible "solutions" for the paradox. In this section I discuss what we might call 
Ryle's solution. In the next section I present what might be called Bohm-Bawerk's 
solution. In Ryle's solution the paradox can be seen as a true paradox, in Bohm-
Bawerk's solution, on the other hand, the paradox is seen as a false paradox. 
What does Ryle's solution look like and what are its implications? If we confront 
the two approaches, the Misesian producer and the Robbinsian consumer, with 
each other we find two clearly distinguishable, irreducible approaches; on the one 
hand a dynamic market concept, seen as the tendency to perform a certain activity 
(a knowing-how) and on the other hand a static market concept, seen as the 
possession of a certain knowledge (a knowing-that). The market may be seen 
as a capacity to perform certain tasks, to sort something out, or as a theory, 
a stock of cognitive knowledge. Both descriptions of the market have parallels 
and differences. It is possible to speak of learning a certain activity, as well as 
learning a certain stock of knowledge, although learning-how differs from learning-
that. "We can be instructed in truths, we can only be disciplined in methods" 
(Ryle, 1945, p. 14). We can ask for the reasons why someone accepts a proposition, 
but we cannot ask this if someone's skill is at stake. So a distinction is made between 
the market conceived as a disposition and conceived as a set of knowing-that. 
Knowing-how is made clear through actions, not through internal or external dicta 
(which is knowing-that). 
This interpretation of the categories, while stating the paradox, reveals that 
the question the paradox tries to solve is a meaningless one. It is an example 
of a category mistake. So to conjoin or disjoin them has no sense. Compare the 
conjunction, "She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair" with the 
distinction, "She came home either in a flood of tears or else in a sedan-chair" 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 23). From this point of view the whole discussion in the literature 
between the distinction of a static or a dynamic market model (i.e. the static 
consumer's role and the dynamic producer's role) may be seen as a discussion 
on the question whether the preference should be given to fruit or to an apple. 
From the traditional point of view, from which the paradox originated in the first 
place, this discussion was seen as involving the difference between apples and 
oranges. 
Consequently the first possible solution (Ryle's) to the paradox is that the 
transition of the Austrians from a static (Robbinsian) to a dynamic (Misesian) model 
of the market was, at the same time, a change in the kind of categories used. 
This change in the type of categories used is such that, by elucidation of that 
62 Part II. The consumer: entrepreneurial and calculative 
Journal of change, it loses its paradoxical character. This conclusion is opposed to the 
Economic statement that this transition is, as it has traditionally always been, open to 
Studies discussion. 
16,2 
Bohm-Bawerk and the "Austrian" Paradox 
-Qg What is meant by Bohm-Bawerk's solution to this paradox in modern Austrian 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = = _ thought? First, I recapitulate my position and second, I look at Bohm-Bawerk's 
second reason for introducing his "fifth" goods characteristic, which says that 
the knowing-how condition was too subjective to be headed under the command 
condition. 
We have seen that Bohm-Bawerk's explicit concept of knowing-how as shaped 
in Menger's implicit concept of knowing-how has found its counterpart in the 
modern Austrian theory about market processes. In Austrian thought it relies 
on the propensity of alertness. This property is de facto given to the producer. 
Thereby we get the paradoxical situation that modern Austrianism has to deny 
in practice what it sustains in theory. The core ro'e in the market is for the producer 
and not for the consumer. This is a rather strange conclusion. For it puts things 
back in the same position as described by Mises 60 years ago. Even more 
astounding, it was precisely this position which the Austrians tried to discount 
with their subjectivism. 
I now want to turn to the question of what Bohm-Bawerk's solution looks like. 
What is so subjective about knowing-how (Bohm-Bawerk's second reason) that 
it can neither be taken under the command condition nor coincide with the above-
mentioned "implicit" (producer's) capacity aspect of the command condition? 
To answer this question I look at someone who stimulates the disposition of 
knowing-how (alertness). How can such acts be qualified? "We use abusive names 
like 'charlatan' and 'quack' for the frauds who pretend to be able to bring things 
off, while we use the abusive word 'hypocrite' for the frauds who affect motives 
and habits" (Ryle, 1949, p. 128). 
From the given qualifications concerning dissatisfaction with the displayed 
behaviour, it is possible to take a more differentiated approach to the concept 
of knowing-how (alertness). I differentiate between a tendency to act or react 
in a certain manner, and a capacity to be equipped to get something fight. Compare 
the difference between proneness and competence. " 'Tends to' implies 'can', 
but is not implied by it" (Ryle, 1949, p. 126). A tendency concerns a proneness, 
in which the source is of interest, in contrast to a capacity, a skill, in which the 
method is of interest. This difference coincides with the different roles that can 
be ascribed to the consumer and the producer in the market process. The 
consumer is asked why he believes something, whereas the producer is asked 
how he knows something and what his method has been. The fraudulent behaviour 
of the "hypocrite", for instance, is often a problem in market research; the 
consumer wants to give a socially accepted answer. To ask the consumer the wrong 
question (alertness being understood as a capacity aspect, which the Austrians 
are inclined to do) and the possible silence following that question, does not signal 
a lack of alertness but signifies the aforesaid different understanding of this concept 
by producer and consumer. Bohm-Bawerk's concept of knowing-how is thus 
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interpreted as being broader than the implicit capacity aspect of the producer as Goods 
incorporated in the command condition by Menger. Bohm-Bawerk's explicit concept Characteristics 
includes the subjective aspect of a tendency, the liability to a certain tendency 
which is pre-eminently applicable to the role of the consumer in the market 
process[12]. Consequently, the paradox is a false paradox. Both producer and 
consumer are alert. jjy 
I have implicitly given at least one answer to the unexploited subject of the _ _ 
entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. I have stated the logical domain of 
the categories to be used, with what other propositions they are consistent and 
inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what propositions they 
follow[13]. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This contribution can be summarised as follows. After an introductory section 
I signalled in my second and third section a difference between Menger and Bohm-
Bawerk in their answer to the question of what turns a thing into a good. On top 
of the four conditions stated by Menger, Bohm-Bawerk added a' 'fifth" prerequisite 
for a thing to become a good — the condition that individuals must know how 
to utilise a thing. In a footnote Bohm-Bawerk gave two reasons for his difference 
with Menger on why it was impossible for him to include his own fifth characteristic 
under Menger's condition of the power of disposal over the thing. I elucidated 
the first reason, that it would stretch the language too much, by alstmguishing 
between the conditions of knowing how to utilise a thing and knowing that a thing 
has certain useful properties. In this I referred to the interpretation of this distinction 
given by Ryle. The two concepts each belong to a different category of concepts, 
with different logical uses. My interpretation also showed, as did Menger's in the 
second edition of his Principles, that the concept of knowing-how can "implicitly" 
be covered by the command condition as the capacity aspect of production. I 
obtained this result, interpreting the knowing-how condition analogous to the use 
which Menger makes of the command condition. 
In sections four and five I analysed the fundamental idea of the modem Austrians 
for market processes, the alertness concept. This alertness concept is, as 
interpreted by the modern Austrians, in fact a form of knowing-how. It has the 
content of a capacity aspect for the producer. But what about the fundamental 
market role in Austrian thought of the consumers? I found that this situation can 
be interpreted in three ways. First, it signals an as yet unexploited subject of 
Austrian thought, the entrepreneurial behaviour of the consumer. The ' 'method-
ological makeshift" of a Misesian producer and a Robbinsian consumer by the 
modern Austrians is spun out too long by the modern Austrians. This is certainly 
the most harmless explanation for Austrianism, but begs the question of how the 
consumer can behave entrepreneurially without being a producer. The second 
and third interpretations came to the fore when this still uncharted subject of 
Austrian thought was interpreted as leading up to a certain lack of balance in the 
presentation of their ideas on the roles of producers and consumers in market 
processes. This unbalanced view can even be interpreted as a paradox; the 
consumer is sovereign in theory but not in practice. For both visions (an unexploited 
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Journal of subject versus a paradox) I found evidence in the work of Kirzner. The paradox 
Economic can be solved in two ways and that gave me my second and third interpretation. 
Studies The second interpretation was that the situation loses its paradoxical character 
16,2 if the role of producer and consumer is seen as a form of knowing-how respectively 
knowing-that. I called this Ryle's solution. But if true, this would contradict the 
Austrian statement that their market model is closer to reality than the standard 
Neoclassical market model. 
I suggested that the other way the paradox could be solved was by restating 
it as a false problem. The description given of the roles of consumer and producer 
did not fit. This was the road I followed in the sixth section. The consumer is 
also alert, but in a different way from the producer. To illustrate this point I turned 
to Bôhm-Bawerk's second reason, that the knowing-how aspect is too subjective 
to be covered by the command condition. Together with another footnote by Bôhm-
Bawerk, in which he stressed that knowing-how should not be elucidated in a 
production context, I asked the question of what is subjective to knowing-how 
and fits the consumer. To answer this question I turned again to Ryle, and 
differentiated between a tendency and a capacity aspect of knowing-how. This 
tendency aspect fitted the role of the consumer perfectly. 
The conclusion of this essay is that whatever may be said of Bôhm-Bawerk's 
objectivism, in his fifth goods characteristic he was much more subjective than 
his contemporaries and epigones. Bôhm-Bawerk's goods characteristic solves a 
certain imbalance which can even be interpreted as a paradox in the modern 
Austrian conception of alertness (the entrepreneurial role in market processes). 
The concept of alertness can be used to characterise the role of the producer 
as well as in its subjective aspect par excellence:the aspect of a tendency, the 
role of the consumer in market processes. So Bôhm-Bawerk's fifth goods 
characteristic can be called a ' 'less-known theme of the Austrians' ' in the sense 
of being of interest to modem Austrian economics. 
Notes 
1. I use the terms modem Austrian, neo-Austrian and "Austrian" as synonyms in this essay. 
They all refer to economic research conducted by a specific group of economists, like Israel 
M. Kirzner (1930), Ludwig M. Lachmann (1976), and Murray N. Rothbard (1926). 
2. I use Alter (1982, pp. 152-3) to give a plausible explanation why just these four characteristics 
are the "end" of economic thought on goods characteristics for the Austrians in general 
and for Menger in particular. Alter refers to the Aristotelian character of the foundations 
of Menger's economic theory, a statement which can be extended to Austrianism in general 
(Smith, 1986, p. 9). The four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to make a thing into 
a good are, according to Alter, "nothing else but an instance of Aristotle's four causes operating 
in the realm of immaterial objects' '. 
3. The central question of Bôhm-Bawerk in his Rechte also lies in this field. Do property rights 
and commercial relations have a goods status? 
4. For expository reasons I call Bôhm-Bawerk's fourth condition his fifth. This is in comparison 
with the other four, identical conditions, stated by both Menger and Bôhm-Bawerk. 
5. From a methodological point of view this essay can be introduced in the words of Friedrich 
von Wieser as follows: "It is one of the most urgent, tedious and ungrateful tasks of economics 
to derive from colloquial speech fundamental ideas on thé economy in general and the goods 
concept in particular. We have to sharpen our scientific concepts relentlessly and without 
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losing touch with the deepest intuitions about the meaning of the language. This must be Goods 
done at a moment when science itself is still in its initial stages and cannot yet formulate Characteristics 
the essential characteristics. These characteristics can only be known after science has done 
its job. It is almost impossible to avoid being scholastic or dialectical" (Wieser, 1900, p. 926). 
Which is hoped to be something else than "The ridiculous 'method' of trying to analyse 
a phenomenon by hunting for the meaning of a word" (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 536). 
6. The question can be asked as to how the five characteristics of Bohm-Bawerk fit into Alter's 1 1 9 
explanation of Menger's four characteristics (see note 2). The question disappears as soon 
as it is realised that knowing-how is a dispositional concept and not the description of another 
cause. "The sense in which we 'explain'... is not that we infer to occult causes, but that 
we subsume under hypothetical... propositions" (Ryle. 1949, p. 49, cf. p. 113). 
7. "The strange phenomenon of 'utilization by way of exchange' simply reveals here a feature 
which is apparent in many other aspects of the nature of goods, the vexatious power of causing 
supposedly well-defined characteristics to fade and become obliterated — a power which has 
so often caused economists in general to surrender to what Robinson calls 'the role of the 
inevitable supernumerary' " (Bohm-Bawerk, 1962, p. 101. note 2). 
8. The person meant is Lord Lionel Robbins. 
9. This entrepreneurial element has been most fully developed inside the modem Austrian 
tradition by one of its present leading exponents. Israel M. Kirzner. The concept was handed 
over to Kirzner by Mises. "In the Austrian view of the market (according to Kirzner:, its 
most important feature is (and was) the dynamic entrepreneurial-competitive discovery-
process" (Kirzner, 1988, pp. 5-6). According to Kirzner (1973, p. 84) it is, apart from Mises, 
especially Hayek who should be honoured for developing this view of the market process 
(Kirzner. 1967, p. 788: 1988, p. 8). 
10. Not withstanding this fact, the description given of the average consumer in the works of 
Mises can hardly be called flattering. Mises speaks of' 'The hosts of inferior people'', ' The 
inferiority of the multitude" and "These dull beneficiaries" (Mises, 1962, pp. 112-13). These 
words must certainly have weakened Kirzner's resistance to give to the producer the 
fundamental market role. On the other hand it must be said that it is especially the definition 
by Kirzner of the concept of alertness as distinct from Schumpeter's, which is so well adapted 
to the part played by the consumer in the market process; "the entrepreneur is to be seen 
as responding to opportunities rather than [which is the case bv Schumpeterl creating them" 
(Kirzner. 1973. p. 74). 
11. In Austrian thinking the differences between knowing-how and knowing-that is widely known 
and considered of fundamental importance. It functions mainly as an argument of the Austrians 
against the efficiency of a central planning system. Knowing-how cannot be communicated 
to and therefore used by a central authority. 
12. See Bohm-Bawerk's reluctance (as cited at the end of the third section and in note seven) 
to illustrate knowing-how in a "production" context. 
13. The pejorative terms with which Mises describes the consumers (see note 10) do not contradict 
this conclusion, but rather reinforce my interpretation. For it is exactly a quality of tendency 
verbs, stating that a person tends to act or react in certain ways and which do not imply 
that anything is brought off, that they can be qualified by such adjectives as "fanatical", 
"stupid" and "childlike". On the other hand none of these qualifications are applicable to 
capacity verbs, which express that a person is equipped to bring things off. or to get things 
right (Ryle, 1949, pp. 128-9). Probably the best attitude for an economist to take towards 
these pejorative terms has already been given by Mises. "There is little sense in distinguishing 
between economic and other motives [error, ignorance, incapacity, laziness, neglectfulnessj... 
if one starts with the action of the marginal consumer and not with that of the businessman... 
One can see how ridiculous such scholastic distinctions are. The maxims of the businessman 
cannot be applied to the action of the consumers, which, in the last analvsis, governs all 
business" (Mises, [1928| 1981, p. 176). 
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Chapter 5. De dynamiek in het marktproces: de ondernemende producent 
versus de ondernemende consument 
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and in an abbreviated form published in the International Journal of New Ideas, II (1), 
1993, pp. 46-58. 
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De dynamiek in net marktproces: de ondernemende 
producent versus de ondernemende consument 
door A.R. Leen* 
In zijn boek Competition and Entrepreneurship geeft Israel M. Kirzner een tweetal 
redenen waarom de 'entrepreneurial role' in net marktproces toegewezen kan worden 
aan de producent. De motivering is kennelijk overtuigend. Sinds het verschijnen van 
dit boek in 1973, waarmee de 'revival' van het neo-Oostenrijkse denken in de écono-
mie begon, wordt binnen het neo-Oostenrijkse denken veelal slechts lippendienst be-
wezen aan Ludwig von Mises' stelling dat een ieders handelen 'ondememend' is. 
In dit essay wil ik nagaan of Kirzners opvatting vanuit een procesperspectief op de 
markt wel zo vanzelfsprekend is als zij wellicht op het eerste gezicht lijkt. Hiertoe zal 
ik gebruik maken van het werk van de 'oude' Oostenrijker Leo Schonfeld-Illy. 
De opbouw van het betoog is als volgt. Allereerst passeren de twee door Kirzner 
gegeven redenen de revue. Vervolgens wordt Kirzners ingang tot een procesopvatting 
van de markt vergeleken met die van Schonfeld-Illy. Tot slot ga ik uitgebreid in op 
Schonfeld-IIly's redenen waarom de ondernemende rol in het marktproces evenzeer 
toegewezen dient te worden aan de consument. 
1. Kirzners ondernemende producent 
De neo-Oostenrijkers leggen in hun economische theorievorming de nadruk op aanpas-
singsprocessen in plaats van op^de gebruikelijke marktevenwichten. Het startpunt van 
de analyse is niet de configuratie van evenwichtsprijzen en -hoeveelheden, maar het 
aanpassingsproces van prijzen en hoeveelheden zoals dat voortvloeit uit een situatie van 
onevenwichtigheid. Deze aandacht voor aanpassingsprocessen is in de ogen van de neo-
Oostenrijkers een van de elementen uit het 'oude' Oostenrijkse denken die in de tradi-
tionele micro-economie op de achtergrond zijn geraakt. 
De neo-Oostenrijkers analyseren het marktproces als een direct uitvloeisel van in-
dividuele menselijke handelingen waarin wordt gepoogd van een minder naar een meer 
bevredigende situatie te geraken. Ieder menselijk handelen bestaat in hun ogen uit twee 
componenten: 1. het vaststellen van een doel-middelrelatie en 2. het maximalisatie-
proces binnen deze relatie. 
Bezien vanuit de dynamiek in de marktprocessen staat het concipiè'ren van de doel-
middelrelatie centraal. De mens is alert ten opzichte van nieuwe doeleinden en het ont-
dekken van tot nu toe onbekende hulpbronnen. De neo-Oostenrijkers zelf spreken over 
* Drs. A.R. Leen is als universitait docent verbonden aan de juridische faculteit van de Rijksuni-
versiteit Leiden. 
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de overgang van een 'mechanical Robbinsian [naar Lord Robbins, neo-klassieke] eco-
nomizer' naar 'Mises' [neo-Oostenrijkse] homo agens. (Kirzner, 1973, biz. 72). In deze 
laatste actor zijn beide elementen — maximalisatiestreven en alertheid — verenigd. 
Hoewel alertheid, zoals hiervoor gesteld, in principe in ieders handelen aanwezig is, 
wordt dit element in de praktijk van de neo-Oostenrijkse analyse aan de producent 
toegewezen. De neo-Oostenrijkers noemen het element van alertheid dan ook het 
'entrepreneurial' element. Consumenten worden beschouwd als passieve, niet-alerte, 
'Robbinsian maximizers'. Een van de nineties van reclame bijvoorbeeld is 'getting the 
Robbinsians [de potentiele consumenten] to see the availability of . . . opportunities' 
(o.e., biz. 148). Reclame maken is een 'entrepreneurial device', dat erop gericht is de 
beschikbare alternatieven onder de aandacht van de consument te brengen, ongeacht 
diens eigen niveau van alertheid. Dit houdt iets anders in dan de smaak van de consu-
ment veranderen of hem informatie (een vorm van 'nonentrepreneurial' kennis) ver-
schaffen. 
Deze identiflcatie van alertheid met de rol van de producent in het marktproces 
wordt door Kirzner gemotiveerd als zijnde 'purely for simplicity for analyses' (Kirzner, 
1967, biz. 797 en 1973, biz. 18 en 41). Deze identiflcatie is bovendien zo gek nog niet, 
gezien de 'near-inevitability of an entrepreneurial role's being filled by the producer' 
(Kirzner, 1973, biz. 72). 
Of de keuze inderdaad de analyse van marktprocessen simpeler maakt blijve voorlo-
pig nog even buiten beschouwing. Waarom is het echter 'zo gek nog niet' het onder-
nemend element uit het handelen bij de producent te situeren? Voor het antwoord op 
deze vraag bekijkt Kirzner de rollen van de diverse marktdeelnemers. Hij onderscheidt 
consumenten, eigenaars van produktiefactoren en producenten. Producenten, die hun 
activiteiten ontplooien door grondstoffen om te zetten in eindprodukten zijn gespitst 
op prijsverschillen tussen de totaal betaalde prijs per eenheid produkt op de grondstof-
fenmarkten en de te verkrijgen prijs op de produktmarkten. En deze alertheid, waar-
voor in principe geen eigen middelen vereist zijn, is juist een vorm van ondernemend 
handelen. Er valt in de maatschappij als het ware 'a built-in group of entrepreneurs' 
(o.e., biz. 18) te onderkennen. 
Anders geformuleerd: Het essentiele verschil tussen consumenten en eigenaars van 
produktiefactoren enerzijds en producenten anderzijds is daarin gelegen dat de produ-
centen niet noodzakelijkerwijze over eigen middelen behoeven te beschikken. Louter 
en alleen op grond van een zekere alertheid ten opzichte van prijsverschillen valt er 
voor de 'pure' ondernemer winst te behalen. Kortom, het is denkbaar dat alle consu-
menten en bezitters van produktiemiddelen 'pure Robbinsian allocators' zijn, maar 
voor alle producenten is dit ondenkbaar. Immers, voor 'pure' ondernemers is alertheid 
een 'conditio sine qua non'. 
2. Kirzners en Schönfeld-Illy's ingang tot marktprocessen 
Voor Kirzner, die voortbouwt op het werk van Mises en Friedrich Hayek, is de groot-
ste fout van de evenwichtsanalyse dat zij als vanzelfsprekend aanneemt dat een even-
wicht daadwerkelijk tot stand komt. Het werkelijke probleem is namelijk om het even-
tuele totstandkomen van deze evenwichtssituatie als een uitvloeisel van een logisch ge-
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sloten (systematisch) procès te beschrijven. Voor de beschrijving van dit procès voldoet 
het optimalisatiekader van Robbins niet. Daarmee vallen immers geen endogene ver-
ändernden in de docl-middelrelaties te beschrijven. In het neo-klassieke allocatiemodel 
bestaat een discontinui'teit tussen elkaar opvolgende beslissingen. Slechts een exogene 
verandering in omstandigheden of in smaak, of het aan het licht komen van nieuwe in-
formatie kan een nieuwe beslissing genereren, die echter onverklaarbaar is in termen 
van het oorspronkelijke doel-middelkader. Zonder exogene veranderingen is er geen 
verklaring waarom de plannen van gisteren vervangen worden door die van vandaag. 
Endogene veranderingen in de doel-middelrelatie zijn mogelijk met behulp van het 
element van alertheid (Kirzner, 1967, biz. 793-794 en 1973, biz. 70-72). Het ontbre-
ken van een marktevenwicht duidt op het bestaan van een gebrek aan kennis over de 
markt. Deze 'onkunde' doet echter winstgevende mogelijkheden ontstaan, waarop 
alerte ondernemers inspringen (Kirzner, 1975, blz. 30). Het element van alertheid geeft 
dus niet alleen een meer realistisch beeld van doelgericht menselijk handelen maar 
maakt tegelijk het beschrijven van de marktwerking als een gesloten procès mogelijk. 
Op dit punt aangekomen is het van belang terug te grijpen op het werk van de 'oude' 
Oostenrijker Leo Schönfeld-Illy (1888-1952). 1 Schönfeld-Illy wordt binnen het neo-
Oostenrijkse denken nauwelijks genoemd. Dit mag toch wel enige verwondering wek-
ken daar hij in een tweetal boeken (1924, 1948) min of meer die problematiek als de 
kern van de economische théorie beschrijft die ook Hayek in zijn geschritten uit de 
jaren dertig en veertig beschrijft en die de neo-Oostenrijkers als baanbrekend voor 
hun inzicht in de werking van het marktproces beschouwen. Voor Hayek is de kern 'a 
problem of the utilization of knowledge wliich is not given to anyone in its totality' 
(Hayek, 1945, blz. 78) en Schönfeld-Illy zegt: 'Es handelt sich um die laufende Deter-
minierung eines vielgliedrigen und weitläufigen Systems, dessen Daten grundsätzlich 
nur als subjektive Erwartungen gegeben . . . und grundsätzlich nicht in die Hand eines 
einzigen Rechners . . . zu bringen sind' (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, blz. 208 en 1924, blz. 
29 ) . 2 
Schönfeld-Illy introduceert-zijn ingang tot een procesopvatting in de économie als 
volgt. Hoe komt, vraagt hij zieh af, binnen een bestaande doel-middelrelatie het in de 
théorie gepostuleerde optimale resultaat tot stand? Voor de consument betekent dit 
concreet de vraag: Hoe vindt in de praktijk het procès plaats om uit de data, waaronder 
de eerste wet van van Gossen, het resultaat, dat is geformuleerd als de tweede wet van 
Gossen, af te leiden (Schönfeld-Illy, 1924, blz. 204-205 en 1948, blz. 3-4). Voor de 
beschrijving van dit procès introdueeert Schönfeld-Illy een nadere speeificatie van het 
1. De naam van deze auteur was oorspronkelijk Leo Schönfeld, maar toen de Nazis Oostenrijk be-
zetten was hij gedwongen zijn naam te veranderen in Uly (Kauder, 1965, blz. 73). 
2. Niettegenstaande een lovende boekrecensie van Hayek (1925) noemt in de tegenwoordige tijd 
alleen Ludwig M. Lachmann in waarderende zin het werk van Schönfeld-Illy (Laclimann, 1966, 
blz. 162 en 1986, blz. 240). 
Een inhoudelijke en vervolgens een meer persoonlijke reden waarom Schönfeld-Illy binnen het 
neo-Oostenrijkse denken niet wordt genoemd: 1. Schönfeld-Illy start zijn analyse met het opti-
malisatieproces binnen een gegeven doel-middelrelatie; dit is echter voor de neo-Oostenrijkers 
van weinig primair belang. 2. Mises, de grondlegger van de neo-Oostenrijkse beweging, moest 
niets hebben van Hans Mayer, de opvolger van Wieser (Mises, 1978, blz. 61-62 en 65), een man 
die door Schönfeld-Illy echter hoog geschat werd (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, blz. 5, 187 en 215). 
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grensnutbegrip, zoals hij dat bij Frierich Wieser aantreft. Essentieel is, dat de kenmer-
ken die Schönfeld-Illy aan zijn grensnutbegrip toeschrijft overeenkomen met die welke 
Kirzner gebruikt voor zijn alertheidbegrip. De kenmerken van het daadwerkelijke opti-
malisatieproces binnen een gegeven kader van middelen en doeleinden blijken gelijk 
aan de kenmerken die nodig zijn om een verandering in een gegeven doel-middelrelatie 
te genereren, waarover meer in de volgende paragrafen. Als Schönfeld-Illy in zijn ana-
lyse het kader van een gegeven doel-middelrelatie verlaat, kan hij zijn grensnutbegrip 
zonder meer gebruiken bij het beschrijven van een allereerst te bepalen doel-middel-
relatie (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, biz. 32-321). 
Schönfeld-Illy beoogt, evenals Kirzner, met zijn analyse niet alleen een realistischer 
beeld van het allocatieproces op individueel niveau weer te geven, maar hij acht zijn 
analyse ook van toepassing op het marktproces in zijn totaliteit. Zijn grensnutbegrip 
levert Schönfeld-Illy de mogelijkheid om het marktproces als een causaal-genetisch 
procès (een eenrichtingsproces van handelen op basis van individueel nut naar prij-
zen) te beschrijven, in afwijking van de neo-klassieke functionele evenwichtstheorieè'n 
(de simultane oplossing van wiskundige functies). 
3. Schönfeld-Illy's grensnutbegrip 
Schönfeld-Illy analyseert de economische calculaties (de 'Wirtschaftsrechnung') van de 
consument. Hoe vindt deze nutscalculatie plaats, gegeven de onmeetbaarheid van het 
nut? Schönfeld-Illy onderscheidt drie principes die voor de oplossing van dit probleem 
'erforderlich und prinzipiell ausreichend sind' (Schönfeld-Illy, 1924, blz. 40-50). Het 
eerste principe luidt dat het in de calculatie niet om het totale nut als zodanig, doch 
slechts om de verandering van het totale nut gaat ('Prinzip des Einzelnutzens'). Het 
tweede principe luidt dat, gegeven de schaarste, een verandering in het totale nut altijd 
vergeleken kan worden met een andere verandering in het totale nut ('Prinzip des Ver-
gleichens von Leistung und Gegenleistung'). Het derde, en voor ons belangrijkste, prin-
cipe is het zogenaamde 'Prinzip der ökonomischen Relevanz'. Dit principe heeft be-
trekking op het probleem 'dass es Nutzengrössen gibt, die weder recht angeschlagen 
noch miteinander verglichen werden können und die . . . im regelmässigen Ablauf des 
Wirtschaftes tatsächlich nicht angeschlagen und nicht miteinander verglichen werden' 
(o.e., blz. 21-22). In het kader van dit derde principe past Schönfeld-Illy's interpreta-
tie van Wiesers grensnutbegrip. Met deze interpretatie lost Schönfeld-Illy, zoals hij zelf 
zegt, een inconsistentie in het denken van Wieser op. 
Wat is namelijk bij Wieser het geval? De omschrijving van het grensnutbegrip heeft 
bij deze auteur betrekking op de fase van het economisch handelen waarin dit hande-
len reeds voltooid is. 'Der Grenznutzen erhält sein Masz von der geringsten unter den 
wichtigsten Verwendungen . . . wenn die höchste Ausnützung des Vorrates und die 
sorgfältigste Sichtung der Bedürfnisse vorausgesetzt wird' (o.e., blz. 75). De omschrij-
ving van de funetie van het grensnut binnen het economisch handelen, heeft bij Wieser 
daarentegen betrekking op het stadium waarin er juist nog economisch gehandeld dient 
te worden. 'Alle Verwendungen, die an Wichtigkeit unter ihm stehen, sind verboten. . . 
alle die über ihm stehen oder ihm gleichkommen, sind erlaubt' (o.e. blz. 75-76). Wat 
geeft echter de garantie, vraagt Schönfeld-Illy zieh af, dat in de laatste, voltooide fase 
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van het economisch liandelen nog al datgene aanwezig is wat tijdens het daadwerkelijk 
economisch handelen is gebruikt, en derhalve in een op deze voltooide fase geente 
begripsomschrijving is opgenomen? 
Volgens Schönfeld-Illy luidt de correcte definitie van het grensnutbegrip, in over-
eenstemming met zijn functie in het economisch handelen: 'Der Grenznutzen einer 
bestimmten Gutsmenge für einen bestimmten Konsumenten ist der an der jeweiligen 
Verfügungsgrenze dieser Gutsmenge stehende und für diese gesamte Gutsmenge be-
züglich der jeweils erwogenen Verfügung ökonomisch relevante Nutzen einer wirt-
schaftlichen kleinsten Teilmenge' (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, blz. 67). De inhoud van deze 
definitie wordt begrijpelijk door Schönfeld-Illy's interpretatie van Wiesers 'Grenz-
gesetz'. 
Wiesers 'Grenzgesetz' geeft het antwoord op de vraag: Wat is de totale waarde van 
een deelbare hoeveelheid goederen voor een consument? In de literatuur vinden wij 
hier tegenover elkaar de opvatting van Wieser en Bugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Wiesers 
'Multiplikationstheorem des Wertes' luidt dat alle eenheden van een voorraad goede-
ren met het grensnut vermenigvuldigd dienen te worden om de totale waarde te be-
palen. Böhm-Bawerk stelt hiertegenover dat men met meer dan een eenheid van een 
goed niet meer dan eenmaal in een en dezelfde behoefte voorziet, maar verschlllende 
behoeften bevredigt. Zijn opvatting luidt dan ook dat de waarde van een voorraad goe-
deren gevonden wordt door de nutswaarde van de verschillende eenheden bij elkaar op 
te teilen ('Integrationstheorem des Wertes') (o.e., blz. 7-9), anders zou de totale waar-
de van een voorraad goederen worden onderschat. 
De formulering van Wieser heeft in de literatuur weinig navolgers gekregen. Schön-
feld-Illy geeft echter een speeifleke interpretatie aan Wiesers 'Multiplikationstheorem', 
waarbij hij zieh overigens op Wieser zelf beroept. De interpretatie van Schönfeld-Illy 
luidt als volgt: Het object van de grenswet is de subjectieve in geld uitgedrukte vraag-
prijs van de consument voor alle eenheden van de voorraad van een bepaald goed (o.e., 
blz. 41). Deze prijs ('die Vorgestalt des Preises') vervult een vertaalfunetie 'tussen' de 
prijs die daadwerkelijk op de ma^kt tot stand komt en het onmeetbare grensnut. 
Deze vertaling van het grensnut in de subjectieve vraagprijs brengt ons weer terug 
naar het 'Prinzip der ökonomischen Relevanz'. Dit principe stelt de economische rele-
vantie van een grens voor het geheel, 'dasz der nämliche Kaufpreis auch für alle übrigen 
gleichen Teilmengen dieser Gutsmenge . . . wirtschaftlich zulässig ist, a fortiore: weil 
der Nutzen dieser übrigen Teilmengen höher ist als der Nutzen dieser Grenzteilmenge 
und somit der für die Grenzteilmenge wirtschaftlich gerechtfertigte Kaufpreis für die 
übrigen Teilmengen erst recht gerechtfertigt sein musz' (o.e., blz. 59-60). '[D]ie kumu-
lative Geltung des Grenznutzens' (o.e., blz. 60) maakt een wezenlijke verkorting van 
het rekenproces mogelijk en maakt problemen, die volgen uit het feit dat van vele za-
ken het nut niet te geven is, oplosbaar. 'So wie zum Beispiel die ihr Brot einkaufende 
Arbeiterfrau . . . bei ihrem Einkauf nicht daran zu denken braucht und nicht daran 
denkt, dass ihre Familie ohne dieses Brot verhungern könnte' (o.e., blz. 60). 
Het voorgaande — het onderscheid tussen de functie van het grensnut en het grens-
nutbegrip in een evenwichtssituatie - roept, wederom, Sterke reminicenties op aan 
Hayeks wijze van probleemstellen, die doorKirzner wordt overgenomen. In zijn arti-
kel 'The Meaning of Competition' (1946) maakt Hayek het onderscheid tussen coneur-
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rentie, opgevat als een procès, èn als een toestand. De grote fout die met het voorop-
stellen van de evenwichtssituatie (en het enten van het concurrentiebegrip op deze 
situatie) wordt gemaakt, is, dat het de toestand als reeds bestaand aanneemt, waarvan 
de verklaring zou moeten aantonen, dat zij het resultaat van het concurrentieproces is. 
Concurrentie is voor Hayek naar haar aard een dynamisch procès, waarvan de voor-
naamste kenmerken als niet bestaand worden beschouwd indien men de veronder-
stellingen maakt, die aan de statische analyse ten grondslag liggen (Hayek, 1946, 
blz. 94). 
Hayek en Schönfeld-Illy zoeken de inspiratie voor hun opvattingen in de dagelijkse 
praktijk van de gewone zakenman (Hayek, 1946, blz. 92) respectievelijk de doorsnee-
consument (Schönfeld-Illy, 1924, blz. 197-198 en 1948, blz. 9 en 200) , met dit ver-
schil dat de zakenman volgens Hayek zieh er heel goed van bewust is wat daadwerke-
lijke concurrentie inhoudt (een procès van-onderlinge wedijver). De doorsneeconsu-
ment baseert daarentegen volgens Schönfeld-Illy zijn economisch handelen in de prak-
tijk op onbewuste vanzelfsprekendheden (Schönfeld-Illy, 1924, blz. 197 en 200; 
1948, blz. 247). Dat de consument maar één prijs biedt voor elke eenheid van een 
voorraad goederen is voor Schönfeld-Illy een voorbeeld van zo'n vanzelfsprekendheid 
die een bewijs behoeft (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, blz. 42). 
4. De dynamische, verwachte vraagprijs 
Wat is echter die subjectieve geldelijke vraagprijs waar iedere consument voor zieh zelf 
mee rekent? Want 'wer wirtschaftet, der rechnet selbst' (Schönfeld-IUy, 1948, blz. 
194). Ieder economisch handelen is op de toekomst gericht (Schönfeld-IUy, 1924, 
blz. 6 en 62). De subjectieve vraagprijs van de consument is daarom een verwachte 
prijs. Hoe kan het ook anders? Voeren de economische handelingen van de consumen-
ten te zamen met andere factoren niet eerst tot het totstandkomen van de daadwerke-
lijke prijs op de markt? (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, blz. 238). Voor de consument geldt 'das 
Prinzip der erwarteten Daten in der Wirtschaftsrechnung', er zijn voor de consument 
geen onveranderlijke, ondubbelzinnig gegeven data (o.e., blz. 202-203 en 207). De con-
sument leert door schade en schände (o.e., blz. 210 en 237), van de opgedane ervarin-
gen en past zijn gedrag (verwachtingen) met behulp daarvau aan (o.e., blz. 222-223 
en 264). 
Schönfeld-Illy kenschetst de verwachte vraagprijs ook als een dynamische vraagprijs. 
Hiermee bedoelt hij dat de consument bij het vaststellen van deze vraagprijs niet los 
van de bestaande marktsituatie opereert. De prijs die een consument voor een goed wil 
betalen en waarmee hij op de markt opereert is immers niet zijn uiterste subjectieve 
prijs die hij voor het desbetreffende goed over heeft. Van deze prijs is hij zieh meestal 
niet eens bewust. Bovendien zou zij hem geen enkele 'winst' laten (o.e., blz. 241). 
Evenals de aanbieder zijn prijs 'auf die gegenwärtig von seinen Konkurrenten geführ-
ten Angebotspreise und auf die daran voraussichtlichen Aenderungen stützt' (o.e., blz. 
229), betrekt de consument zijn prijs 'nach den Verhältnissen der Grenzkäufer des 
Marktes' (o.e., blz. 244). De rijke koper betaalt naar de maatstaf van de arme koper 
('der ökonomische Relevanz der Grenznutzen der Grenzkäufer für die Höhe des Kauf-
preises aller Käufer') (o.e., blz. 245 en 289). 
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De hierboven geschetste opvatting van Schönfeld-Illy over de inhoud van net prijs-
begrip is analoog aan Kirzners 'alertness' en het daaraan gekoppelde prijsbegrip: 'the 
idea of a price that does not reflect and express entrepreneurial judgment and hunch 
is virtually a contradiction in terms' (Kirzner, 1988, biz. 6). Kirzner onderschrijft dan 
ook Mises' Stelling dat er 'nothing automatic or mechanical in the operation of the 
market' is (Von Mises, 1949, biz. 332). 
Aldus zien wij dat volgens Schönfeld-Illy de opvatting van Kirzner als zou de con-
sument een 'pure Robbinsian maximizer' zijn niet juist kan zijn. Het is dus niet 'near-
inevitable' om speciaal de producent de 'entrepreneurial role' toe te wijzen maar 'in-
evitable' om aan een ieder deze rol toe te kennen, ihclusief de consument. 
Voor Schönfeld-Illy heeft de subjectieve, dynamische, in geld uitgedrukte vraag-
prijs niet alleen interne invloeden op het economisch handelen van de consument, maar 
ook externe invloeden op de gehele markt. Zoals wij bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot 
het 'Grenzgesetz' zagen, is de prijs van de grenseenheid niet alleen bepalend voor de 
prijs van de overige eenheden van een voorraad goederen, maar is, naar analogie, de 
marginale koper ook bepalend voor de prijzen die de overige kopersbetalen (Schönfeld-
Illy, 1948, biz. 65-66). Op het niveau van de gehele markt levert de verwachte vraag-
prijs ook een oplossing van wat wel de 'ökonomische Determinationszirkel' wordt 
genoemd. Hiermee wordt bedoeld de wederzijdse, wederkerige afhankelijkheid van de 
variabelen in de zogenaamde functionele evenwichtstheorieen ('Preisveränderungs-
theorie'). De cirkelredenering luidt dat enerzijds de marktprijzen uit de waardeschat-
tingen van de economische subjecten volgen, maar dat anderzijds voor de totstandko-
ming van deze waardeschattingen het bestaan van gegeven prijzen vereist is. Immers, 
in een niet-additieve nutsfunctie is het nut van een bepaald goed onder andere afhan-
kelijk van het bezit van andere goederen, dat op zijn beurt weer afhankelijk is van de 
prijzen van die goederen (o.e., biz. 184). Anders geformuleerd: in de bijzondere theo-
rie over het consumentengedrag zijn de prijzen gegeven, in de algemene prijstheorie 
(waarvan de bijzondere theorie toch een wezenlijk onderdeel is) zijn de prijzen daaren-
tegen de onbekenden van het^systeem (o.e., biz. 187). Voor Schönfeld-Illy berust deze 
Gordiaanse knoop op een verwisseling van de verwachte met de daadwerkelijk betaalde 
prijs (o.e., biz. 214). Wij hebben met een causaal-genetisch proces ('Preisbildungstheo-
rie') van doen, waarin producenten en consumenten op basis van bestaande feitelijke 
prijzen — uitgaan van een geheel prijsloze wereld is niet nodig en volkomen irreeel — 
met verwachte, in onderlinge concurrentie bepaalde (o.e., biz. 215, 229 en 245), prij-
zen werken, 'der sich erst später tatsächlich erfüllende Zweck tritt in Gestalt seiner 
subjektiven Erwartung als Zweckursache Kausal vor das wirtschaftliche Uberlegen und 
Handeln des Subjekts' (o.e., blz. 213). Beide partijen leren van hun ervaringen (bij-
voorbeeld, het goed blijkt voor de consument niet te koop voor de verwachte prijs; de 
producent blijft met een voorraad onverkoopbare goederen zitten) en passen hun ge-
drag aan (o.e., blz. 222). Dit levert een proces in de tijd op dat niet veel anders is dan 
'the modern Austrian view of the market as a competitive-entrepreneurial process of 
discovery' (Kirzner, 1988, blz. 1). 
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5. Samenvatting en conclusies 
Kirzner onderscheidt het maximeren binnen een gegeven doel-middelrelatie van het 
vaststellen van deze relatie. De 'Robbinsian maximizer' kan slechts de eerstgenoemde 
functie vervullen, Mises' 'homo agens'beide functies. De consument fungeert in Kirz-
ners analyse als een 'pure Robbinsian optimizer'. 
Schönfeld-Illy die evenals Kirzner een procesperspectief op de markt hanteert,komt 
naar aanleiding van zijn analyse van het consumentengedrag tot een tegenovergestelde 
opvatting. De consument blijkt - zelfs binnen het 'Robbinsian' kader — dezelfde de-
menten nodig te hebben welke Kirzner buiten dit kader, in het concipiëren van de 
doel-middelrelatie, situeert. De onmeetbaarheid van een nut dat zelfs niet eens verge-
leken kan worden met een ander nut wordt in het economisch handelen zoals dat in de 
praktijk geschiedt, omzeild met behulp van het principe van de economische relevan-
tie. Dit principe, waarvan Wiesers wet van het grensnut een voorbeeld is, leidt bij 
Schönfeld-Illy tot een opvatting over de roi van prijzen in het handelen die gelijk is aan 
die van Kirzner. 
Tevens is Schönfeld-Illy van mening dat de door hem geschetste dynamische roi van 
de consument onmisbaar is voor een marktproces in de.zin van een causaal-genetisch 
procès. 3 
Wij kunnen concluderen dat Kirzners beide motieven om de dynamische roi in het 
aanpassingsproces alleen aan de producent toe te kennen principieel onjuist zijn. Het 
argument van de 'analytical convenience' (Kirzner, 1973, biz. 18) gooit het kind met 
het badwater weg. Deze versimpeling doet ons in ieder geval ten dele in de wereld van 
de functionele evenwichtstheorieè'n belanden. Het argument van de 'near-inevitability 
of an entrepreneurial role's being filled by the producer', is op zichzelf wel juist, maar 
geldt evenzeer voor de andere marktpartijen.4 
Hiermee is het concurrentiebegrip zoals ook de neo-Oostenrijkers dat opvatten ver-
der verduidelijkt. Concurrentie is niet alleen een procès van onderlinge wedijver tussen 
producenten om de gulden van de consument maar vooral een tweezijdig procès tussen 
producent èn consument (Kirzner, 1963, biz. 110). Concurrentie is een procès dat zieh 
enerzijds afspeelt tussen de producenten en consumenten en anderzijds binnen de bei-
de groepen afzonderlijk. 
3. '. . . die Nachfrage mit dem sie hervorrufenden erwarteten Nutzen und Grenznutzen der Güter 
ist das erste und letzte Glied, das Alpha und Omega, in der Reihe der Preisverursachungen, sie 
ist die treibende und die entscheidende Kraft, die Dynamis des Ganzen'(Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, 
blz. 231). 
4. Hebben de neo-Oostenrijkers weinig moeiteom de voorkeur voor aanpassingsprocessen in plaats 
van marktevenwichten bij de 'oude' Oostenrijkers terug te vinden, voor wat betreft de in markt-
processen centraal gestelde rol van de producent Ugt dit moeilijker. Kirzner komt in zijn onder-
zoek naar de rol van de producent bij Menger tot een negatief resultaat en noemt dit paradoxaal 
(Kirzner, 1979, blz. 71). 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5: DE DYNAMTEK IN HET 
MARKTPROCES: DE ONDERNEMENDE PRODUCENT VERSUS DE 
ONDERNEMENDE CONSUMENT 
THE DYNAMICS INSIDE THE MARKET PROCESS: THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
PRODUCER VERSUS THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CONSUMER 
In his book Competition and Entrepreneur ship, Israel M. Kirzner argues that the 
entrepreneurial role in the market process can be assigned to the producer. The motivation 
apparently is decisive. Since the publication of the book in 1973, which played a great role 
in the revival of neo-Austrian thought in economies, neo-Austrians have only payed lip-
service to Ludwig von Mises's thesis that all action is entrepreneurial. But is the oblivion 
of the entrepreneurial consumer as obvious from a process point of view as it looks like on 
first sight? To investigate this I used the work of the older Austrian, Leo Schonfeld-Illy. 
Schonfeld-Illy is hardly mentioned in the neo-Austrian tradition. This may come as a 
surprise. In two books (1924, 1948) he more or less describes the same issues as being the 
core of economic theory as Hayek did in his writings of the thirties and forties. Yet neo-
Austrians frequently refer to Hayek as the one who pioneered their views on the operation 
of the market. However, in the old days, apart from a favorable book review by Hayek 
(1925), to my knowledge only Ludwig Lachmann has ever spoken with any appreciation of 
Schonfeld-Illy (Lachmann, 1966, p. 162 and 1986, p. 240). There are at least three reasons 
why Schonfeld-Illy is hardly mentioned today by neo-Austrians. (1) Schonfeld-Illy started 
his analysis with the maximalization process within a given ends-means framework. A 
given framework, however, is just about the opposite of the process with which neo-
Austrians start their analysis. (2) Mises, the founder of the neo-Austrian movement, had no 
use for Hans Mayer (Mises, 1978, pp. 61-62 and 65), a man highly esteemed by 
Schonfeld-Illy (Schonfeld-Illy, 1948, p. 5; p. 187 en 215). This high regard was reciprocal 
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(Mayer, 1954, p. 3). (3) Few of Schonfeld-Illy's work have been translated into English, 
the language of the neo-Austrians. 
For Hayek the core of economics is "a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is 
not given to anyone in its totality" (Hayek, 1945, p. 78). For Schonfeld-Illy "the problem is 
the continual determination of a multipartite and circumstantial system, of which the data 
fundamentally are given only as subjective expectations... and fundamentally cannot be 
brought into the hands of one calculator"(Sch6nfeld-IUy, 1948, p. 208 and 1924, p. 29). 
SchoTifeld-IUy develops the central idea of his process analysis by using Friedrich Wieser's 
marginal utility idea, and resembles Hayek's discussion of competition. For Schonfeld-Illy, 
Wieser's definition of marginal utility relates to a situation in which action is already 
completed. Wieser's description of the function inside economic action of marginal utility, 
however, relates to the situation from which economic action has to start. Now SchSnfeld-
Illy asks: "What is the guarantee the last stage of economic action contains all those things 
we use during the actual economic action and consequently are contained in a conceptual 
definition grafted upon this completed stage?" (Schonfeld-Illy, 1924, p. 77). 
Posing the problem as the distinction between the function of marginal utility out of 
equilibrium and the definition of marginal utility in equilibrium, agrees with the problem 
formulated by Hayek in the forties as one of the central elements of neo-Austrian thought. 
In his article "The Meaning of Competition" (1946) he differentiates between competition 
as a process and competition as a situation. The greatest error in postalating an equilibrium 
situation and defining competition as a situation is that one "assumes the situation to exist a 
true explanation ought to account for as the effect of the competitive process." For Hayek 
"competition is by its nature a dynamic process whose essential characteristics are assumed 
away by the assumptions underlying static analysis" (Hayek, 1946, p. 94). 
Kirzner and Schonfeld-Illy place their view on processes in relation to Jevons' Law of 
Indifference. This law states that "in the same open market, at any moment, there cannot 
be two prices for the same kind of article" (Kirzner, 1979, p. 157). Kirzner sees his process 
analysis as a solution to the problem of "how during the course of the process, many prices 
converge, as entailed by Jevons' Law of Indifference, toward a single price" (Kirzner, 
1979, p. 20). For SchSnfeld-IUy, Jevons' Law refers to the indifference des Marktpreises 
and marginal utility refers to the indifference des Nachfragepreises. Just as for Kirzner, the 
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single market price needs to be explained, so for Schonfeld-Illy the one price the consumer 
calculates for each unit of a stock of goods needs an explanation. Both men question a 
self-evidence in the theory as they find it. In the end, however, for Schonfeld-Illy too, 
marginal utility is an intermediary and part of the explanation of the process which results 
in Jevons' Law of Indifference. (Schonfeld-Illy, 1948, pp. 41-42, p. 230 and p. 296). 
Like Kirzner's analysis, Schonfeld-llly's analysis not only aims at a more realistic 
description of the allocation process at the individual level, but has consequences for the 
analysis of the market process at the level of society, too. The marginal utility idea gives 
Schonfeld-Illy the opportunity to describe the market process as a causal-genetic process (a 
one direction process of action going from individual utility to prices); a process that is at 
variance with neoclassical functional equilibrium theories (the simultaneous solution of 
mathematical functions). Schonfeld-Illy analyses the economic calculations of the 
consumer—the problem of how to employ scarce means in the best way to produce the 
results wanted most. The peculiar problem of consumer calculations, which also demands 
its special discussion in economic theory, is how to bring the immeasurable utility in a 
motivated, efficient way into the monetary calculation process. Utility and marginal utility 
are only present in the calculations of the consumer (Schonfeld-Illy, 1924, pp. 13-14 and 
1948, p. 1). For Schonfeld-Illy "the demand for goods with the expected utility and 
marginal utility which it reveals, is the first and last, the alpha and the omega, in the chain 
of the origin of price, it is the driving and decisive force, the dynamics of it all (SchQnfeld-
Illy, 1948, p. 231). 
For Mises, too, economics is concerned with the question of how calculable action is 
possible. (Mises, 1940, p. 186). "No other distinction is of greater significance ... than that 
between calculable action and incalculable action" (Mises, 1966, p. 199). Mises makes a 
distinction between the calculations of the producer and the consumer. The producer 
"should buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest market. In buying and selling 
[he] should know no other goal than the greatest monetary profit". The consumer, however, 
places utility at the centre of his calculations (Mises, 1960, pp. 174-179). But after 
signalizing the distinction between the calculations of the producer and the consumer, 
Mises and the neo-Austrians lose sight of the consumer part of the distinction. The 
consumer retains the solution of the famous value paradox as the basis of the valuation 
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process. Human action in the form of only buying decisions (consumers), but also of only 
selling decisions (resource owners) becomes of subsidiary interest. The entrepreneurial role 
in human action is confined to the producer: his actions between the input and the output 
markets. 
Since utility is immeasurable, what principles can substitute for an actual numerical 
calculation process (Schfinfeld-Illy, 1924, p. 40 and p. 56)? Schonfeld-Illy's view about 
this function of marginal utility as a dynamic, expected demand price is analogous to 
Kirzner's alertness and related price concept. Kirzner endorses Mises' thesis that "there is 
nothing automatic or mechanical in the operation of the market" (Mises, 1966, p. 335). 
"The idea of a price that does not reflect and express entrepreneurial judgement and hunch 
is virtually a contradiction in terms" (Kirzner, 1988, p. 6). 
I conclude that for Schonfeld-IUy, Kirzner's view of the consumer as a pure Robbinsian 
maximizer cannot be true. It is not inevitable to ascribe the entrepreneurial role to the 
producer, but on the contrary, inevitable to confer this role on everyone, including the 
consumer. With this result it is not really remarkable that Neo-Austrians on the one hand 
have no difficulty in recovering a preference for the older Austrians for adjustment 
processes instead of market equilibria, but on the other hand, have more difficulty in 
recovering the central position of the producer in adjustment processes. In his search for 
the entrepreneurial role in Menger's system, Kirzner finds a negative result and speaks of a 
paradoxical result (Kirzner, 1977, p. 71). 
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Chapter 6 was originally published in New Perspectives on Austrian Economics. (G. 
Meyer, ed.). London and New York: Routledge, 1995. It was based on an earlier version, 
which appeared in Research Memorandum: 90.08, Center for Research in Public 
Economics, Leiden University. September 1990. The Paper was presented at the congress 
of the Allied Social Science Association, Anaheim (USA), January 5, 1993. 
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6 
THE SHORT-CUT APPROACH TO 
CONSUMER CALCULATIONS: A 
NEO-MARGINALIST SOLUTION 
Auke R. Leen* 
INTRODUCTION 
In economic textbooks, the presentation of the standard model of con-
sumer choice is often followed by a disclaimer: 'People aren't that smart' 
(Parkin 1990: 167) or W e consumers are not expected to be wizards' 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989: 451). But, suppose the present-day 
economist's model is not only a formal model that helps thinking but 
reflects the reality of the maximization process of the consumer too. 
Then, what wriggles most? It is neither the beginning nor the end. We 
all intuitively accept the start: a budget constraint and a set of preferences 
(including Gossen's first law of decreasing marginal utility). Didn't econo-
mists in the early phases of the history of economics think that Gossen's 
first law signified a real-world psychophysical phenomenon: the so-called 
Weber—Fechner law? We also accept the result: the optimal allocation of 
goods (Gossen's second law of equi-marginality). No, what wriggles most 
as highly unrealistic is the maximization process that lies in between both 
Gossen's laws. Whatever it is the consumer does, it certainly is not solving a 
Lagrangean function: the constrained maximization of a utility function. 
Indeed, consumers can't be that smart. 
From a theoretical point of view, to compute the marginal utilities a 
consumer has a lot to do. First, one has to line up all the alternatively 
possible combinations of goods one can get. Second, one has to assess the 
needs that successive units of the various goods can satisfy. Third, one has 
to find out at what point in the row satisfaction breaks off. See for instance 
the Mengerian Table 6.1. It shows the marginal utility that a consumer 
derives from various amounts of food and cloth. Each physical unit of food 
or cloth costs $1. Suppose a consumer's budget is $4; how much of each 
good should one buy? Table 6.1 shows that, if rational, one would allocate 
$3 to food and $1 to cloth. 
The problem of how to abbreviate economic calculation was one of the 
* The author gratefully acknowledges the comments by Prof. Dr. R.P. Zuidema. 
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Food Cloth 
Quantity Marginal utility Quantity Marginal utility 
4 4 0 0 
3 5 1 5 
2 8 2 4 
1 10 3 3 
0 0 4 2 
core problems for the neo-marginalists. The neo-marginalists were a gen-
eration of economists of the Austrian school of economics. They worked 
from the early 1920s until the end of the 1940s. The first generation was 
the founder Carl Menger; the second generation, his two heralds Eugen 
von Bohm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser; the neo-marginalists, Hans 
Mayer, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Leo Schonfeld-Iily are the third gene-
ration. For them, marginal utility was not only the solution to a problem but 
also gave rise to this new problem. Marginalism, the solution to the well-
known value paradox, posed the problem of finding an overall goods 
allocation with its astonishing amount of individual comparisons. 
Economic theory had to be in congruence with reality. 
The abbreviation problem was overlooked by the English and French co-
inventors of marginalism. For them, because of the mathematical mould of 
their theories, the problem was a mathematical one: solving a Lagrangean 
function. In the classical objective value theory, too, the problem had no 
place in the core of economics and could be neglected by the theoretical 
economists. Value was given with outside labour costs. With subjective use 
value, however, this changed. At least for the Austrians, value had to be 
calculated by each person. The problem was further aggravated with the 
transition from a cardinal to an ordinal utility concept; it changed from a 
quantitative to a qualitative one, which was even more difficult to handle. 
The problem becomes even more complex if we use a household produc-
tion function. For then the consumer has to state not only the needs to be 
fulfilled by the goods themselves but also by their intermediate products. 
In this paper, first I give the logical development of the idea of taking 
short cuts (abbreviations) in consumer calculations; it is related to the role 
of marginal utility in equilibrium arid disequilibrium. Second, a first for-
malization is given of taking short cuts in an intertemporal model of 
consumer choice. Saving and consumption patterns are explained for 
different groups of consumers. 
S H O R T CUTS I N E Q U I L I B R I U M 
According to Bohm-Bawerk (1886: 74—77), experience shows that calcula-
tions do not give us much trouble. Why? First, we do have a lot of practice. 
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We are great virtuosi in our value calculations. Calculations, after all, do not 
have to be more exact than is worthwhile. Second, we have all sorts o f 
reliefs, e.g. our memory, things w e have learned from other people and our 
everyday routines. All the reliefs can be used as long as our situation does 
not drastically change. This is practically the case for most o f the people 
most o f the time. 
Rosenstein-Rodan asked: h o w do we find the initial equilibrium situation 
that holds on in the first place and is o f relevance if nothing changes? His 
answer was that w e cannot create this situation uno actu, it is the result o f a 
historical process o f trial and error. If, however, we are in equilibrium, the 
attained marginal utilities fulfil their function as a short cut without which 
there simply could be no rational economic conduct. The marginal utilities 
are the sine qua non for any real-world economic calculations. 
The utilities o f the new uses [changes in allocation] which are con-
templated are compared with past marginal utilities in these uses; if they 
are larger, the new uses are expedient, if smaller, the dew uses are not 
expedient. The marginal utility in different need classes (kinds of uses) 
thus fulfils a watch-dog function with respect to consumption. 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1927: 85) 
The complementarity o f utilities seems to pose a problem. Even with a 
relatively small change in the data, it suggests that the whole economic plan 
has to be revised; one is forced to g o through all calculations again and 
again each time a situation changes. This, according to Rosenstein-Rodan, is 
not so. A consumer, usually, does not substitute a house for a car but a 
hamburger for a • cheeseburger. The layers o f goods allocation are the 
marginal ones;- complementarity is the lowest and the utilities are the 
smallest. Small changes in the data have no great repercussions. Mayer, 
the successor o f Wieser, added the time element to the watch-dog function 
o f marginal utility. Generally, a consumer plans the purchase o f goods not 
for one but for more than one time period (Mayer 1922: 15). All consumers 
have to ration their supply o f goods so that it lasts until new goods become 
available. The Mengerian table has to be multiplied for each time period. 
Consequently, if the consumer's horizon is one time period, the marginal 
utility o f a stock o f goods appears only once: it is unique. If, however, the 
consumer's horizon is more than one time period, the same marginal utility 
appears more than once. This is due to the periodical repetition of the same 
needs (Mayer 1922: 17-18) . 
In short, for the neo-marginalists the essential function of marginal utility 
was to abbreviate economic calculations. To apply the abbreviated proce-
dure we need (a) an initial equilibrium situation, and (b) relative constancy 
o f needs and ends. 
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Short cuts in disequilibrium 
Almost unnoticed by the other neo-marginalists, Schonfeld-Illy changed 
the use of the consumer's abbreviation procedure. He was dissatisfied with 
a theory that described small changes in equilibrium only, and not how the 
equilibrium came about. His favourite examples of budget allocation were 
students who receive their first income after graduation, people who marry 
and start a family, and immigrants in a foreign and strange country 
(Schonfeld-Illy 1948: 125-126 and 321). For him, marginal utility as an 
instrument of abbreviation is not only used in equilibrium but in disequili-
brium too. Abbreviation is no longer linked with small changes but with 
abrupt, great changes in means and ends. 
Schonfeld-Illy developed his use of marginal utility from what he thought 
was an inconsistency in Wieser's thought. Wieser, the brother-in-law of 
Bohm-Bawerk, took the definition of marginal utility from the last stage 
of calculation. 'The measure of marginal utility is got from the least useful 
of the most important uses . . . conditional on the highest use of the supply 
and the most careful inquiry of the needs' (Schonfeld-Illy 1924: 75; cf. 
McCulloch 1977: 254). On the other hand, he drew the description of the 
function of marginal utility from the situation that actually starts calcula-
tion. 'All uses that stand below are forbidden . . . all uses that stand above 
or are equal are permitted' (op. at.: 75). Schonfeld-Illy wondered whether 
the last stage of calculation contains all the things that have been used 
during the start. Isn't a definition based on the last stage too narrow? What 
is the correct definition of marginal utility consistent with its function? 
A consumer rarely deals with a single good. A consumer calculates 
mostly with stocks of goods that contain many different intensities of 
utility. For a consumer the marginal utility of a stock is the utility of the 
economically smallest part of the stock. It lies at the margin of use of the 
stock and is of releyance to the whole stock with regards to the plans one 
has for using it. For the price a consumer is willing to pay for a good at the 
margin of a stock, based on its marginal utility, has an economic relevance 
for all other units. 'A fortiore: for the utility of these other units is higher 
than the utility of the marginal unit and therefore the same, marginal price 
paid for the other units certainly must be justified' (Schonfeld-Illy 1948: 
60). The cumulative validity of the subjective demand price makes it 
possible to shorten the calculation process: we do not have to state and 
compare the other utilities anymore. Buying bread, a parent does not think, 
nor needs to think, that the family might die without it. The possibility of 
abbreviation is a direct result of Gossen's first law of decreasing marginal 
utility. Marginal utility becomes an instrument in a process of trial and 
error; it is used to discover the optimal consumption pattern (Schonfeld-
Illy 1948: 67 and 126). 
In short, marginal utility fulfils two special roles. It acts no longer only as 
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a watch-dog that precludes all utility under it and sustains all utility above it. 
Its function, too, is its economic relevance: the relevance of the economic: 
use at a margin for a whole. More correctly, its function can grow from 
economic relevance only, to being watch-dog too. 
A FIRST M O D E L O F C O N S U M E R A B B R E V I A T I O N 
To show the difference between the abbreviating role of marginal utility in 
equilibrium and disequilibrium, I select three groups of consumers. First, 
consumers who are in disequilibrium by choice, and second, those who are 
in disequilibrium by necessity. Examples, of the first group are trendsetting 
consumers; examples of the second, immigrants on arrival in a foreign 
country and people who marry and start a family. All these consumers are 
discovering what their optimal allocation looks like. The third group are the 
familiar consumers from the traditional theory of consumer choice. They 
are the well-established consumers, who are in equilibrium by definition. 
I model the abbreviating role of marginal utilityi_as a habit-forming 
process. A good not only provides immediate satisfaction but also affects 
the marginal utility derived from subsequent consumption. The familiar 
results of habit formation (cf. Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 
1988; Chaloupka 1991) are used and reinterpreted as follows. In a simple 
intertemporal model of consumer choice a household maximizes the utility 
function 
where Z, stands for the composite commodity from which utility is directly 
obtained in period /. The commodities are produced in a household 
production function 
with a composite market good Xh the consumer's time allocated to 
calculation Th and the consumer's human capital specific to calculation 
skill S,. All other inputs of time and (human) capital are ignored. I assume 
that 
U= U(Z„ZM, ...,Zt+n) (6.1) 
Z,= Z(X„ T„s,y (6.2) 
dZ, 
ar, 
and also that 
dzz, 
> o dT,dSt 
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S, is produced through learning by doing: consumers learn to calculate by 
calculating. It accumulates the effects of earlier commodity allocation. A 
simple investment function is chosen: 
S, = S (Z,_i, Z ,_ 2 , . . , E<) (6.3) 
E, registers education and other human capital relevant for calculation, i.e. 
abbreviation skills. I assume that-
dS d^S 
ek > °' a n d az^kt > o, . = i, 2, ... 
The ratios of the marginal utilities and the shadow prices, the marginal 
costs of adding a unit of the composite commodity, set the optimal 
allocation of consumption over time 
MU* - Mu - J^L. (64) 
MUy -ML ~ n-7  K ' 
The term KZl, the shadow price, is the full price of commodity Zt It can be 
deduced from the first-order condition of the maximization of the utility 
function (6.1) subject to the combined time and budget constraint 
E pX, + wT, wT* + b, _ 
( 1 + r ) ' (1 + r)< 
where w is the wage rate, r the interest rate, b the non-wage income and T* 
the total available time (absence of time preference is presupposed). The 
shadow price consists of two parts: the full money price of the composite 
commodity, 
pdX, wdT, . 
dZ, dZ, 
and the change in the discounted money value of future time inputs from 
the effect of the production of Z, on subsequent S, 
y4 / dZl+i dZt+i \ dSZl+. 1 " U \dSZl+i 1 dTZlJ • dZ, • (1 + r)'' 
where n is the length of life (cf. Stigler and Becker 1977: 79, n. 5); to be 
simplified to 
pdX, wdT, 
nz- = -dzj + -dz; - A t (6-5) 
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If S is a beneficial habit, -Jp- > 0 and A, becomes positive, consumption of 
Z decreases the price of consumption at a later point in time. If J" is a 
harmful habit, however, < 0 and A, becomes negative, consumption 
of Z increases the price of consumption at a later point in time. In other 
words, the marginal utility of time allocated to calculating gf^ff increases by 
the consumption of Z if S is a beneficial habit; it decreases if S is a 
harmful habit. 
D I F F E R E N T SAVING A N D C O N S U M P T I O N P A T T E R N S 
How does the model explain the consumption and saving patterns of the 
selected consumers? For well-established consumers, the ones we know 
from traditional economic theory, the last term of equation (6.5), Ah is 
zero. The price is the familiar marginal cost formula. These consumers are 
in equilibrium by definition: they move from one equilibrium to another 
and make marginal comparisons only. Marginal utility functions as a watch-
dog. To develop an abbreviation skill is neitherUntendcd nor necessary: they 
have it already. The relative price of consumption now and in the future 
does not change. 
For those who are in disequilibrium by choice, our trendsetting consu-
mers, calculation can be short-sighted (myopic) or far-sighted. When short-
sighted, just as with the well-established consumers, A, is zero. Only this 
time, one is short-sighted because one does not want to be far-sighted. 
When far-sighted, At is negative. Trendsetters do not see the allocation 
process as a positive investment. On the contrary, after the discovery of a 
new consumption pattern, human capital specific to abbreviation loses its 
value. For the trendsetter, abbreviation is a harmful habit. Abbreviation 
breeds a habit one does not want to have; it takes time and energy to get rid 
of it. 
For the short-sighted trendsetter, the future price rises. For the trendset-
ters who see their abbreviation skill as a harmful habit the value of saving in 
future inputs is negative. The full shadow price rises; it is cheaper to 
consume now than in the future. The rise is greater for the far-sighted 
than for the short-sighted consumer, since for the latter the future harmful 
effects are not discounted at all. With an inelastic demand curve for the 
commodity, however, for the short-sighted as well as for the far-sighted 
trendsetter, the consumption of goods and time spent on calculating does 
not fall in the future. An inelastic demand curve seems a realistic assump-
tion. Trendsetting can only be shown by conspicuous consumption. The 
abbreviating role of marginal utility as a short cut in calculations results in 
consumption as a harmful rational addiction: an increase in present 
consumption raises future consumption. 
For far-sighted consumers who are in disequilibrium by necessity, e.g. our 
immigrants, A, is positive. The abbreviating role of marginal utility as a 
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short cut in calculations results in consumption as a beneficial addiction. In 
other words, the marginal utility o f time allocated to figuring out the 
present composite commodity increases by the growth in calculating 
capital. The relative price o f consumption now declines versus the price 
in the future. If the demand curve is sufficiently elastic, consumption will 
rise and savings decline. A long-run elastic demand curve is likely; these 
consumers are not yet spending much. 
Now, let me look at the producer's problem: w h o are the most suscep-
tible to the advertising o f new goods? Advertising o f new goods lowers the 
search costs, but it also makes human capital obsolete. The investment 
function can show the influence o f advertising on human capital through a 
depreciation rate, 8, o f human capital specific to abbreviation, S,: 
For the well-established consumers w h o have the biggest investment in 
human capital, 8 is strongly negative. The ultimate abbreviation skill, i.e. 
marginal utility as a watch-dog, is their defining characteristic; without it 
they cannot exist. For consumers w h o are in disequilibrium by necessity, 
although 8 is still negative, the odds at stake are much lower. By trial and 
error, immigrants and young couples are still discovering their optimal 
consumption pattern. For trendsetters, w h o are in disequilibrium by 
choice, the fact that human capital specific to abbreviation becomes 
obsolete is either of no concern, if they are short-sighted, or, in the case 
o f abbreviation as a negative addictive good , a positive fact. 8 is zero for the 
short-sighted and positive for the far-sighted trendsetter. 
Because for all groups the relative prices change, saving and consump-
tion patterns will change too. Well-established consumers buy the least new 
goods , short-sighted trendsetters buy more, and far-sighted trendsetters 
with a positive depreciation rate buy the most new goods . As time goes by, 
immigrants and just-married couples buy fewer new goods. 
First, all this reminds one o f the present-day work o f Herbert A. Simon. 
He, too, bases his theory on certain limitations o f the human mind 
described as 'bounded rationality'. 
The capacity o f the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size o f the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world -
or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. 
S, - S(Z,~U Z,-z, • • -, E„ 8) (6.6) 
CONCLUSION 
(Simon 1957: 198) 
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The difference, however, between Simon and Schonfeld-Illy is that the 
simplifying devices of Simon result in a lack of optimality, but those of 
Schonfeld-Illy do not. Simon's consumers calculate solutions that are good 
enough. Schonfeld-Illy's consumers calculate solutions that are optimal. 
Second, I can get the same results by introducing the present-day notions 
in addiction literature of tolerance and reinforcement (Chaloupka 1991: 
723). Tolerance means that the utility from a given amount of consumption 
is lower when past consumption is greater, ^ < 0. Reinforcement means 
that increases in past use raise marginal utility of current consumption, 
gl^f > 0. A habit is addictive by definition. It is called a beneficial 
addiction if | | > 0 and a harmful one if H < 0. For an addiction it is a 
necessary and sufficient condition that reinforcement exceeds tolerance. 
This means that, given time preference, CT, and the depreciation rate, 8, 
b^Z d2Z 
(Becker and Murphy 1988: 680). 
For the abbreviation problem the notions of tolerance and reinforcement 
are not easily intuitive to interpret. The notions of a positive and negative 
habit in terms of marginal utility, and the elasticity of demand, however, are 
straightforward to understand. So I stick to the terminology of Stigler and 
Becker's original article. 
Third, the way I handled abbreviation may strike some readers as rather 
old-fashioned at its best or completely wrong at its worst. Isn't one of the 
blessings of modern economic theory that it is not expected to be a 
description of reality? Shouldn't one look for the implications of utility-
maximizing theory for observable behaviour (Stigler 1965: 153)? I believe, 
however, that the paper proved there is still something to be gained from 
looking at the neo-marginalist phase of the development of utility theory. It 
gave us just what we wanted: testable predictions. 
In other words, I did not take marginal utility as a shorthand but as a 
short cut. It was no shorthand for, but a short cut in, actual consumer 
calculations. 
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Friedmans paradox 
Wat is het marginale nut? Is het het nut van de laatste eenheid of de verandering 
van het totale nut door het gebruik van een extra eenheid? Volgens Milton 
Friedman, in zijn Price Theory, is het het laatste. De eerste betekenis leidt tot een 
paradox: het druist in tegen ons dagelijks taalgebruik. Want, stel wij hebben voor 
ons een schaal met gelijke sinaasappels. Daar alle sinaasappels gelijk zijn, moet 
ook het nut van iedere sinaasappel gelijk zijn; iedere sinaasappel is ons om het 
even. Omschrijven wij marginaal nut als het nut van de laatste sinaasappel dan is 
dat ook het nut van iedere andere, willekeurige sinaasappel. Het totale nut is dan 
gelijk aan het aantal sinaasappels maal het marginale nut. Dit lijkt geen goede 
manier om marginaal nut te omschrijven. Het totale nut is immers gelijk aan het 
aantal sinaasappels maal het gemiddelde nut. Deze omschrijving van gemiddeld 
nut is in overeensteniming met ons dagelijks taalgebruik. Marginaal nut, volgens 
Friedman, moet worden omschreven als de verandering van het totale nut: het 
nut van de laatste sinaasappel plus de verandering in het nut van de voorafgaande 
sinaasappels als er een extra sinaasappel wordt gebruikt (Friedman, 1976, p.36). 
Neo-Marginalisten 
Friedmans opvatting vindt algemeen ingang in de économie. Toch is er teruninste 
één groep economen geweest die het tegendeel heeft beweerd: de neo-Margina-
listen. De neo-Marginalisten waren een generatie economen uit de Oostenrijkse 
school die werkten vanaf het begin van de jaren twintig tot einde van de jaren 
veertig: De eerste generatie, de stichter Carl Menger; de tweede generatie, zijn 
1 Vakgroep Staalhuishoudkunde, Landbouwuniversileit Wageningen. 
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beide herauten Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk en Friedrich von Wieser; de derde 
generatie de neo-Marginalisten Hans Mayer, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan en Leo 
Schönfeld-Illy. 
Voor de neo-Marginalist is marginaal nut, zonder dat dit voor hem een paradox 
oplevert, wel het nut van de laatste eenheid. Niet het marginale, maar het totale 
nut is voor hem het probleem. Het is voor een consument een onmogelijkheid om 
het totale nut van een voorraad gœderen te bepalen. Wat hij echter wel kan, is 
de verandering van het totale nut bepalen. Het is deze verandering die het nut van 
ieder goed bepaalt. Het bepalen van het nut van ieder goed in de betekenis van 
zijn eigen, afzonderlijke nut is onmogelijk. Nuttigheden beïnvloeden elkaar 
wederzijds en hangen af van de toestand op een bepaald moment (Schönfeld-Illy, 
1924, p.3 en p.41). Er bestaat voor de neo-Marginalist geen tegenstelling hissen 
het nut van de laatste eenheid en de verandering van het totale nut. 
Böhm-Bawerks Integrationstheorem versus Wiesers Multiplikationstheorem 
des Wertes 
Maar ook blij ft, voor tenminste twee leerlingen van Wieser, de waarheid behouden 
van de regel: het totale nut van een voorraad is gelijk aan het aantal goederen 
maal het marginale nut. Hoewel Friedman er niet expliciet naar verwijst, is de 
regel al een oude bekende. Aan het einde van de vorige en het begin van deze 
eeuw streden Böhm-Bawerk en Wieser er al over. Ook toen ging het om de bepaling 
door een consument van de totale waarde van een voorraad goederen. Volgens 
Wiesers Multiplikationstheorem des Wertes moet je om de totale waarde van een 
voorraad goederen te bepalen alle eenheden met het bereikte marginale nut 
vermenigvuldigen. Böhm-Bawerks Integrationstheorem des Wertes, daarentegen, 
stelt dat de totale waarde van een voorraad de optelling is van het nut van de 
afzonderlijke eenheden. Praktisch iedereen gaf Böhm-Bawerk gelijk. Immers, 
Wiesers theorema onderschat de totale waarde van een voorraad. Verschillende 
eenheden van een voorraad bevredigen verschillende behoeften en niet één en 
dezelfde behoefte meerdere malen. 
Mayer en Schönfeld-Illy gaven ieder een eigen interpretatie van Wiesers 
theorema. Zij trachtten het theorema van hun leermeester te verklaren vanuit de 
feitelijke situatie van een consument die voor het probleem Staat een voorraad 
goederen te waarderen. Mayer introduceerde het tijdsaspect van het rekenproces 
en Schönfeld-Illy de beperktheid van de rekencapaciteit van de consument. 
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Mayers interpretatie: het tijdsaspect van het rekenproces 
Om de marginale nutten te bepalen, Staat een consument vanuit een theoretisch 
gezichtspunt voor een schier onmogelijke opgave. Hij moet alle combinaties 
bepalen van de goederen die hij kan krijgen. Zo ook moet hij de behoeften bepalen 
die de verschillende eenheden van een voorraad kunnen bevredigen. Vervolgens 
moet hij uitvinden bij welke hoeveelheid van ieder goed de consumptie moet 
worden beeindigd. 
Hoe dit rekenproces te bekorten was een van de kemproblemen voor de 
neo-Marginalisten. Marginaal nut was niet alleen de oplossing van een probleem 
maar gaf ook aanleiding voor een nieuw probleem. Het marginalisme, de oplossing 
van de bekende waardeparadox, Steide het probleem van het vinden van een op-
timale goederenallocatie met zijn enorme hoeveelheid van individuele vergelij-
kingen. Want, volgens de neo-Marginalisten, dient de economische theorie in 
overeenstemming te zijn met de alledaagse praktijk^Dit Staat in directe tegens-
telling met de moderne opvatting van wat een economische theorie is. Van haar 
wordt immers niet meer verwacht dat zij een directe beschrij ving van de alledaagse 
praktijk is; het gaat om de implicaties van de nutsmaximaliserende theorie voor 
het waameembare gedrag. 
Het probleem van het grote aantal calculaties was niet als zodanig gesignaleerd 
door de Engelse en Franse mede-ontwerpers van het marginalisme. Gezien de 
wiskundige vorm van hun theorieen was het probleem een rekenkundig probleem: 
het oplossen van een Lagrange mnctie (het rnaximeren onder randvoorwaarden 
van een nutsfunctie). In de klassieke objectieve waardeleer was er ook al geen 
plaats geweest voor het calculatieprobleem. Waarde werd immers bepaald door 
van buiten gegeven arbeidskosten. 
Böhm-Bawerk gaf het eerste Oostenrijkse antwoord. Uit de praktijk blijkt dat 
het ons helemaal niet zoveel moeite kost. Op de eerste plaats hebben wij veel 
ervaring. Wij zijn grote virtuosen in onze waardecalculaties; calculaties die ook 
niet exacter behoeven te zijn dan zij aan waarde opleveren. Op de tweede plaats 
hanteren wij allerlei Versimpelingen van het rekenproces: vuistregels, ons ge-
heugen, de dingen die wij van andere mensen hebben geleerd en onze alledaagse 
routines. AI deze hulpmiddelen kunnen wij gebruiken zolang onze situatie zieh 
niet drastisch wijzigt, wat het geval is voor de meesten van ons gedurende het 
grootste gedeelte van ons leven (Böhm-Bawerk, 1886, pp. 74-77). 
Rosenstein-Rodan vroeg zieh af: Hoe vinden wij die oorspronkelijke even-
wichtssituatie die in de uitgangspositie van belang is en relevant is als er verder 
niets verändert? Zijn antwoord was dat wij het evenwicht niet ogenblikkelijk 
kunnen realiseren. Het is het resultaat van een proefondervindelijk historisch 
proces. Als wij het echter hebben bereikt, vervullen de bereikte marginale nutten 
een funetie in het rekenproces zonder welke er in het geheel geen rationeel eco-
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nomisch gedrag mogelijk is. De marginale nutten zijn de sine qua non voor ieder 
daadwerkelijk rekenen. Het nut van de nieuwe uitgaven die worden beoogd, wordt 
vergeleken met de oude marginale nutten. Als zij groter zijn, zijn zij voordelig, 
als zij kleiner zijn, zijn zij dat niet. Het marginale nut van de verschillende uitgaven 
vervult een waakhondfunctie met betrekking tot de consumptie (Rosenstein-Rodan 
[1927], 1960, p. 85). 
Mayer betrekt de waakhondfunctie van het marginale nut op een consument 
die voor meerdere perioden tegelijk plant. ledere consument moet zijn voorraad 
goederen zodanig in de tijd verdelen dat zij toereikend is tot nieuwe goederen 
beschikbaar zijn. Als het rekenproces van de consument één période beslaat, komt 
het marginale nut maar één keer voor: het is uniek. Als het, daarentegen, meerdere 
tijdsperioden beslaat, verschijnt hetzelfde marginale nut meerdere malen. Dit 
tengevolge van de periodieke herhaling van dezelfde behoeften (Mayer, 1922, 
pp. 17-18). Het meerdere malen voorkomen van het marginale nut in Wiesers 
theorema is hiermee in overeensteniming. Het bevat geen paradox. 
Schönfeld-Illy's interpretatie: het verkorten van het rekenproces 
Schönfeld-Illy ging nog een stapje verder met de invulling van het marginale 
nutsbegrip. Hij was ontevreden met een théorie die slechts kleine veranderingen 
rond het evenwicht kon beschrijven en niet de weg waarlangs dat evenwicht tot 
stand komt. Zijn favoriete voorbeelden van budgetallocatie betroffen Studenten 
die, na afstuderen, hun eerste inkomen ontvangen, mensen die gaan trouwen en 
een gezin stichten en emigranten die in een ver en vreemd land arriveren. Voor 
hem was marginaal nut alç een instrument van versimpeling niet alleen van toe-
passing in evenwicht maar ook bij onevenwichtigheid. Versimpeling van het re-
kenproces wordt niet langer in verband gebracht met kleine veranderingen, maar 
met abrupte, grote veranderingen in middelenen doeleinden (Schönfeld-Illy, 1948, 
pp. 125-126 en p. 321). 
Schönfeld-Illy's idee over het versimpelen, verkorten, van het rekenproces in 
een situatie van onevenwichtigheid is zijn interpretatie van Wiesers Multipli-
kationstheorem. Hij tracht weer te geven wat Wieser bedoelde, maar kennelijk 
zijn tijdgenoten niet duidelijk kon maken. Het Multiplikationstheorem heeft be-
trekking op de subjectieve vraagprijs van de consument. De vraagprijs wordt 
uitgedrukt in geld en heeft betrekking op alle eenheden van een voorraad goederen. 
Voor iedere eenheid van een voorraad hanteert de consument dezelfde prijs. Deze 
prijs functioneert als een intermediair tussen de prijs die op de markt tot stand 
komt en het niet in een getal uit te drukken marginale nut. 
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Dit gebruik van het marginale nutsbegrip noemt Schönfeld-Illy het principe 
van de economische relevantie. Het principe stelt de economische relevantie van 
het gebruik aan de marge voor een geheel. De prijs die relevant is voor de marginale 
eenheid heeft een economische relevantie voor alle andere eenheden van een 
voorraad, a fortiori: daar het nut van deze andere eenheden hoger is dan het nut 
van de marginale eenheid. Die prijs, die ook voor de andere eenheden wordt 
gerekend, is daarom zeker gerechtvaardigd. De cumulatieve relevantie van de 
subjectievevraagprijs maakt het mogelijkhet rekenproces te verkorten: wehoeven 
die andere nutswaarden niet meer te bepalen en te vergelijken. Deze mogelijkheid 
is een direct gevolg van Gossens eerste wet van het dalend grensnut. Het grensnut 
wordt een instrument in een proefondervindelijk procès; het wordt gebruikt om 
de optimale allocatie te vinden. 
Conclusie 
Schönfeld-Illy's problematiekherinnert sterk aan het werk van Herbert A. Simon. 
Ook hij baseert zijn théorie op beperkingen van de menselijke geest, die hij 
'bounded rationality' noemt. De capaciteit van de menselijke geest om complexe 
Problemen te formuleren en op te lossen is erg klein in vergelijking met de Pro-
blemen die moeten worden opgelost, wil er van objectief rationeel gedrag in de 
werkelijke wereld sprake zijn - of zelfs maar van een redelijke benadering van 
deze objectieve rationaliteit (Simon, 1957, p. 198). Het verschil tussen Simon en 
Schönfeld- Illy is dat de Versimpelingen van Simon wel, maar die van 
Schönfeld-Illy geen vermindering van de optimale oplossing ten gevolge hebben. 
De consumenten van Simon berekenen oplossingen die goed genoeg worden 
geacht. Die van Schönfeld-Illy berekenen oplossingen die optimaal zijn. 
Voor de neo-marginalisten vervult het marginale nut een tweetal nineties. Het 
is, ten eerste, een waakhond die elk hoger nut toelaat en elk lager nut afwijst. 
Niet alleen in deze maar ook in toekomstige tijdsperioden. Ten tweede heeft het 
een economische relevantie: de relevantie van het economisch gebruik aan de 
marge voor het geheel. Het maakt een onmisbare verkorting van het rekenproces 
mogelijk. Beide nineties volgen uit de nadruk op de alledaagse praktijk van het 
rekenproces van de consument. Hiervoor is binnen Friedmans méthodologie geen 
plaats. Vandaar ook Mayers en Schönfeld-Illy's piatvloerse interprétâmes van de 
regel die stelt dat de totale waarde van een voorraad gelijk is aan het aantal 
Produkten maal het marginale nut. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 7: PLATVLOERSE NEO-MARGINALISTEN 
BANAL NEO-MARGENALISTS 
What is the marginal utility? Is it the utility of the last unit, or the change in total utility 
brought about by using the last unit? For Milton Friedman, in his Price Theory, it is the 
latter. He believes that the former leads to the paradox of marginal utility being the 
opposite of the way everyday language is used. Take for example a number of identical 
oranges. Since all oranges are the same, the utility of each one must be the same too. One 
is not preferred to another. If marginal utility is the utility of the last orange, this is the 
utility of every other orange too. Total utility would be equal to the number of oranges 
multiplied by the marginal utility. This does not seem to be a good description of marginal 
utility. Total utility is the number of oranges multiplied by their average utility. This 
accords with everyday use of language. Marginal utility for Friedman is the change in total 
utility: the utility of the last orange plus the change in utility of all the previous oranges 
used (Friedman, 1976, p. 36). 
The way Friedman describes marginal utility is the way most economists do. However, 
one group of economists, the neo-Marginalists do not agree. For them marginal utility is 
the utility of the last unit. The problem is not marginal utility but total utility. The 
consumer is unable to determine the total utility of stock of goods. What he can do, 
however, is determine change in the stock, and this change determines the utility of each 
good. To determine the utility of each good separately is impossible. Utilities influence 
each other and depend on the situation (Schonfeld-Illy, 1924, p. 3 and p. 41). The neo-
Marginalist sees no antithesis between the utility of the last unit and the change in total 
utility. 
Two of the pupils of Wieser, however, retained the truth of the rule that the total utility 
of a stock of goods equals the number of goods multiplied by the marginal utility. Though 
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Friedman does not explicitly refer to this rule, it is also an old one. At the end of the last 
century and the beginning of the present Bohm-Bawerk and Wieser quarrelled over it. The 
question then too was how to deterrmne the total utility of a stock of goods. In his 
Multiplicationstheorem des Wertes, Wieser maintained that the total utility of a stock of 
goods can be obtained by multiplying all units with the attained marginal utility. However, 
Bohm-Bawerk in his Integrationstheorem des Wertes, maintained that it was obtained by 
adding the utility of each good separately. Almost every one agreed with Bohm-Bawerk. 
Wieser's theory underestimates the total utility of a stock of goods. Different units of a 
stock of goods satisfy different wants—not the same want all the time. Neo-marginalists 
Mayer and Schonfeld-Illy both gave their own interpretation of Wieser's theory. Both tried 
to explain it from the point of view of a consumer who faces the problem of estimating the 
value of a stock of goods. Mayer focused on the time aspect of the calculation process, 
Sch5nfeld-Illy on the limited capability of the consumer to calculate. 
Mayer looked at the function of marginal utility as if a consumer has to plan his 
expenses for several time periods in advance. Every consumer has to portion his goods 
over different time periods till new goods become available. If the consumer looks at one 
time period, marginal utility functions once: it is unique. If, however, calculation involves 
more than one time period, the same marginal utility appears more than once; the same 
wants are repeated periodically (Mayer, 1922, pp. 17-18). Therefore Wieser's use of the 
same marginal utility more than once is not paradoxical, but is in accordance with the 
situation. Schonfeld-Illy expanded on the use of marginal utility. He was unsatisfied with a 
theory that could only explain small changes around an equilibrium situation in the 
behavior of the consumer, but could not explain its attainment: the way the equilibrium 
situation arises. His interpretation of Wieser's theory was to simplify or shorten the 
calculation process in a situation of disequiUbrium. He tried to explain what Wieser 
intended to say, but could not make it clear to his contemporaries. 
For the neo-Marginalist the idea of marginal utility is two-fold. First, it functions as a 
watchdog: it lets every good with a higher utility pass, but retains every good with a lower 
utility. Not only in the present time period, but also in every future one. Second, it has an 
economic relevance: the relevance of the use at the margin for the whole. It shortens the 
consumer's calculation process. Both functions follow if we look at the day-to-day 
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calculation process of the consumer. To look at the realism of the assumptions is of course 
not necessary in Friedman's positive methodology. If we do, however, we come to both 
Mayer's and Schonfeld-Illy's rather banal interpretation of the rule that states that the total 
value of a stock of goods equals the number of products multiplied by the attained 
marginal utility. 
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Chapter 8. Creativity, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Policy 
Chapter 8 was originally published in On the condition of labor and the social question 
one hundred years later (Thomas O. Nitsch, et al. eds). Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1994. A shorter version appeared in The Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. XI, No. 2 
Spring 1996, pp. 130-9. The paper was presented at the Sixth World Congress of Social 
Economics, Omaha, Nabraska (USA), 1991. Sections III to VII were presented in an 
extended form at the conference of the Allied Social Sciences Association, New York, 
USA, January 3-5, 1999. 
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Creativity, Entrepreneurship, 
and Consumer Policy 
Auke R. Leen* 
I. "New Things" of Centesimus Annus Ask for Creativity 
and Entrepreneurship 
With his ninth encyclical Centesimus Annus (CA) Pope John Paul II pays 
homage to the hundredth anniversary ofRerum Novarum (RN). In CA John Paul II 
extends the thoughts over the market economy of his predecessor Pope Leo XTII to 
the "new things" of our time. A central feature of modem time is the growing 
importance of human beings in production processes. In early times natural fertility 
of land was the most important production factor. Later capital, i.e., machines, took 
over this role. In our time human beings are central, their creativity and entrepre-
neurship are paramount in production processes (John Paul II1991, pp. 26-27). Not 
all people, however, do have the means to participate effectively and in a way 
worthy to their humanity in modem production processes. Consequently, John Paul 
II makes a plea for more creativity and entrepreneurship at all levels, especially the 
lower levels, within a firm. 
If more creativity and entrepreneurship is demanded of human beings in their 
capacity as wage-recipients (producers) there is no reason to deny this to them in 
their capacity as wage-spenders (consumers). Are there not, as John Paul II in CA 
stresses, other new things of our advanced society: the rise of a consumption 
mentality and problems in choosing new needs and new ways of satisfying them 
(John Paul II 1991, p. 30)? Consumer decisions are central in modem society. 
Besides, consumption and production are not words pointing to a classification of 
real living human beings. Consumption and production are analytical categories of 
action. A human being is no split personality; he is one and indivisible; he is a 
consumer in the same way as he is a producer. So the questions arise (1) how does 
capitalism allow for the creativity and entrepreneurship of the consumers? And (2) 
can consumer policy enhance or does it, just the opposite, only stifle consumer's 
creativity and entrepreneurship? 
104 Part III. The Austrian perspective on consumer policy 
94 Sixth World Congress of Social Economics 
... 
n. The Capitalistic Market Economy Is Detrimental to 
Creativity and Entrepreneurship 
In his book The Joyless Economy, An Inquiry Into Human Satisfaction and 
Consumer Dissatisfaction, Tibor Scitovsky argues that capitalism is detrimental to 
the creativity and entrepreneurship of the consumers. Of course it can be main-
tained that if people want variety, capitalism can supply i t Is not the market but a 
huge voting-machine in which the dollars spent by the consumer can be counted as 
votes? This may be true, and is captured in the notion of consumer sovereignty, but 
mass production also entails the notion that "almost nothing gets produced that 
cannot be produced in the thousands" (Scitovsky 1976, p. 7). 
The essence of capitalism is mass-production. The division of labor in a 
capitalistic market economy makes possible an enormous increase of productivity. 
Economics of scale imply that commodities can be more cheaply produced for 
many people than for few. In order to make a profit sellers will try to cater to desires 
which everybody shares. These desires are the more simple ones. The tastes of the 
crowd are imposed on the whole society, which leads to standardized and homo-
geneous products. 'The monotony of mass-production work is fully matched by the 
monotony of its product" (Scitovsky 1976, p. 249). 
Following Scitovsky, it appears that not only the market economy but also 
market theory plays down the consumers yearning for novelty. Economic theory is 
built on a one-sided psychological image of man. Psychologists postulate an 
optimum level of arousal (level of excitement) caused by stimulation. Deviations 
from theoptimum level in an upward direction cause feelings of tension, fatigue and 
oppression. Deviations from the optimum level in a downward direction cause 
feelings of emptiness and boredom. Deviations lead to attempts to restore the 
optimum level of stimulation. 
Arousal reduction has become less problematic in a rich, capitalistic society. 
There is a lot of what Scitovsky calls comfort; specific needs which are satisfied. 
Economists have restricted their theoretical approach to arousal reduction caused 
by feelings of pain, hunger, thirst, coldness, and heat, "[TJhe economist's model of 
consumer behavior . . . comes closest to that half of the psychologist's theory" 
(Scotovsky 1976, p. 30). But the capitalistic society still has a much more general 
lack of novelty and stimulation. This second important motive of human behavior 
with respect to consumption, i.e. the longing for new things, for stimulation and 
variety, is neglected. The fact that the mass market does not stimulate the consumer 
has serious consequences. "The yearning for new things and ideas is the source of 
all progress, all civilization; to ignore it as a source of satisfaction is surely wrong" 
(Scitovsky 1976, p. 11). 
III. Consumer Policy Emphasizes Maximization 
If, as Scitovsky mantains, the capitalistic market economy fails in stimulating 
creativity and entrepreneurship, what role does consumer policy play in enhancing 
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creativity and entrepreneurship? What are the roots and essence of consumer 
policy? 
A. The Roots 
Since the early beginnings of economic science the welfare of the consumer 
takes a central position. Economic processes start and end with consumers. 
Consumption is, according to Adam Smith, the sole end of all production. The 
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary 
for promoting that of the consumer. Policies to strengthen the functioning of the 
market, however, did concern the consumer only indirectly or, if directly, on an ad 
hoc, temporary base. We may think of rationing devices in situations of extreme 
scarcity or the prescription of certain product qualities, e.g. food quality, in the case 
of dangerous products. From the 1960s onward, however, the aim of consumer 
policy is a systematic and direct improvement of the position of the consumer in the 
market 
The motivation for consumer policy is based on either one or both of the 
following reasons. First, consumer sovereignty is absent in present-day society. 
The will of the consumers is no longer fundamental for production decisions. 
Second, in choosing, consumers are confronted with a highly complicated, 
nontransparent market The consumer faces a situation of information shortage as 
well as one of information overload (Imkamp 1986, p. 235). 
The first reason goes along the following lines. Full sovereignty of the 
consumer implies a complete servitude of the producer to the consumer. The 
consumer king, however, is capricious and unpredictable in his behaviour. To 
secure their capital investments, producers try to plan production and distribution. 
Through all kinds of sales effort the producer tries to secure its existence. The 
consumer feels his impotence. He feels himself played upon by the producer. 
Consumer sovereignty becomes an empty word. 
The second reason emphasizes that the consumer also feels a certain 
discomfort in choosing from all the available, constantly growing and changing, 
products and services. The present-day consumer is confronted with a rich but by 
its magnitude and variation, nontransparent assortment of goods. Product informa-
tion is mainly given by the producers and is, consequently, one-sided. In choosing 
the consumer is stifled by information dependence. Themarket for consumer goods 
is highly nontransparent. 
Consumer policy tries to answer these feelings of impotence and discomfort 
The first reason, lack of consumer sovereignty, gives rise to a top-bottom motiva-
tion of consumer policy. Aims are deduced from certain basic values or needs of the 
consumer (Kuhlmann 1990, p. 60). Consumer policy becomes the protection of 
individual rights in the economic context. Taken from President Kennedy's 
presidential address of 1962, these rights are (1) the right to safety, (2) the right to 
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be informed, (3) the right to choose, and (4) the right to be heard. The implementa-
tion of these rights mustrestore the equality in theproducer-consumerrelationship. 
The second reason, consumer feelings of discomfort, gives rise to a bottom-
top motivation of consumer policy. Inductive methods show consumer complaints. 
In aggregated form they build up the aims of consumer policy. One of the purposes 
of the inductively formed aims is to restore the market transparency of the 
consumers. Consumer policy tries "to insure that all consumers obtain what they 
really want (were they fully informed), subject to the limitation of their income" 
(Maynesl979,p. 97). 
B. The Essence 
What measures are taken to strengthen the position of the consumer on the 
market? Some measures are primarily aimed at changing the behavior of the 
producer, others at changing the behavior of the consumer. In both fields measures 
try to protect or inform the consumer. The overall aim of the measures is to secure 
that no unreasonable physical and economic risks fall on the consumer. 
For physical safety, protection means bans on certain dangerous products 
and, for other less dangerous products, technical standards specifying acceptable 
safety standards. For economic safety, protection means, e.g., regulation of the 
information content of advertising, or regulation of one-sided producer formulated 
standard contracts. Furthermore, there are subsidies for comparative testing, 
mandatory informative labelling, and quality certification (Thorelli and Thorelli 
1974, p. 2). All these measures aim at better consumer information: they try to 
increase the market transparency for the consumer. 
The common denominator of all measures is that somehow the ends-means 
relationship is supposed to be already known to consumers and government 
officials. The essence of consumer policy is (1) to increase the efficiency of the 
known (household) production process, and (2), in cases of conflict between certain 
ends from an individual or social perspective, to influence the ends of the consumer 
household. But given a socially accepted hierarchy of ends these latter policies are 
in a certain sense also only trying to ensure the efficiency of the household 
production process (Kuhlmann 1990, pp. 5-6). 
Consumer policy tries to reduce the known transaction costs of a consumer 
transaction in terms of physical and economic risk. 
The government claims to know which products are unequivocably danger-
ous and ought to be banned and what the minimally acceptable safety standards are. 
The government also claims to know the standard price, standard quality, standard 
contract terms, the relevant product characteristics in comparative testing, and the 
relevant product characteristics for the product labels. 
The theoretical motivation behind consumer policy is taken from the pre-
dominant, standard neoclassical market model. In neoclassical theory the consumer 
is a maxim izen action follows from an optimal choice in a given and known ends-
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means relationship. Maximization includes situations of measurable uncertainty 
that can be reduced with search. Because, in reality, the consumer is confronted 
with an information gap as well as, just the opposite, an information overload, the 
essence of consumer policy is to direct or restrict the choices of the consumers. 
Prices per standard quantity and comparative testing, for instance, increase the 
market transparency for the consumer and direct the choices of the consumers. 
Laws putting limits to interests rates or prescribing standard rules, on the other 
hand, restrict the choices of the consumers. 
In other words, consumer policy tries to realize the conditions of the 
neoclassical market model in terms of full knowledge, market transparency, and the 
homogeneity of goods. It is captured within a given and known ends-means 
relationship. 
IV. Erring People Depend on Creativity and Entrepreneurship 
Next to the well-known neoclassical market model there is the far less-known 
Austrian market model. At the centre of this market model is the process of 
conceiving the ends-means relationship. The consumer and producer are more than 
mere calculators, they are venturing, innovating, exploring, and searching for new 
means and new ends. 
The essential difference between the neoclassical and Austrian market model 
is the different understanding of the concept of error and the role of error itself in 
a market economy. Contrary to the neoclassical market model, consumer problems 
are not always to be attributed to inadequate resources or to a faulty institutional 
structure. There is also the possibility of sheer error opportunities costlessly 
available arc overlooked. Let us take a closer look at older and modem Austrian 
economics to see.how the concept of an erring individual has developed. 
A. Austrianism: a Geographical and Pejorative Label 
In the 1880s German professors attached the epithet 'Austrian' to the 
economic theories of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, and Wieser. It was a pejorative 
epithet bestowed by disdainful German economists. Why was it a pejorative 
epithet, and what was the reason for their disdain? 
As far as the epithet Austrian relates to a geographical area it is justified 
because of the historic fact it was founded and first elaborated by three Austrians, 
holding chairs at the universities of Vienna, Innsbruck, and Prague. In 1871 Carl 
Menger published his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Eco-
nomics). Until the end of the seventies, however, there was no Austrian School: 
there was only Carl Menger. Later on Menger was joined by two younger 
economists, brothers-in-law, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk and Friedrich Wieser. 
They became the enthusiastic supporters of the new ideas put forward in Menger's 
book. 
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The pejorative overtone of the predicate Austrian was the result of another 
historic face never before had any new mode of thinking originated in Austria. "For 
people who were not familiar with economics, the predicate 'Austrian' as applied 
to a doctrine carried strong overtones of the darkdays of the Counter-Reformation 
and of Metternich. To an Austrian intellectual, nothing could appear more disas-
trous than a relapse of his country into the spiritual inanity of the good old days" 
(Mises 1969, p. 14). 
The German economists attached the smear to Menger and his followers 
because for them Austrian economics meant backwardness. Both the Germans and 
the Austrians attacked classical economics. The Germans were appealing for an 
alleged modem historical approach. Menger, on the contrary, although he wanted 
to rebuild the foundations of economic science too, retained the abstract, theoretical 
character of economics. The clash over methods is known as the Methodenstreit. 
B. Older Austrians 
Menger's theory turned the value theory of the classicals upside down. The 
classical Ricardian theory held that the normal value of consumption goods was 
determined by their cost of production. Menger's theory, on the contrary, held that 
the cost of production itself is ultimately determined by the value of consumption 
goods. Labor is not the source of value, but is ameans to value. Value was no longer 
to be seen as governed by past resource costs but as expressing judgements 
concerning future usefulness in meeting consumer wants (Kirzner 1987, p. 146). In 
making these judgements, Menger, according to William Jafte, describes man not 
as a "lightning calculator" but as a "bumbling, erring, ill-informed creature, 
plagued with uncertainty, forever, hovering between alluring hopes and haunting 
fears, and congenitally incapable of making finely calibrated decisions in pursuit 
of satisfactions" (Jaffe" 1976, p. 521). Menger's theory came to be known as the 
subjective theory of value. 
The classical objective value theory was a second best solution to the problem 
of how prices are determined. Classical economists "were fully aware of the fact 
that prices are not a product of the activities of a special group of people, but the 
result of an interplay of all members of the market society" OMises 1966, p. 62). But 
because of the problems encountered in the famous value paradox they considered 
the activities of the producer only. 
According to the Austrians, value is in the mind of individual man, who 
chooses and maximizes, for whatever reason, his profit or utility. From the 
interaction of the valuations of the consumers flows the market demand. The 
market supply of the producers is determined by the expected demand. The 
interaction of demand and supply determines the market price. By offering a more 
satisfactory theory of demand, the subjective or marginal theory of value was more 
comprehensive than the classical theory, which last theory emphasized the activi-
ties of the producer only. 
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C. Modern Austrians 
In modern Austrianism, the post-World War II continuation of the Austrian 
tradition, the two central figures are Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Israel 
Kirzner (1986 p. 134 and 152) describes modem Austrianism as an authentic 
extension of Menger's older static subjectivism: a consequent dynamic subjectiv-
ism. Mises and Hayek focus in their theories on market adjustment processes. For 
Kirzner, building his theory along the lines of Mises and Hayek, one of the greatest 
failures of neoclassical equilibrium analysis is it takes for granted that an equilib-
rium is actually brought about For instance, in a disequilibrium would be buyers 
who have returned home empty handed should leam that it is necessary to outbid 
other buyers, and buyers who have paid high prices should discover that they could 
have obtained the same goods at lower prices (Kirzner 1973, p. 14). The real 
problem is to describe the possible realization of an equilibrium as the result of "the 
systematic way in which plan revisions are made as a consequence of the 
disappointment of earlier plans" (Kirzner 1962, p. 81). 
Neoclassical equilibrium theory cannot describe endogenous changes in the 
end-means framework: its maximization scheme is not fit for the task to generate 
systematic modifications of choices. The allocation model suffers from a discon-
tinuity in the succession of decisions. Only an exogenous change in the data, e.g., 
in tastes, in technology, or in information, can generate a new decision, a decision 
unexplainable in terms of the original framework. Without exogenous changes 
there is no 'choice-theoretic' explanation why yesterday's plans are replaced by 
today's. 
Mises and Hayek made it possible to describe the adjustment process as a 
systematic sequence of decisions. Mises' extension of subjectivism was to describe 
the individual niecision unit not only as maximizing but also as finding out the 
relevant ends-means relationship. This opens the way for incorporating learning 
into the understanding of market processes. Hayek's extension of subjectivism was 
precisely to describe the market process as one of learning by discovery (Kirzner 
1986, p. 47; cf. Kirzner 1985, p. 26). 
Endogenous change in the ends-means relationship is possible with the 
entrepreneurial element in each individual market participant: alertness (Kirzner 
1967, pp. 793 -794 and 1973, pp. 70-72). Alertness is the propensity of knowing 
where to look for information (Kirzner 1973, p. 68), "the propensity... toward fresh 
goals and the discovery of hitherto unknown resources" (Kirzner 1973, p. 34). A 
disequilibrium situation points to a situation of market ignorance. From the 
ignorance emerge profitable opportunities. Entrepreneurial alertness exploits 
(Kirzner 1979, p. 30). Alertness gives a more realistic image of human action and 
makes possible the description of the market as a unified discovery process. 
"[The] 'alertness' view of the entrepreneurial role rejects the thesis that if we 
attribute genuine novelty to the entrepreneur, we must necessarily treat 
entrepreneurially generated market events as not related to earlier market events in 
any systematic way. The genuine novelty... attributed] to the entrepreneur consists 
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in his spontaneous discovery of the opportunities marked out by earlier market 
conditions (or by future market conditions as they would be in the absence of his 
own actions)" (Kirzner 1985, p. 11). "[These] entrepreneurial discoveries are the 
steps through which any possible tendency toward market equilibrium must 
proceed" (Kirzner 1985, pp. 11-12). 
V. Austrians and Neoclassical Compared 
It is well known that there are two other contributors to the marginal 
subjective value theory: Leon Walras and William Stanley Jevons. In the modern 
Austrian perspective there are insights to be found in embryonic form in Menger's 
writings which are not absorbed in, or came to be lost from, mainstream neoclas-
sical Walrasian and Jevonsian (Marshallian) economics (Kirzner 1989a, p. 232). 
The differences refer to (1) the subject of, (2) the place of process analysis in, 
and (3) the epistemological character of economic theory. 
A. The Equilibrium Situation or The Equilibrating Process 
According to modern Austrians, the main difference between the neoclassi-
cal and Austrian market model is that in the modem Austrian market model 
adjustment processes and not market equilibria occupy a central position. In 
adjustment processes dispersed knowledge and lack of knowledge are of funda-
mental importance. Correct foresight, full knowledge, is not a precondition for the 
attainment of equilibrium but the defining characteristic of the state of equilibrium. 
"The statement that, if people know everything, they are in equilibrium, is true 
simply because that is how we define equilibrium" (Hayek 1949, p. 46). 
In the modern Austrian marketmodel, action does not primarily follow from 
an optimal choice in a given ends-means relation, as is mostly the case in the 
neoclassical market model. At the centre of the modern Austrian market model one 
finds the process of conceiving the ends-means relationship. The change in market 
model contains a change "from a 'mechanical' Robbinsian [after Lord Robbins] 
neoclassical economizer to Mises's [modern Austrian] homo agens" (Kirzner 
1973, p. 72). "[Homo agens] is not merely engaged in computing the patterns of 
means allocation that will most faithfully reflect the hierarchy of given ends [like 
Robbins' calculating agents]. Homo agens is actively seeking out the best course 
of action, he is venturing, innovating, exploring, searching" (Kirzner 1967, p. 792). 
The discontinuity in the succession of decisions in the neoclassical market 
model indicates that the neoclassical maximizer does not choose at all. "[T]he 
replacement of one set of given ends by a second set occurs before (or at least 
outside)... [neoclassical] choice itself (Kirzner 1986, p. 142). "The very circum-
stance that the 'chosen' course of action is seen as already inexorably implied in the 
given configuration of preferences and constraints, of ends and means, makes the 
choice 'mechanical' or 'automatic' - and thus not a true choice at all. True choice 
surely requires the realistic possibility of more than one alternative" (Kirzner 1986, 
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p. 139). Choices are not only concerned with merely selecting the highest out of an 
array of given and ranked alternatives, but also embrace the perception and 
evaluation of the alternatives identified as relevant (Kirzner 1989b, p. 18). 
To discover what are the relevant means and ends must be distinguished 
sharply from neoclassical search theory. In neoclassical search "[tjhe searcher 
knows what he is looking for, and he knows where to look for i t . . . [In the case of 
discovery, on the other hand,] the discoverer discovers something he did notknow 
existed, or something, the ready availability of which he had not realized" (Kirzner 
1989b, p. 27). Search is concerned with wiping out known ignorance. Discovery is 
concerned with wiping out utter ignorance: one does not know that one does not 
know. 
The process of discovery is not completely unpredictable. For modem 
Austrians there is the possibihty that the outcome "may emerge as a result of the 
alert grasping of a hitherto unnoticed opportunity." In neoclassical equilibrium 
theory, on the contrary, the outcome is "either the fully expected result of deliberate 
plans, or the fortuitous expression of pure luck" (Kirzner 1989b, p. ix and p. 30). 
B. Processes: The Start or The End of The Analysis 
The neoclassical core of economic theory is the simplified static model. 
Processes can be studied as theoutgrowth of somehigherorderof.mostly.technical 
sophistication. For modem Austrians, however, the distinction between process 
and situation can not be characterized as one of a choice between two, independent 
subject matters of economics. For modem Austrians the process elements "are 
central and essential for understanding markets and not merely refinements to our 
knowledge" (Kirzner 1989a, p. 234) or matters of embarrassment. Process, discov-
ery, and uncertainty are essential for everyday economics. "It is not that markets 
work in spite of the open-ended uncertainty surrounding human action, but rather 
that they work precisely because of this quality of human action. The open-ended 
uncertainty of the environment itself provides the scope and possibility for an 
entrepreneurial process of competitive discovery" (Kirzner 1989a, p. 234). 
C. Methodology 
Subjectivism not only characterizes the substance but also the method of 
Austrian economics. The subjectivistic method, first explicitly wriuen down by 
Mises and to a lesser extent by Hayek, is called praxeology. A name, the logic of 
action, introduced by Mises as characterizing the verbal axiomatic-deductive 
methodology of Austrian economics (Lachmann 1976, p. 56). The ideas for this 
method Mises found in the writings of some classical economists and older 
Austrians (Rothbard 1980, p. 29). It is claimed that the praxeological method was 
the implicit method of the economics profession till the 1950s (Hoppe 1988, p. 9 
and p. 11). 
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Praxeology starts from the fundamental, self-evident axiom that men act by 
virtue of their being human. Human beings try to exchange a less for a more 
preferred situation. Mises, as a Kantian, describes the fundamental axiom as a priori 
to all experience. It is a part of "the essential and necessary character of the logical 
structure of the human mind" (Mises 1966, p. 34). For Murray Rothbard, as an 
Aristotelian, on the other hand, the fundamental axiom is "so broadly based in 
common human experience that once enunciated... [it becomes] self-evident and 
hence does not meet the fashionable criterion of 'falsifiability'", (Rothbard 1976, 
p. 25). Praxeology consists in the verbal elaboration of the logical implications of 
the fundamental axiom of human action. There are a few subsidiary axioms. The 
most important of these broadly empirical axioms are, that individuals vary in tastes 
and abilities, that human beings regard leisure as a valuable good, and that people 
leam from experience. We deduce, except for logical errors in the deductive 
process, true conclusions from, a true axiom. "Our science considers only the 
essential. It views action.... as [a] formal construction" (Mises 1976, p. 13). In this 
respect, praxeology models sciences like logic and geometry. 
The subsidiary axiom that people leam from experience is of fundamental 
importance to the description of the market as a systematic sequence of economic 
states. Its 'broadly empirical' character is based on the general propensity of man 
to be alert to opportunities. "The process by which facts are hammered into human 
consciousness is not wholly ungovemed by the logic of human action" (Kirzner 
1979,p. 30). After recognizing that people do err, we assume at least a tendency for 
man to notice those facts that constitute possible opportunities for gainful action. 
"The market process emerges as the necessary implication of the circumstance that 
people act, and that in their action they err, discover their errors, and tend to revise 
their actions in a direction likely to be less erroneous than before" (Kirzner 1979, 
p. 30). 
VI. The Forgotten Consumer 
The consumer was central to Menger, no doubtabout that (cf. Menger 1923), 
but the consumer is not central for modem Austrian economics. Somewhere in the 
trajectory between Menger's contribution to Austrian economics, the way in which 
all value in economics springs off from the final valuation of the consumer, and the 
modem Austrian contribution, the process through which consumer valuations are 
being translated in production decisions, the consumer got lost. 
I think the main reason for the oblivion of the consumer is that the Austrian 
discovery insight is discussed by way of the methodological makeshift of an 
entrepreneurial producer and a non-entrepreneurial consumer (Mises 1966, p. 253; 
Kirzner 1973, p. 41). But when is this methodological makeshift (Mises 1966, p. 
253) raised? Though alertness is in principle present in every action, in their 
elaborations the modern Austrians ascribe it to the producer (cf. Rothbard 1985, p. 
282; Ekelund & Saurman 1988, p. xx; Pasour 1989, p. 95). Accordingly, alertness 
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is called the entrepreneurial element Consumers arepassive, non-alert, Robbinsian 
maximizers. For instance, one of the functions of advertising is 'getting the 
Robbinsians [the potential consumers] to see the availability of... opportunities' 
(Kirzner 1973, p. 148). Advertising differs from changing the consumer's taste or 
providing information (non-entrepreneurial knowledge) to him. Advertising (an 
entrepreneurial device) makes the consumer aware of available opportunities, 
regardless of the level of his alertness. 
So we get the following paradoxical situation. For Austrian economists, 
classical economists were at fault because they were able to explain only the actions 
of the businessman. Classical economists completely neglected the rationality on 
the part of the consumer. It was precisely this limitation of classical economics, 
explaining only the actions of the businessman, that the Austrian subjective theory 
of value was able to overcome (Mises 1976, p. 147 and p. 175). To a certain extent 
however, modem Austrian economics, justas the classical economists before them, 
has lost sight of the consumer, too. The consumer is absent in the elucidation of the 
market as a dynamic process of entrepreneurial discovery. 
The oblivion of the consumer in modem Austrian economics is, as we saw, 
fully matchedby theanalysisof creativity and entrepreneurship in CA. CA, too,asks 
for entrepreneurship of human beings in their capacity as wage-receivers, only. 
Jozef Solterer, in an article from 1950"The entrepreneur in economic theory" 
and a bookreview of Mises' book Human Action from the same year (1950b), 
describes economics, just like the modem Austrians, as the scienceof human choice 
and human action (Solterer 1950a, pp. 14-15). Solterer distinguishes three classes 
of choice. The first class is to buy or sell and is studied in the theory of pure 
competition. The class corresponds to what the Austrians call the act of maximizing 
inside a given ends-means relationship. The second class is to choose to build a 
structure. A structure that would not exist without the acting person. Solterer and 
the Austrians call the second class the entrepreneurial aspect of choice. Solterer also 
distinguishes a third class of choice: the task to assign the total product without 
remainder to the agents who helped produce it To each of these types of choices 
Solterer attaches "the nameof avirtuous procedure: the first, honesty [commutative 
justice]; the second, responsibility [social justice]; the third, fairness [distributive 
justice]" (Solterer 1950a, p. 19). To pursue explicitly the concept of virtuous action 
distinguishes Solterer's from Mises' conception of economics (Solterer 1950a, p. 
15). But Solterer, too, applies the concept of entrepreneurship explicitly to the 
producer only and not to the consumer (Solterer 1950a, p. 19). 
To sum up, Austrian economics sees man as an erring individual, who has the 
propensity of entrepreneurship: the propensity to notice the implications of earlier 
errors. With the propensity of entrepreneurship endogenous corrections of earlier 
errors and market processes can be described. Capitalism, seen as a dynamic 
process and populated with erring individuals, depends on creativity and entrepre-
neurship. If error correction is the essence of the market process then people are 
necessarily endowed with entrepreneurship. Consequently, in Austrian economics, 
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in contrast to Scitovsky' s analysis, stimulation and novelty are of the essence of the 
market process. But, just like CA and Solterer, the concept of entrepreneurship is 
worked out for the producer only. 
VII. Consumer Policy Is Detrimental to Creativity and 
Entrepreneurship 
How does the Austrian vision of the market process relate to consumer 
policy? To be more specific: What is the impact of consumer policy upon the 
perception by consumers and producers of the available array of opportunities? 
Consumer policy "may effect what it is that decision makers discover to be the 
situation in which they act" (Kirzner 1985, p. 94). It is these consequences that must 
betaken account of, in terms of costs, in each assessment of the likely consequences 
of consumer policy. 
To describe the ways in which discovery problems may hamper consumer 
policy I use the same four headings as Kirzner (Kirzner 1985, p. 137). 
A. The Undiscovered Discovery Process 
A consumer problem does not necessarily point to the necessity of govem-
mentintervention. The market is a discovery process: genuine inefficiencies can be 
relied upon in the future to generate market processes for their own correction. But 
the systematic tendency for imperfect knowledge to be spontaneously improved 
upon is not an instantaneous one. In Austrian economics time is not the problem but 
part of the solution. 
What are, for instance, the market responses to the information asymmetry 
between producers and consumers? Of course sellers, as specialized producers, 
know more about their services than non-specialized buyers possibly can. Also, 
sellers, by knowing more about the quality of their service than consumers, are able 
to manipulate consumers. This led George Akerlof to his prediction that in 
equilibrium in the market for used cars, only 'lemons' will be offered for sale 
(Akerlof 1970, p. 490). The government's answer to the problem of how to protect 
the public health or safety is often in the form of occupational license or governmen-
tal organizations of certification. 
But there are also many free market responses to the alleged market failures: 
producer supplied guarantees, private information services, producer provided 
quality screening services, and all forms of non-governmental organization of 
certification. Besides, there are many information surrogates that keep consumers 
adequately informed: repeatedly purchasing certain services, drawing on the 
experience of friends, relatives, and neighbors, or inferences drawn from the length 
of life of firms offering services. To conclude: "if consumers are able to check the 
veracity of suppliers in any manner, laissez-faire market equilibrium can support 
[contrary to Akerlofs assertion] high quality" (Young 1987, p. 18). Besides, 
consumers who prefer lower-priced, lower-quality service will be worse off with 
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licensing, because such suppliers will not be permitted to practice and in this way 
the poor subsidize the lower information search costs of the rich (Young 1987, 
p. 21). 
In this respect one must notice that even in a nontransparent market like the 
illegal drugs market there arise institutions which lower the transaction costs of 
both producer and consumer. A drugs supplier faces high selling costs. It is not easy 
for him to make selling efforts; there is certainly no room for direct advertising. 
And, if caught, he runs into high costs in terms of imprisonment and income 
forgone. For the consumer, too, there are high buying costs. He faces high search 
costs, high costs in the form of uncertainty over the quality of the goods, and in cases 
of fraud, there is no law to protect him. 
In this disequilibrium situation coordination between buyers and sellers and 
transaction volume are low. One can expect that some entrepreneurial people try to 
make some profit as middleman in creating an information market "We need not" 
as Kirzner also says, "wait for evidence on the way information comes to spread 
through a society. We can, instead, employ our logic of choice to identify, within 
disequilibrium markets, the opportunities for gain that disequilibrium conditions 
themselves create. Postulating a tendency for such opportunities to be discovered 
and exploited, we can then explain the way such gradual discovery of opportunities 
in turn gradually alters the pattern of opportunities presented in the market as the 
process unfolds" (Kirzner 1979, p. 33). We can be sure of that element in human 
decision making which Kirzner calls the entrepreneurial propensity in human 
action: alertness. Alertness is "the propensity . . . toward fresh goals and the 
discovery of hitherto unknown resources" (Kirzner 1979, p. 34). 
As Harald Kunz demonstrates the middleman tries to reduce the high costs 
for both produber and consumer. He offers information the consumer of drugs 
needs, and the drugs supplier likes to be spread. For the producer, the middleman 
separates the market of drugs supply from the market of drugs selling. For a fee, he 
creates an information market which lowers the selling costs of the supplier. 
Because he is no drugs supplier, the middleman himself does not face high 
imprisonment costs. At the same time, he lowers the search costs for the consumer. 
Both supplier and consumer value the middleman, as he reduces the transaction 
costs for both of them (Kunz 1985, pp. 93-103). 
The self interest of all parties concerned ensures that such a market can exist 
The middleman will not share his information about where to buy drugs with too 
many people. Otherwise the drugs supplier can be sold out when a buyer arrives. 
The information will be exclusive. If the middleman wants to stay in the market he 
must be reliable not only in his information on where to buy but also on product 
quality. The more reliable the middleman is, the more he can charge his customers. 
The other way around, the supplier has to be truthful about quantity and quality of 
his drugs to his middleman, otherwise he will loose business. Better quality 
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commands a higher price for the supplier and a higher fee for the middleman. The 
result will be that (1) the market will be more coordinated and the transaction 
volume will be higher than otherwise would be the case; (2) an experience good 
becomes more or less a search good; and(3) quality does not deteriorate; there is 
even a stimulus to increase quality. 
Clarence Ayres, in a book review of Mises' Epistemological Problems in 
Economics, opposed Mises' condemnation of the mixed economy. Ayres denied 
the "automaticity" of the self-regulating purely capitalistic economy (Ayres 1961, 
p. 200; cp. Solterer 1950b, p. 128). As the drugs example showed, by spelling out 
more clearly the concept of human choice, as the modem Austrians do, part of 
Ayres critique can be met "To commence an analysis of choice after a particular 
ends-means framework has been declared known and relevant, is [indeed] to deal 
with choice in a manner that renders it completely mechanical. The creativity of 
choice, the element that makes action human, has been left out" (Kirzner 1979, p. 
148). The market process, however, depends on creativity, entrepreneurship, and 
the discovery of hitherto unknown ends and means. An activity that lies between 
pure luck and rational calculation. 
B. The Unsimulated Discovery Process 
How do government officials know what prices to set or qualities to require? 
In the absence of the pure profit incentive, market opportunities which present 
themselves in the form of potential profit opportunities arc not likely to be 
discovered by the regulators. "It is doubtful in the extreme if ideals such as 
benevolence or patriotism can be relied upon, in general, to enable a potential 
discoverer to identify his own personal interest with that of the discovery of an 
opportunity for a reallocation of resources desirable for society" (Kirzner 1985, p. 
33). The discovery process of the marketcannot be simulated by regulatory activity. 
Because in consumption the consumer always captures the profit himself, at 
first sight it looks as if the consumer's alertness is stimulated irrespective of the 
market form. The relevant information will always be of benefit to the potential 
discoverer. In a regulated market, however, things are a bit more complicated. 
Regulators and consumers in a regulated economy focus on the efficiency of 
the given and known household production process for which traditional incen-
tives, e.g., lowering the search costs are of help. Consumers in a non-regulated 
economy, however, are next to the efficiency of the transformation process alert to 
the discovery of genuine errors: to expect the unexpected. Government regulation 
of producer decisions, however, takes possible surprises out of the open-ended 
surroundings of the consumer. Consequently, it is to be expected that a consumer 
in a regulated market (government takes care of me) is less alert to new ends and 
new means than the consumer in an unregulated market. Profit inspired diversity 
in consumer goods and services stimulates the consumer. The consumer's alertness 
is switched on by the fact that there may be something lurking around the comer. 
Something he is hopeful or something he is fearful of. 
Part ETI. The Austrian perspective on consumer policy 117 
Creativity. Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Policy 107 
C. The Stifled Discovery Process 
Government regulation, e.g., price and quality restraints, tends to bar entry 
by potential new competitors. A price restraint does not merely block the upper 
reaches of a given supply curve but also may inhibit the discovery of as yet 
unsuspected sources of supply. Next to the discoordination generated by imposed 
prices in markets for existing goods there is the effect that such ceilings may inhibit 
the discovery of as yet wholly unknown new products (Kirzner 1985, p. 143). To 
stick to the example of the drugs market. Think of such *undiscovered' uses of 
marijuana as paper, fuel, building materials, clothing, animal food, and a protein 
source for humans. 
At this point one must remember that competition is a two-sided process 
taking place between producers and consumers and within each group. The 
likeUhood that regulation may discourage, hamper, and even completely stifle the 
discovery process of the unregulated market counts for producers as well as for 
consumers. 
The Austrian methodological makeshift of a Misesian entrepreneurial pro-
ducer and a Robbinsian non-entrepreneurial consumer, used for the elucidation of 
the market process, is at this point of no help and leads to wrong policy conclusions. 
If the methodological makeshift is not removed then the Austrians do not have valid 
arguments against those forms of consumer policy which try to increase the market 
transparency of the consumer. For then there are no valid arguments against passing 
on to the consumer comparable and relevant product characteristics for the existing 
supply of products. When the methodological makeshift is not removed, it is 
possible from an Austrian perspective to make a plea for quality certification as a 
form of collective (public) good (Hayek 1982, ni, p. 44). It is also possible to defend 
the subsidization by the government of comparative testing by consumer organiza-
tions (Kaufmann 1985, p. 24). 
From the Austrian vision, however, on the functioning of the market in 
general, these policies can only be rejected. The question is, what are the relevant 
product characteristics, and how are these characteristics changed over time (cf. 
Rothbard 1970, pp. 43-47; O'Driscoll & Rizzo 1985, p. 105 and p. 236)? The' 
consumer, too, discovers new unexpected ends (new forms of utility) to old and new 
means. It is not always the case that the role of the producer "consists in relieving 
the consumer of the necessity to be his own entrepreneur" (Kirzner 1973, p. 136). 
The situation can also be the other way around. The producer hires a trendwatcher. 
Someone who looks out for what a trendy consumer discovers. 
D. The Wholly Superfluous Discovery Process 
Measures taken by government officials to protect the consumers are likely 
to open up new avenues for entrepreneurial gain: they introduce a different 
disequilibrium situation. This new disequilibrium situation will generate its own 
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discovery process with its own wholly unexpected and even undesired final 
outcomes, e.g. enterprising bribery and corruption of the regulators. 
To sum up, I presented a less obvious drawback of policies to protect the 
consumer. The Austrian understanding of the market economy provides a novel 
angle for a critique of the regulated consumer. Regulatory restrictions interfere with 
the spontaneous discovery process that the unregulated market tends to generate. 
In order to give a full appreciation of the market as a competitive-entrepreneurial 
discovery process it was necessary to emphasize the entrepreneurial role of the 
consumer. 
For modem Austrians consumer policy stifles the profit or utility incentive 
that converts a socially desirable opportunity (an opportunity that transcends an 
existing framework of perceived opportunities) into apersonally gainful one. These 
'conversions' are the steps of the discovery process through which any possible 
tendency toward market equilibrium must proceed. So, we end up with about the 
opposite of what consumer policy intends. Is not the ultimate aim of consumer 
policy to better the possibilities to satisfy needs by means of consumption? To asses 
the results of consumer policy as a social policy it is necessary to look at the 
entrepreneurial behavior of the consumer and the producer. 
V m . Conclusion 
What picture does the capitalistic market economy give us if we extend some 
of the "new things" pointed at in CA from the producer to the consumer? What does 
creativity and entrepreneurship entail for the consumer in a capitalistic market 
economy? 
ForScitovskynotonlyeconomicanalysisbut the capitalistic marketeconomy, 
too, has no room for entrepreneurship, for the yearning for novelty by the consumer. 
Economic analysis is based on a psychological model of man which emphasizes 
arousal reduction in cases of depreviation. Arousal stimulation in cases of lack of 
novelty is forgotten. The capitalistic mass market is detrimental to novelty, it leads 
to homogenized and standardized products. Only the rich can buy variety. Con-
sumer policy, framed within a given ends-means relationship, is of no help either. 
It tries to realize the conditions of the neoclassical market model and only looks for 
error correction inside a given and known ends-means relationship. 
Austrian economics extends the concept of error and error correction. Error 
is no longer confined to maximizing decisions inside a given ends-means relation-
ship, but is extended to the creative, entrepreneurial process of conceiving the ends-
means relationship. In that way, it makes room for creativity and entrepreneurship. 
Consequently, what CA asks of the modem market economy, and Scitovsky 
could not find in it, is spelled out in modem Austrian economics. It is the 
entrepreneurial element in human decision making. Error correction is the result, 
not only, of new information purposefully searched for, or, just the opposite, sheer 
luck but can also be the result of alertness: creativity and entrepreneurship. What 
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the capitalistic market process depends on, is nothing but, entrepreneurship. For 
Austrians neoclassical inspired consumer policy is detrimental to the entrepreneur-
ship of the consumer. 
•Assistant Professor, Department of General Economics, Wageningen Agricultural 
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Government Regulation of Advertising: 
Good or Bad? 
A Comment on the Paper by Kassarjian and 
Kassarjian in JCP, Volume 11, 
September 1988 
ABSTRACT. Kassarjian and Kassarjian (1988) present some interesting results on 
the impact of regulation on advertising. They state three hypotheses that are partly 
confirmed by the facts. The theory behind the three hypotheses is not explicitly 
stated. In this paper I will first try to reconstruct the implicit theory. Secondly I will 
give a completely opposing theory and show that it can explain the same facts. The 
resulting evaluation of the government regulatory programme is negative as opposed 
to Kassarjian and Kassarjian's evaluation. 
In an interesting article "The Impact of Regulation on Advertising: A 
Content Analysis" Harold Kassarjian and Waltraud Kassarjian 
(1988) present "the results of a formal content analysis of claims 
made in advertisements . . . before (1970), during (1976), and after 
(1984) the spurt of regulatory activity in the US." In the midst of the 
1970's the Federal "trade Commission (FTC) pursued an advertising 
substantiation programme. Advertisers had to have available all 
documentation, proof, and substantiation for claims that purported 
to be based on objective evidence. Under the programme, false or 
deceptive claims might lead to a law suit. The results of the content 
analysis are presented as tests of three hypotheses on how adver-
tising claims change as a result of government regulation. The 
hypotheses are partly confirmed by the facts. Kassarjian and Kassar-
jian's conclusion is that "the advertising substantiation programme 
was moderately successful." "In 1976 consumers were provided less 
information, but it was of better quality than in 1970. However by 
1984 the various trends seem to suggest that advertisers are return-
ing to their pre-regulation ways." 
In this comment I will try to make explicit the theory that is 
behind Kassarjian and Kassarjian's hypotheses. If the character of 
Journal of Consumer Policy 14:449—457,1992. 
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the goods is taken into consideration, I can show that from a dia-
metrically opposed theory, alternative hypotheses can be deduced 
that are confirmed by the facts too. 
THEORIES BEHIND THE FACTS 
The implicit theory of Kassarjian and Kassarjian is as follows. 
Advertising is partly deceptive and partly manipulative. Without 
government regulation this situation will continue. With government 
intervention (the FTC substantiation programme) producers will 
change, based on a cost-benefit analysis, the content of their ads. 
"[IJndustry [can] avoid the expense and adverse publicity of a govern-
mental investigation and trial." In some cases the content will change 
from claims that could have been scientifically verified (sounds 
verifiable but no evidence is presented) to more inherently verifiable 
claims (the evidence itself is presented). In some other cases the 
content will change to vague but safe puffery (literal verification is 
not possible). These three claims (sounds verifiable, evidence pres-
ented, and puffery) constitute the types of advertising claims analyzed 
in Kassarjian and Kassarjian's paper. 
To put it bluntly, consumers are implicitly assumed blithely to 
consume goods of questionable quality. Consumers ignore or under-
estimate risks; producers use advertising partly as a means to mis-
lead the consumers. Advertising can manipulate consumers into 
taking action they otherwise would not have taken: Consumers need 
government protection. 
I contrast this view with the theories of, e.g., Stigler (1961), 
Nelson (1970, 1974), and Kirzner (1973) (for a general overview of 
the alternative theories, see Ekelund and Saurman, 1988). The 
authors claim advertising is a good like any other good. It is supplied 
by the producer at a level of quality demanded by the consumer. 
Advertising lowers the search costs of the consumer for all three 
types of advertising claims analyzed in Kassarjian and Kassarjian's 
paper. On the whole the consumer gets the type and quality of 
advertising he wants and is willing to pay for. 
To put it bluntly, again, consumers are assumed to make choices 
in such a way as to yield them the largest expected benefit. Con-
sumers can manage the risks of their personal environments, they 
know what is best for them and cannot be fooled all the time. Con-
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sumers assess the kind of advertising they get from a cost-benefit 
point of view; It lowers the full prices, which includes the search 
costs, of the products they buy. Advertising is an essential part of the 
competition process: It makes the product known to the consumers. 
Consumers are not passive actors but by-and-large act in their own 
self-interest. 
FRAUD 
What does the alternative theory imply about the occurrence of 
fraud, i.e., the deceptiveness in claims in which the attribute sounds 
verifiable and which government regulation is supposed to mitigate? 
One would expect the amount of fraud for the products investi-
gated by Kassarjian and Kassarjian to be not very high. The targeted 
products for substantiation under the FTC programme are antiper-
spirants and pet foods. A control group consists of the comparable 
products skin lotion and prepared foods. The goods can be charac-
terized as low priced mass-products. I deduce the following three 
points. 
Firstly, the amount of information requested by consumers will be 
rather low (Laband, 1986). For the products the learning-by-doing 
effect is great; losses are not substantial. For both producer and 
consumer an extensive use of ads is not worth the cost. Through 
repetitive sale, the amount of fraud will soon be brought to a 
minimum. 
Secondly, claims that could have been scientifically verified but 
for which no evidence is presented will not be very numerous. The 
goods are so-called "experience" goods for which quality claims are 
not as essential as for "search" goods. For experience goods quality 
can be experienced only after the product has been bought. For 
search goods quality can be discovered and tested before the good is 
actually bought. 
Thirdly, most of the claims will be inherently verifiable or a sheer 
hyperbole. To reach the consumers nation-wide, the lowest common 
denominator will be necessary. Advertising will be rather simple and 
universal. It is to be expected that the number of potentially decep-
tive claims (claims that sound verifiable in laboratory or survey) will 
be low. 
Consequently the decline in number of claims in which the 
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attribute sounds verifiable, as it happened under the FTC substantia-
tion programme, will probably be a real loss in valuable informative 
claims. This given the fact that it will not be fraud that declines. The 
hard-core of claims in which the attribute sounds verifiable is 
reduced. 
HYPOTHESES A N D FACTS 
I state Kassarjian and Kassarjian's hypotheses followed by my own 
hypotheses as I deduce them from the alternative theory. 
Hypothesis 1: Number of Attribute Claims Made 
Kassarjian and Kassarjian's first hypothesis is that "the number of 
claims made in 1976 advertisements would be less than those made 
in 1970, and would once more increase in 1984. The effect would 
be more pronounced in those industries that were required to 
provide substantiation then in similar, but non-targeted industries" 
(pp. 271—272). Kassarjian and Kassarjian come to the hypothesis on 
the basis of the increasing costs for producers to substantiate a 
certain claim, e.g., as the result of the negative news in cases of an 
investigation by the FTC. The relevant cost-benefit ratio changes. 
The hypothesized U-shaped curve for the number of claims, 
however, did not emerge. Except for pet foods, the number of claims 
did not decrease between 1970 and 1976. However, the long run 
effects of regulatory activity was that advertisers made fewer claims. 
What hypothesis follows from the alternative theory? I distinguish 
between the short and long term. Since advertising is a necessary 
part of competition and cannot be dispensed of, producers will 
in the short term, for the same cost-benefit reason as given by 
Kassarjian and Kassarjian, substitute less for more effective claims of 
advertising (Ehrlich & Fisher, 1982). Less effective should be inter-
preted as less demanded by consumers, e.g., less eye-catching for the 
consumers and therefore less attractive for the producers. In the 
short term the total number of claims will therefore be about the 
same. 
In the long term, producers will resort to other means of convey-
ing this type of claim, e.g., sales talks or product demonstrations in 
shops. Consumers might revert to a form of mouth-to-mouth adver-
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tising, given the fact that the sort of information lost by the reduction 
in claims in which the attribute sounds verifiable is still demanded by 
consumers. In the end the total number of claims will go down. 
The long term negative trend in the number of claims is rein-
forced by the following circumstances. Firstly, if the number of 
claims drops, competition will slow down. Consequently, in the long 
term, fewer new product improvements and corresponding claims 
will be made. 
Secondly, because research has to be done, "scientific" advertising 
is costly. As there is always the possibility that regulation will come 
back, research investments become more risky. The length of time a 
producer can profit from them will become shorter. Even if regula-
tion stops, the entry barrier for "scientific" advertising will be greater. 
The second circumstance also contains a reason why, in the short 
term, the number of scientific claims will stay the same, even rise 
modestly in the non-targeted industries. There are still gains to 
be made. Research costs are already made, they are sunk costs 
(Kessides, 1986). It is to be expected that the marginal returns for 
"scientific" advertising in the non-monitored goods increase. Some 
consumers are not aware which goods are monitored and which are 
not. We could call this the "bandwagon-effect" for the non-moni-
tored goods. Consequently the amount of (effective) fraud may 
remain the same or even rise. For producers who want to deceive, 
though the costs are higher, also the gains at stake do rise; con-
sumers, who will believe that there is no fraud any more, now that 
the government has taken care of it, will be less alert of existing 
fraud. 
The alternative hypothesis is: The number of claims made in 1976 
advertisements will be more or less the same as those made in 1970, 
and would decline in 1984. For the non-targeted industries even a 
slight rise in the number of claims made in 1976 can be expected. 
Except for pet foods (the only good that confirmed Kassarjian 
and Kassarjian's hypothesis), my hypothesis is better confirmed by 
the facts. Maybe for pet foods the costs of substitution of "scientific" 
information by the other two types of claims were too high (the 
returns too low). 
Hypothesis 2: Verification of Claims 
The second hypothesis of the Kassarjian and Kassarjian paper, 
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presented by them as a three way split is as follows: "Industries from 
which substantiation was demanded would have handled verification 
of claims in one of two extreme ways: either by providing inherent 
verifiability and verifying evidence, or, at the other extreme, by 
making non-verifiable vague claims'or puffery. It was assumed that 
by 1984 after the cessation of regulatory activity, the trends would 
reverse" (p. 272). 
As described in the foregoing section such results are to be 
expected and are not different for my opposing theory: a U-shaped 
curve for claims that sound verifiable and inverse U-shaped curves 
for the inherently verifiable claims and puffery. 
What differs, however, is the interpretation of the hypothesis. 
What in Kassarjian and Kassarjian's theory is a favourable develop-
ment, the decline in "claims that sound verifiable but in which the 
evidence [is] not presented and undoubtedly not available" (p. 281), 
is in the opposing theory a real loss in valuable information claims. 
The facts confirm the hypothesis better than Kassarjian and 
Kassarjian assume. Most of the exceptions can be explained by a 
peculiarity of Kassarjian and Kassarjian's presentation of the facts. 
Because the number of claims are given as a percentage, as 
opposed to what Kassarjian and Kassarjian assert (pp. 277 and 
282—283), no straightforward conclusions about causality can be 
made. For instance, if in the case of two types of claim, which sum 
up to one hundred percent, one of the claims goes up in absolute 
number while the other remains the same, then as a percentage, the 
second claim will go down. But this last phenomenon has nothing to 
do with causality. Two exceptions to the hypothesis can be explained 
as having its source in the arithmetic "trap." 
1. Contrary to the percentage rise, antiperspirants claims in which 
evidence is presented in ad or which are inherently verifiable go 
down in absolute number — a fact that confirms the hypothesis. The 
effect happens because the total number of claims, on the basis of 
which the higher percentage is calculated, sharply declines between 
1976 and 1984. 
2. Contrary to what was expected the percentages of puffery 
claims of skin lotions and prepared foods rose between 1976 and 
1984. In absolute number, however, they went down. This can be 
explained, again, by the overall decline in number of claims. 
The contradictions between the hypotheses and the facts are not 
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real. The hypotheses are even better corroborated by the facts than 
the authors imagined. 
Hypothesis 3: Number of Informational Cues 
Kassarjian and Kassarjian's third hypothesis is "Advertising within 
industries from which substantiation was requested would provide a 
lower level of informational cues in 1976 than they had in 1970. By 
1984 the number of information cues would again rise. Further, in 
1976 these ads would be less informative than advertisements from 
industries without substantiation orders" (p. 273). 
The facts confirm part of the hypothesis. By 1976 "the targeted 
industries were giving less information to consumers . . . while the 
non-targeted industries were providing significantly more informa-
tion." By 1984 "[a]ntiperspirants and skin lotions had significantly 
fewer informational claims than in 1976, while pet and people food 
remained more or less the s a m e . . . " (p. 282). 
Following the total reduction in claims (Hypothesis 1) the number 
of informational cues will decline, too. A cue, however, is not the 
same as a claim; it stands to a claim as a genus to a species. In an 
earlier paper, Healey and Kassarjian (1983) found less claims than 
cues. A claim is a statement or assertion about an attribute describ-
ing what the advertised product is or does. For instance, for anti-
perspirants the product attributes mentioned are wetness control, 
odour control, comfort (ease of use), ingredients, etc. A cue, on the 
other hand, says something about the level of informativeness of the 
advertisement. The cues, i.e., the evaluative criteria, are the factors 
that could potentially be used in intelligent decision making. We can 
think of price, value, quality, and performance. 
There is, however, a difference between a cue and a claim that is 
of importance to the interpretation of the decline in the number of 
informational cues in the alternative theory. From the perspective of 
competition an essential informative characteristic of advertising is to 
let people know that the product is there. The consumer has to see 
that there is a product before the product in a certain sense even 
exists. This informational claim, however, is not counted as an 
informational cue by Kassarjian arid Kassarjian. So, when through 
regulation "scientific" claims are substituted by inherently verifiable 
claims or vague claims, the change often will be from an informa-
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tional cue to a claim which just states that there is a product and 
which is not counted as an informational cue. Consequently the 
decline in level of informativeness will be more nominal then real. 
The alternative hypothesis is: The number of informational cues 
will decline between 1970 and 1976,-a trend which will be sustained 
in the long run. The facts given by Kassarjian and Kassarjian confirm 
the hypothesis. 
TWO FINAL REMARKS 
To conclude: 
In the alternative theory, the effect of government regulation is the 
opposite of what Kassarjian and Kassarjian assert. The situation 
without government intervention is optimal. Consumers are getting 
and producers are supplying the quality of advertising that is 
demanded. Advertising has nothing to do with fraud or deceptive-
ness but is a matter of attractiveness. Attractiveness is essential for 
the competitive market process. 
To say the least, the whole issue is tricky. Every set of facts can be 
explained, especially after they are known to us, by different, even 
opposing, theories. On the other hand, facts can never prove a 
theory, they can only falsify it. What remains are two opposing 
theories that both explain the same facts. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Staaliche Regulierung der Werbung: gut oder schlecht? Ein Kommentar zum Beitrag 
von Kassarjian und Kassarjian in JCP, Band 11, September 1988. Kassarjian und 
Kassarjian untersuchen in ihrem Beitrag die Wirkung von staalicher Regulierung auf 
die Qualität von Werbeaussagen, insbesondere was das Ausmaß an Irreführung 
betrifft. Die Autoren stellen drei Hypothesen auf, die durch die präsentierten Daten 
teilweise bestätigt werden. Insgesamt ziehen die Autoren die Schlußfolgerung, daß 
staatliche Regulierung ziemlich erfolgreich war. Der Autor dieses Kommentars 
bewertet nun dieselben Daten anders und präsentiert für sie eine alternative 
Erklärung. Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Erklärungen ergibt sich daraus, 
daß seine Erklärung sich aus einer Theorie ableitet, die der implizierten Theorie von 
Kassarjian und Kassarjian genau entgegengesetzt ist. Nach seiner Theorie ist dje 
Situation ohne staatliche Eingriffsmöglichkeiten optimal. Konsumenten bekommen 
und Anbieter liefern diejenige Qualität der Werbung, die nachgefragt wird. Werbung 
ist eine Sache der Attrativität und Gegenstand eines wettbewerblichen Markt-
prozesses. Nach dieser Theorie können die Erfolge staatlicher Interventionen 
ausschließlich negativ, d.h. ineffizient, sein und nicht, wie Kassarjian und Kassarjian 
geltend machen, negativ oder positiv oder irgendwo dazwischen. 
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Reply 
The authors of the original article, Harold H. Kassarjian and Wal-
traud M. Kassarjian, have sent the following reply: 
"As much as we would like to present a rejoinder, we simply feel 
that there is nothing much to add. Every set of facts can be explained 
by different, even opposing, theories. Our data stand as they were 
presented. We have one interpretation, the author proffers another. 
It is up to the reader to decide which one of us is correct." 
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DOES IT EXIST AND CAN WE USE IT: 
COMPETITION AMONG CONSUMERS? 
(Pricing a real novelty: the Austrian point of view) 
AUKER.LEEN 
Agricultural University, Wageningen 
The attainment of those initial sales is often the 
hardest part of marketing a new innovation... One 
of the most important strategic goals of pricing, 
especially when the product is innovative, is to 
obtain trial (Nagle 1987, p. 139 and p. 196). 
I. Introduction 
You do not doubt there's competition among producers. But among 
consumers? And with competition I mean what it once meant in econom-
ic science and still means in everyday language: active rivalry. Of course 
when you -as a consumer- look in the mirror you see things you do and 
don't like. And, maybe, one of the things you don't like, is that urge in 
you to keep up with the Joneses. That's rivalry for sure. And then there's 
the way you behave when you buy you weekly groceries: you try to get in 
the shortest line with your shopping cart. That's rivalry too. 
The first form of rivarly is well known. It's studied by the sociologist 
and one of the principles of marketing. Doesn't advertising heighten con-
spicuous consumption? The second form is, since the days of Adam Smith, 
studied by the economist: the laws of supply and demand. If there's a 
shortage, you did up the prices -or what ever it takes to compete: a quick 
move with your shopping cart for instance. 
That second form of rivalry -is it still active today? I want to look at ec-
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onomics: the market process, not sociology: the behavior of conspicuous 
consumers. Except for my shopping cart behavior every Thursday, and 
when buying or selling a house once or twice in my life, I nearly never feel 
that I have to compete. There's enough for everyone; the producer com-
petes (Udell 1964, p. 45; Dickson 1992, p. 71; Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 8). 
But then so what if there is or isn't competition among consumers? 
First, suppose there isn't. Is, in the modern market, competition one-
sided? First, suppose there isn't. Is, in the modern market, competition 
one-sided? Do, as a rule, only producers compete? Second, suppose there 
Js competition among consumers. If we know the why and is thereof, 
maybe we can use it in marketing too. Are you -as a producer- using com-
petition among consumers? 
II. Free entry: the why and is of competition among producers 
Let's start at the beginning. Why is competition a problem among 
consumers but isn't among producers? For the producer the question isn't 
difficult to answer -if he doesn't, he's out of business in no time. He offers 
a product that competes with others. Something we can see and is inde-
pendent of the market situation. A shortage, a surplus, or an equilibrium -
the producer competes. To sell a product in a world of scarcity and 
change it has to be the best. 
And if there's free entry, the why implies the is of competition. A con-
dition Smith was already aware off. "The exclusive privileges of corpora-
tions, statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws which restrain, in par-
ticular employments, the competition to a smaller number than might 
otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a less degree. 
They are a sort enlarged monopolies..." (Smith [1776] (1974), p. 164). 
I give another answer. It isn't based-on something >we can see, huton a 
deduction from a self-evidence- man act: we try to improve our situation. 
What's otherwise the use of acting? We search for new ends and means -
the entrepreneurial element in human action. The self-evidence is the fun-
damental axiom of the Austrian School of economic thought. But 
"[entrepreneurial activity from being competitive? Israel Kirzner says, "is 
always competitive and ... competitive activity is always entrepreneurial" 
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(Kinzer 1973 p. 94). For what would stop entreprenewrial activity from 
being competitive? "Competition ... is at least potentially present so long 
as there exist no arbitary impediments to entry. So long as others are free 
to offer the most attractive opportunities they are aware of, no one is free 
from both the urge and the need to compete" (Kirzner 1973 p. 97). And if 
a competitor seeks to outdistance his rivals this means transcending, en-
trepreneurially, a given ends-means relation. 
III. Competition among consumers: the why not 
But competition among consumers isn't that obvious, the billboards 
on Times Square show the consumer as a sovereign king, way above all 
down-to-earth competition. To speak of a chocolate or steel king, howev-
er, is misleading. For the producer, pride comes before a fall. The produc-
er competes, the consumer chooses. Serving-the-customer is a basic nor-
mative idea of our society. 
In other words, if the consumer doesn't compete, he isn't out of "busi-
ness" in no time. "[T]he masterful housewife," as Wesley Mitchell said, 
"cannot win away the husbands of slack managers as the masterful mer-
chant can win away the customers of the less able" (Mitchell 1912, p. 274). 
The Amish in Pennsylvania, who are living the way their ancestors did, 
are still alive. The producer has to please someone else, the consumer 
only himself, if no one may steal a march on me, free entry is absent. 
What's the answer of the Austrians-making, again., a deduction from a 
self-evidence? Aren't their central ideas: discovery, entrepreneurship, and 
alertness? Ideas bound up with competition. And didn't the older Aus-
trians put the consumer instead of the producer at the center of their theo-
ry? Value was no longer governed by past resource costs but by judge-
ments concerning future usefulness, in meeting consumerwants. 
Acting implies -as we saw- entrepreneurship: choosing ends and 
means. But the ends and means aren't given, they have to be discovered. 
Being human, however, both producer and cosnumer err. Choosing im-
plies making errors. An error isn't always a calculation mistake, solved 
with better calculation. Either is it .always the result of a lack of knowl-
edge, solved with knowledge that exists and we can search for. There's 
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also the possibility of a entrepreneurial error: an opportunity-costlessly 
available- is overlooked. We don't see the ten-dollar bill laying in front of 
us-for free. And it's the correction of these errors that interests the Aus-
trians. Errors solved with the entrepreneurial element in each of us: alert-
ness. Alertness is "the propensity ... toward fresh goals and the discovery 
of hitherto unknown resources" (Kirzner 1973, p. 34). 
But now the Austrians have the same problem. Thought the consumer 
discovers, errs, and is alert the quetion still is: Why should he do this rival-
rously? The answer isn't as obvious as it was for the producer. There are 
-differences in free entry. In theory the producer can fulfil his entrepreneu-
rial role without any means. He acts in between two markets: a buying 
and a selling market. Pure arbitrage is possible. Entry is free; rivalry is 
fierce. The consumer, on the other hand, acts in a buying market only. He 
has to possess means, entry isn't free. 
IV. Competition among consumers: the why 
Let's not give up our discussion of the market. There's rivarly when a 
consumer looks over his shoulder. He wants to know what opportunities 
others are about to embrace in order to embrace an at least as attractive 
one. Discovery and adjustment are two-fold. It is explicit rivalrous behav-
ior: I try to steal a march on my fellow consumers. But it also includes -
as is said for the producer- various, hardly secondary, degrees of coopera-
tion and copycat behavior. "[limitation can be an extremely entrepreneu-
rial act, particularly if it entails the opening of new markets for the inno-
vative product" (Baumol 1993, p. 157; cp. Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 8). 
"I remember him [Sam Walton, the founder of Wal-Mart] saying over and 
over again: go in and check our competition... If you get one good idea, 
that's more than you went into the store with, and we must try to incor-
porate it into our company" (Walton 1993, p. 81). Why does this count 
for the consumer as well? 
Firts, if I look at what others do, and at least not make a worse offer, I 
increase my chances to gain. I use the knowledge of others and gain by 
buying what everyone else does, through lower prices, a greater efficiency. 
Second, I am not only hopeful of the gains I get if I imitate, but, just as 
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important, fearful of the losses if I don't. Suppose I stick to my consump-
tion pattern. Consumption patterns, however, change. Heating is no long-
er done by coal but by gas. Getting coal becomes difficult and expensive. 
Third, I feel a certain urge to watch others. If I don't, the gains are low-
er: I will give up potential utility. Still not to use a washer is an example. 
Consumers cooperate and imitate. If you want to survive, you have, if 
not to set, at least to confirm a trend. Trends, fashions, and fads are the 
expressions of a competitive error-solving process. They are the work of 
the producer as well as of the consumer. In disequilibrium, imitation can 
be a way to discover opportunities. The risk, the cost, of doing everything 
on one's own may be too great. For the producer, "imitation may by able 
to achieve a given increase in productivity far more cheaply, in terms of 
real resources consumed in the process, than can be done by innovative 
effort" (Baumol 1993, p. 165). For the consumer, imitation replaces single 
high-cost consumers by groups of low-cost consumer. Consumers join to-
gether into retail cooperatives or different competing trends. 
Competition isn't a contest with one winer. Less successful consumers 
aren't eliminated; they are removed to a more modest place. Competi-
tion among consumers is niche competition. There's a place for everyone-
even for the Amish. Niche competition, Lester Thurow says, is win-win. 
Competiton among consumers in the old days and the exception I noted in 
these days are forms of head-to head competition. "Head-to head competi-
tion is never win-win, at best it is win-lose, and everyone can see it as po-
tentially lose-lose" (Thurow 1992, p. 58). 
V. Disequilibrium: the is of competition among consumers 
Now we know why consumers compete. They do it because they make 
errors, and try to correct them-disequilibrium phenomena. A disequilibri-
um points to market ignorance. From the ignorance emerge profitable 
opportunities competitive-entrepreneurial alertness exploits (Kirzner 
1979, p. 30). All that's necessary to let this happen, is that we live in a dis-
equilibrium: a world of change. Which of course we do. So the why and is 
of competition among consumers are the same. There's competition at all 
times and places. Competition among consumers isn't bound up with a 
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shortage. Just as competition among producers isn't with a surplus. 
What about free entry? Is there no role for it here as there was for it in 
competition among producers? Sociologically and psychologically there 
are costs to change a consumption pattern. I am not looking, however, 
for a change in prefernces. What Veblen describes can of course -as I did 
in the beginning- be called competition but it doesn't fit in here, it's soci-
ology. Likewise Robinson Crusoe had to be competitive. Competitive he 
had to be towards his own ideas. Ideas competing for recognition (Dewey 
1933, p. 103). But that's phychology and not my interest either. Nor, as-
suming stable preferences, I am looking for a change in relative prices or 
in income that could explain a change in consumption. I am looking for a 
competitive market process set in motion by unexploited opportunities. 
So again: What about free entry? 
It all depends on how one looks at it. Though for the producer entry is 
free for pure arbitrage it isn't for imitaiton. For the producer' imitation is 
stifled by patent protection-patent litigaitons enough. A protection that's 
unknown to the consumer. The producer has an advantage in arbitrage, 
equalizing prices, the consumer in imitation, equalizing utilities. 
VI. The marketing mix 
Indeed the end of the bidding up of prices by consumers since the days 
of Smith is one thing. But as long as they make entreprieneurial errors 
they compete when they try to solve them. The question is: if there are 
entrepreneurial errors and consumers try to solve them competitively, 
how to use this for pricing? 
Why pricing? Because of all the P's of marketing, pricing is less 
thought of from the point of view of competition among consumers. A 
producer prices a'praductfrom as little as possible to whatever the traffic 
will bear. He thinks about costs, competitors, and -in modern marketing-
especially customers. Product, placeand promotion, however, don't only 
put the customer first, but use competition too. Not only, just as pricing 
does, do they use competition among producers. Aren't there coopera-
tive, adaptive, opportunistic, and predatory prices (Nagle 1987, p. 86)? 
But they also use competition among consumers. They use the first form 
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of rivariy, I noted in the beginning: to keep up with the Joneses. And;they 
try to stimulate the consumer's entrepreneurial alertness. "The advertiser 
[for istance] has, as it were, injected a pleasant surprise into the world of 
the consumer. The consumer finds that his world, his range of options, is a 
little richer than he dared anticipate" (Kirzner 1988, p. xx). 
Price, in the 1970s, was the last P to include the consumer: his price 
sensitivity (Nagle 1987, p. xi; cp. Monroe 1990, p. 368). The emphasis, 
however, still is on the price-sensitive consumer per se: his entrepreneuri-
al alertness -not on his competitive- entrepreneurial alertness. The rea-
sons is probably the one I started with. Today, competition among consu-
mers -the bidding up of prices- in dormant. So, if it doesn't exist, and 
there's nothing else to replace it, what's there to be used? 
To put it differently. Pricing tries to harvest the value, the other P's 
sow the seeds of (Nagle 1987, p. 1). "[Pjrofits, not just sales, ...[are] the 
objective" (Hunt and Morgan 1995, p. 11). We know, however, that a 
price creates value too. A high price can fill status needs. But-there's an-
other way to create value-use the competitive-entrepreneurial consumer. 
Price can be used as an instrument of communication. It brings to the at-
tention: it creates value for competing consumers. Then price doesn't 
only harvest but sows the entrepreneurial process too. It induces immedi-
ate overt behavior by strengthening the announcement of the offer (cp. 
Waterschoot and Bulte 1992, p. 89). 
VII. Pricing a real novelty 
I look at the introduction of an innovative new product - a real novel-
ty. Something that's a potential mass product. How to price if there isn't 
a market yet? That's where entrepreneurial consumers come in. Then the 
consumer's entrepreneurship, the discovery of new means and ends, is 
paramount. The product has to be discovered, information diffused. The 
producer needs all the help he can get. Just as in the days of Smith, he can 
use competing buyers. Then it couldn't hurt, either, to bring the buyers to-
gether and organize the bidding. 
Pricing a new product is one of the most difficult pricing problems. 
"The newer the product, the greater the uncertainty associated with the 
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important, fearful of the losses If I don't. Suppose I stick to my consump-
tion pattern. Consumption patterns, however, change. Heating is no long-
er done by coal but by gas. Getting coal becomes difficult and expensive. 
Third, I feel a certain urge to watch others. If I don't, the gains are low-
er: I will give up potential utility. Still not to use a washer is an example. 
Consumers cooperate and imitate. If you want to survive, you have, if 
not to set, at least to confirm a trend. Trends, fashions, and fads are the 
expressions of a competitive error-solving process. They are the work of 
the producer as well as of the consumer. In disequilibrium, imitation can 
be a way to discover opportunities. The risk, the cost, of doing everything 
on one's own may be too great. For the producer, "imitation may by able 
to achieve a given increase in productivity far more cheaply, in terms of 
real resources consumed in the process, than can be done by innovative 
effort" (Baumol 1993, p. 165). For the consumer, imitation replaces single 
high-cost consumers by groups of low-cost consumer. Consumers join to-
gether into retail cooperatives or different competing trends. 
Competition isn't a contest with one winer. Less successful consumers 
aren't eliminated; they are removed to a more modest place. Competi-
tion among consumers is niche competition. There's a place for everyone-
even for the Amish. Niche competition, Lester Thurow says, is win-win. 
Competiton among consumers in the old days and the exception I noted in 
these days are forms of head-to head competition. "Head-to head competi-
tion is never win-win, at best it is win-lose, and everyone can see it as po-
tentially lose-loseV (Thurow 1992, p. 58). 
V. Disequilibrium: the is of competition among consumers 
Now we know why consumers compete. They do it because they make 
errors, and try to correct them-disequilibrium phenomena. A disequilibri-
um points to market ignorance. From the ignorance emerge profitable 
opportunities competitive-entrepreneurial alertness exploits (Kirzner 
1979, p. 30). All that's necessary to let this happen, is that we live in a dis-
equilibrium: a world of change. Which of course we do. So the why and is 
of competition among consumers are the same. There's competition at all 
times and places. Competition among consumers isn't bound up with a 
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everyone considers you a leader, a trend-setter, the surest way to keep 
that position is to play monkey. The best strategy is to follow the trend 
once it's adopted by the majority. In their eyes you can't loose. So, again, 
in economic competition the winner doesn't take it all. There's a place 
for everyone-even for the imitating trend-setter. Our problem becomes: 
If the innovators some-times, somehow don't lead, but imitate the imita-
tors, how to reach the imitators - your future mass market? 
Finally, the third strategy, to set a neutral price, doesn't look that great 
either. It's a passive strategy. It's one you use because of the default of 
the other more activist ones. And it's a negative strategy. It's the surren-
der of price to the other P's (Nagle 1987, p. 120). Still, it's the strategy I 
propose. However, I add some promotional pricing. Something that 
makes it the better world of the other two. The emphasis on and the sharp 
dichotomy between a skimming and a penetration price -ds is used in the 
marketing literature (Dean 1976, p. 147; Kotler 1964, p. 44; Monroe 
1990, p. 292)- clarifies. But not without a cost. 
VIII. The rule of competitive-entrepreneurial pricing 
When you want to use competing consumers, what price tactic to add 
to that neutral price? In other words, if the utter ignorance of means and 
ends creates entrepreneurial errors, how to use them for pricing? I give 
the rule of competitive-entrepreneurial pricing. 
A competing consumer is error-solving. He's alert to price signals and 
watches others. By doing that and at least not to offer a worse bid he in-
creases his chances to gain and minimizes those to lose. The producer can 
use this. For the producer the trick is to make it look as if the price signals 
a trend. For this, a simple sweepstake will do. The tactic might be to give 
a gift to every one hundredth who orders with a certain mailorder house, 
buying a product hitherto not sold by post. Or, to give a lottery ticket to 
every buyer who books a trip to a new destination with a certain travel 
agency. These tactics simply suggest that the buyer - isn't alone. He's riding 
a trend: solving an error. This is the rule of competitive-entrepreneurial 
pricing. 
It's essential not to give the gift to everyone. Give it every one hun-
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dredth buyer, or -if it's a prize- make the chance to win one out of thou^ 
sand. Otherwise it looks, at worse, as an ordinary cut in prices, valid for 
everyone-without any suggestion of a trend, at best; as the tactic of selling 
a new product with a;gift of known value. The last, indeed, helps selling 
the first. You're speeding-up the discovery process. Just as you speed-up 
the consumer's economizing process by making the sale for a limited pe-
riod or as long as supply lasts. It's better, however, to compare the rule 
with pricing a known product below the equilibrium price. The resulting 
signs of a shortage: waiting lines, delays in delivery, and the ticket scalper 
signal a trend too-not, however, of an unknown bu of a known product. 
Why settle on the neutral price? It signals the right value. A skimming 
price, almost by definition, would be contradiction. First, the happy few 
aren't interested in vulgar lotteries for the many. Second, the innovators 
aren't generally a random sample of buyers (Nagle 1987, p. 139). A lot-
tery, however, picks the winners at random. They innovators know that. 
So, it has little appeal to them. And a penetration price isn't necessary. 
For the consumer the gains are still pure discovery gains. Gains to be 
compared with the old way of spending. They aren't to be mixed up with 
the gains by economizing that are possible later on. Tiy to ride the trend. 
Don't throw money away by cutting prices. 
IX. How the government stifles entreprineurial pricing 
In pricing, next to costs, competitors, and customers there's of course 
the law. This doesn't seem to be a problem. Isn't, at least since the signing 
of the Sherman Act in 1890, the government one of the staunch defenders 
of competition? But though we all know of her trying to improve with 
anti-trust policy competition among producers, we never hear of her do-
ing the same for competition amongs consumers. In general the latter is 
thought to be taken care of, first, by the sheer number of buyers: there are 
many. Second, by a policy to create a more equal distribution of income. 
Just as on the producer's side of the market, big firms, oligopolies, are 
suspect, so too on the consumer's side, the big spenders, the wealthy oli-
garchy. But there's more. There are the specific regulations of the Federal 
Trade Commissions (FTC), Unfair or deceptive prices are forbidden 
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(Monroe 1990, pp. 405-406). The producer must be able to compete; at-
tempts to manipulate the competitive structure are forbidden. The consu-
mer must be able to express his wishes; he isn't to be misled. 
For.the FTC the rule of competitive-entrepreneurial pricing looks de-
ceptive. So it ought -at least potentially- to be banned. By a gift, you. lure 
the consumer to buy a good who's value is unknown to him. And will, in-
deed the future price -the one without the gift- be unchanged? A gift, to 
make it worse, only a few will have. It seems the buyer is misled. That, 
however, can't be. It aren't calculation or knowledge errors we're talking 
about. Then, indeed, you can lower the consumer's price sensitivity when 
you make comparison with competing offers difficult. The producer, for 
instance, uses calculation problems by pricing his eau de toilette 1.25 oz 
$17 instead of, as his competitor does, 1.50 oz. $20. And doesn't he use 
knowledge problems by pricing his firtilizer the same as his competitor? 
Claiming; however, that his fertilizer lasts twice as long. But does it (Na-
gle 1987, p. 61-62)? 
Here, however, it's new ends and means we are talking about. That's 
what the market is trying to find out. We aren't talking of products that 
are known and have substitutes, products which aren't that new (Tellis 
1986, p. 151-2). The regulations of the FTC stifle the discovery process. A 
process set in motion by competitive-entrepreneurial pricing. 
X. Conclusion 
The good news is that on pricing a real novelty you don't walk alone. 
Indeed, you have to start from scratch, but you can use competition 
among consumers in sprending the news. Of course you are serving the 
customer, but that doesn't mean he can't help you to deliverthe message. 
Where trends arexonceiveoV.consumers compete. They discover -create^ 
the market for you. Trends aren't sold by competingproducers, they.are. 
bought by competing consumers. 
How do you do it? By passively relying on word-of-mouth recommen-
dation? No, you can take the steer: You let the consumer know that he, 
too, isn't walking alone. Give him a lottery ticket when he buys your 
product. Now he knows, there's a chance he'll be a winner, out of say-
144 Part ED. The Austrian perspective on consumer policy 
130 Auke Lecn 
indeed-thousand other buyers. Then you give him value for money even 
before uses your product. 
Competition among consumers doesn't only help the producer. It 
helps the consumer to compete: to correct errors, too. Just as competi-
tion among producers helps the producer. "[IJf our story," Walton says in 
his autobiography, "doesn't prove anything else about the free market 
system, it erases any doubt that spirited competitions is good for business 
- not just customers, but the companies which have to compete with one 
another too. Our competitors have honed and sharpened us to an edge we 
wouldn't have without them" (1993, p. 242). 
The government has nothing to do with this tactic. It can't be decep-
tive. There's, simply, nothing to be deceptive of yet. You help the consu-
mer to discover new ends and means. To ban it the government stifles the 
discovery process the market is. In pricing new goods the government 
isn't the solution to spreading information the consumer might value. 
She's -again- part of the problem: holding him ignorant. 
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Eind jaren '60 werd een Amsterdamse huisvrouw verwond door een 
flesje tomatenketchup. Enkele weken nadat zij een flesje van het merk 
Heinz had aangeschaft, spatte het flesje uit elkaar toen zij het op 
volstrekt normale wijze wilde openen. De vrouw, die een bril droeg, 
kreeg een groot aantal scherven in haar Unkeroog. Zij sprak de 
fabrikant aan om schadevergoeding, maar had daarbij weinig succes. 
Een ander geval betrof een lekkende beddekruik. Een baby werd 
kort na de geboorte door de kraamverzorgster in een met een kruik 
verwarmde wieg gelegd. Toen de baby ongewoon hard ging huilen, 
inspecteerde de kraamverzorgster de wieg en ontdekte dat de kruik 
niet goed sloot. Heet water was uit de kruik in de wieg gelekt. De baby 
werd met brandwonden naar het ziekenhuis gebracht. De fabrikant 
Jumbo die de kruik had gemaakt, moest zieh verweren in een proces. 
Rechtbank en Hof wezen de vordering af. De Höge Raad kwam in zijn 
arrest echter tot een tegenovergestelde uitspraak. 
Bovenstaande voorbeelden zijn met andere, soortgelijke voorbeel-
den aan te vullen. Als beddekruiken lekken, flessen exploderen, wie 
draait er dan voor de schade op: de producent, de consument, beide of 
de gemeenschap in haar totaliteit? 
Dit hoofdstuk gaat dus over produktaansprakelijkheid. De bedoeling 
is een economische analyse te geven van het produktaansprakelijk-
heidsrecht.1 
We spreken van produktaansprakelijkheid als we een producent 
aansprakelijk willen stellen voor de schade die voortvloeit uit de 
omstandigheid dat hij een ondeugdelijk produkt op de markt heeft 
1. Te zamen met het in hoofdstuk 2 aangehaalde artikel van Coase uit 1960 vormt een 
artikel van Calabresi over de onrechtmatige daad het startpunt van de "new law and 
economics" (Guido Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts", Yale Law Journal, volume 70, maart 1961). 
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gebracht. Wij laten hierbij de contractuele aansprakelijkheid van de 
leverancier - de tussenpersoon van wie het slachtoffer een produkt 
geleverd kreeg - buiten beschouwing. Het bestaan van een directe 
contractuele band tussen slachtoffer en producent was lange tijd een 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde wilde er überhaupt van het bestaan van 
aansprakelijkheid van de producent sprake zijn. 
Belang van het onderwerp 
Het onderwerp produktaansprakelijkheid heeft zieh in Nederland in 
de afgelopen jaren in de nodige belangstelling mögen Verheugen. 
Reden voor deze belangstelling was naast de gegroeide onvrede met 
het systeem van produktaansprakelijkheid zoals dat tot voor kort in 
Nederland in zwang was, de in 1985 vastgestelde richtlijn van de 
Europese Gemeenschap over de harmonisatie van het produktaan-
sprakelijkheidsrecht binnen de Gemeenschap. We lichten de twee 
genoemde redenen nader toe. 
Voor de Jurist zijn de twee grootste euvels van het tot voor kort 
vigerende aansprakelijkheidssysteem enerzijds de enorme admini-
stratieve kosten verbünden aan de werking van het systeem (zoals de 
proceskosten) en anderzijds het niet-compenseren van het slachtoffer 
bij het ontbreken van schuld van de producent. De gebrekkige bescher-
ming van de consument vormde voor de Europese Gemeenschap een 
van de redenen om het produktaansprakelijkheidssysteem nader 
onder de loep te nemen. Uiterlijk op 30 juli 1988 diende er op grond van 
de EG-richtlijn een nieuwe, wettelijke regeling met betrekking tot 
produktaansprakelijkheid tot stand te zijn gebracht. 
Naast de bescherming van de consument is voor de Europese 
Gemeenschap het harmonisatie-aspect van belang. De Europese Ge-
meenschap streeft ernaar in 1992 een gemeenschappelijke markt tot 
stand te hebben gebracht. Onder een gemeenschappelijke markt wordt 
verstaan een vrij verkeer van goederen, personen, diensten en kapi-
taal. De verschillende produktaansprakehjkheidssystemen in'lie 
diverse lidstaten werken concurrentievervalsend en vormen een be-
lemmering voor het vrije goederenverkeer. De bedoelde coneurrentie-
vervalsing treedt op doordat de kostenfactoren - door de verschillen in 
produktaansprakelijkheidsregels - niet in alle lidstaten even zwaar 
wegen. Op de laatst genoemde reden van de Europese Gemeenschap 
zal in dit hoofdstuk niet nader worden ingegaan. 
Paragraafindeling 
Zoals al is aangegeven, is het doel van dit hoofdstuk het geven van een 
economische analyse van (de ontwikkeling in) het produktaansprake-
lijkheidsrecht. De opbouw van het hoofdstuk is als volgt. In paragraaf 
4.2 wordt een aantal begrippen geintrodueeerd en toegelicht. Het gaat 
daarbij allereerst om de twee stelsels van produktaansprakelijkheid, 
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schuld- en risico-aansprakelijkheid, die in dit hoofdstuk op hun effi-
cientie worden geanalyseerd. Vervolgens gaan wij nader in op de 
soorten kosten - alsmede hun onderlinge relatie - verbonden aan de 
preventie en de compensatie van schade. In paragraaf 4.3 beschrijven 
wij de onderscheiden benaderingen van jurist en econoom van het 
rechtsinstituut produktaansprakelijkheid. In paragraaf 4.4 schetsen 
wij - allereerst onder een tweetal stringente verondersteUingen - de 
efEciente regeling van produktaansprakelijkheid. De gemaakte veron-
dersteUingen, het bestaan van risico-neutraliteit en het ontbreken van 
transactiekosten, laten wij vervolgens vallen. In paragraaf 4.5 bekij-
ken wij, aan de hand van een voorbeeld, in hoeverre in de Nederlandse 
rechtspraak en de ontwikkeling daarvan een achterliggende eco-
nomische logica te herkennen valt. Paragraaf 4.6 geeft een samenvat-
ting van het behandelde. 
4.2 Begripsbepaling 
Op grond van de EG-richtlijn uit 1985 zijn wij in Nederland onlangs 
van een systeem van schuldaansprakelijkheid overgegaan op een 
systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid, waar het de aansprakelijkheid 
van de producent voor schade door gebrekkige en daardoor gevaarlijke 
Produkten betreft2. Deze verandering lichten we in het onderstaande 
kort toe. 
Schuldaansprakelijkheid 
Het systeem in Nederland ten aanzien van produktaansprakelijkheid 
was tot voor kort een stelsel van schuldaansprakelijkheid. Onder 
het vigerende recht diende degene die door een gebrekkig produkt 
schade leed, behalve het gebrek, de schade en het oorzakelijk verband 
tussen beide, in beginsel ook schuld van de producent te bewijzen. 
Waarbij het wel zo was dat in veel gevallen de producent moest 
bewijzen dat hem geen verwijt trof. Zo kon Heinz de rechter overtuigen 
dat in het produktieproces geen fout was gemaakt. Hetgeen de bedde-
kruikfabrikant Jumbo echter niet lukte. Dit leidde ertoe dat het 
slachtoffer bij het ontbreken van een foutieve gedraging van de 
producent niet werd gecompenseerd. 
Risico-aansprakelijkheid 
Met name het bewijs van schuld van de producent was onder het 
systeem van schuldaansprakelijkheid voor de benadeelde moeilijk te 
2. Vgl. de invoering van art. 1407 a t/m j BW bij wet van 13 September 1990 
(inwerMngtreding 1 november 1990), Stb. 487. 
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leveren. Een oplossing voor dit probleem is minder zware eisen te 
stellen aan de bewijslast. Als een uiterste consequentie wordt het 
schuldvereiste als zodanig gesehrapt, wanneer het gaat om schade-
claims tegen producenten van gebrekkige Produkten. Een produkt is 
gebrekkig, ondeugdelijk, indien het niet de veiligheid verschaft die 
men ervan mag verpachten.3 We spreken dan over een systeem van 
schuldloze aansprakelijkheid of risico-aansprakelijkheid. Be-
paalde personen worden dan aansprakelijk gesteld voor de schade, 
ongeacht of hen een verwijt treft voor het ontstaan van de schade. Deze 
aansprakelijkheid is gewoon een risico dat men loopt wanneer men 
handelend gaat optreden. Dit betekent dus dat de producent 
aansprakelijk kan worden gesteld voor schade veroorzaakt door een 
gebrekkig produkt, zonder dat de benadeelde het moeilijke bewijs van 
schuld van de producent behoeft te leveren. 
In de Europese richtlijn is voor een systeem van risico-aansprake-
lijkheid gekozen. Dit systeem diende dan ook in Nederland te worden 
gerealiseerd. Door invoering van risico-aansprakelijkheid wordt de 
rechtspositie van de consument - hij behoeft het moeilijke bewijs van 
de schuld van de producent niet meer te leveren - sterk verbeterd. 
Ongevalskosten 
We bekijken de twee voorbeelden die in de inleiding gegeven zijn nader 
op de kostenaspecten. Het eerste dat opvalt is dat de slachtoffers door 
middel van een juridisch proces compensatie zochten voor de door hen 
geleden schade. Dat ging echter gepaard met hoge proceskosten (in het 
Jumbo- of lekkende-beddekruik-arrest verliep de rechtsgang via 
Rechtbank eh Hof naar Hoge Raad). Kenmerkend is dan ook dat in het 
tweede voorbeeld, de lekkende beddekruik, - zulks in verband met het 
feit dat de Gemeente in diens rechten jegens Jumbo was gesubrogeerd 
- het niet het slachtoffer zelf was, maar de Gemeente Amsterdam (het 
ziekenfonds), die het proces aanspande. Kennelijk beschikte deze 
laatste over ruimere financiele middelen en een längere adem. 
Vervolgens zijn er de kosten, die het bedrijf moet maken om een 
deugdelijk en ongevaarlijk produkt op de markt te brengen. Zo slaagde 
Heinz, die per jaar zo'n drie miljoen flesjes tomatenketchup produ-
ceert, er in de rechter te overtuigen dat elk van die flesjes voor het 
verlaten van de fabriek grondig is gecontroleerd. 
Wij onderscheiden de door ongevallen in de maatschappij ver-
oorzaakte kosten dan ook in drie categorieen, te weten kosten van het 
voorkömen van schade (primaire ongevalskosten), kosten van het 
vergoeden van schade (secundaire ongevalskosten) en de bijko-
3. Voor een nadere juridische begripsbepaling verwijzen we naar een recent artikel van R. 
Dekkersin Ars Aequi 1987, pp. 610-620, "Hetwetsvoorstelproduktaansprakelijkheid." 
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mende kosten, zoals de genoemde proceskosten (tertiaire ongevals-
kosten). 
Reductie van de ongevalskosten 
In het streven naar efficiëntie - waarover in paragraaf 4.4 meer - speelt 
het terugdringen van de totale ongevalskosten een belangrijke rol. In 
de uitwerking van deze doelstelling treedt de relatie tussen de zojuist 
genoemde kostencategorieën op de voorgrond. 
De reductie van de primaire en secundaire ongevalskosten in 
combinatie kan tot op zekere hoogte tegenstrijdig genoemd worden. 
Dit wordt duidelijk als de primaire en secundaire kosten tot hun kern, 
prévenue en compensatie, teruggebracht worden. Een volledige com-
pensatio, bijvoorbeeld verkregen door een volledige verzekering tegen 
schade, kan strijdig zijn met een op preventie gerichte verdeling van 
het risico over de mensen. Consument en producent kunnen in het 
eerste geval namelijk onvoorzichtiger gaan handelen. Voor beide dekt 
de volledige compensatie, verkregen door de verzekering, immers de 
schade. Dit is een voorbeeld van moreel risico. De kans op het ontstaan 
van een gebeurtenis is afhankelijk van de eigen gedragingen. Deze 
eigen gedragingen zijn op hun beurt afhankelijk van de vraag of 
iemand verzekerd is of niet (zie hoofdstuk 3). 
Zoals genoemd zijn er ook de kosten die voortvloeien uit (de reductie 
van) de primaire en secundaire kosten. De werking en toepassing van 
het produktaansprakehjkheidsrecht vormen op hun beurt namelijk 
ook zelf weer kosten voor de maatschappij. Deze tertiaire ongevalskos-
ten hangen af van de efficiëntie van de administratieve en juridische 
behandeling van de twee eerst genoemde kostensoorten. De grootte 
van deze tertiaire kosten is als het wäre een contrôle van de wijze 
waarop primaire en secundaire kosten worden opgevangen. 
Overigens kan opgemerkt worden dat in het streven naar efficiëntie. de 
vermindering van ongevalskosten geen absolute regel is. Ongevals-
kosten kunnen noch moeten te allen koste vermeden worden. Sommige 
risico-dragende activiteiten worden immers getolereerd, omdat het 
nut van de betrokken aktiviteit het daaraan verbunden ongevallen-
risico ver overstijgt. Wij zijn niet bereid alle autoverkeer te verbieden 
ook al is dat de enige zekere méthode om verkeersongelukken uit te 
schakelen. Het komt er op aan de ongevalskosten af te wegen tegen het 
nut van de risico-dragende activiteit. In de economische terminologie 
spreekt men van de optimalisatie van het risieo. 
We kunnen deze optimalisatie van het risico als volgt illustreren. 
Gesteid kan worden dat geen produkt geheel ongevaarlijk is. Zo is er 
bijvoorbeeld bijna geen geneesmiddel zonder bijwerking. De vraag is 
alleen welke bijwerkingen van een bepaald geneesmiddel nog aan-
vaardbaar zijn. Die tolerantiegrens ligt voor de pil aanmerkelijk lager 
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dan voor chemotherapieen, die dienen om de gevolgen van dodelijke 
kankers te beperken. Ook een kleine auto is in onze maatschappij niet 
onaanvaardbaar gevaarlijk. Een kleine auto stelt de bestuurder bij een 
frontale botsing echter wel aan een aanzienlijk grotere kans op licha-
melijk letsel bloot dan de standaard Amerikaanse slee. Kennehjk 
overtreffen de baten van dit produkt (de läge prijs en het läge 
benzineverbruik) de kosten (het grotere risico op Hchamelijk letsel bij 
ongevallen). 
4.3 De verschilfende invalshoeken van jurist en econoom 
Wat is het kenmerkende van de economische benadering van produkt-
aansprakelijkheid? Zo op het eerste gezicht lijkt het kostenaspect toch 
alom tegenwoordigin de juridische discussie rond produktaansprake-
lijkheid. Voor de consument wordt het immers gemakkelijker en 
daarmee goedkoper - nu hij het moeilijke bewijs van de schuld niet 
meer behoeft te leveren - zijn schade op de producent te verhalen. En 
voor de producent staan toch de verhoogde aansprakelijkheidskosten 
en de mogelijkheid tot verzekeren centraal. Een antwoord op deze 
vraag naar het eigene van de economische benadering van het recht 
vinden wij door de verschillende kijk op aansprakelijkheid van jurist 
en econoom te expliciteren. 
Compensatie versus preventie 
Voor de jurist is het aansprakehjkheidsrecht in de eerste plaats een 
instrument van compensatie van de door de slachtoffers geleden 
schade. Als de jurist vanuit dit gezichtspunt een beroep doet op de 
econoom, kan dat bijvoorbeeld een beroep zijn dat erin bestaat uitleg 
te vragen over de schadebegroting. Vergelijk de zo juist met betrekkirjg 
tot de juridische discussie rond produktaansprakelijkheid genoemde 
traditionele kostenaspecten. 
Als de econoom zieh daarentegen gaat begeven op het terrein van het 
aansprakehjkheidsrecht dan denkt hij in eerste instantie niet aan de 
vergoeding van de schade. Waar de econoom aan denkt is "Hoe 
voorkomen wij ongevallen?". Zijn vraag luidt: "Hoe kunnen wij de 
ongevalskosten zoveel mogelijk minimahser en, rekening houdend met 
het nut van de risico-dragende activiteit?" 
Het gaat de econoom in de eerste plaats om de preventieve funetie 
van de aansprakelijkheidsregels. Voor de jurist gaat het om de vergoe-
ding van de kosten van het slachtoffer nadat het ongeval heeft plaats 
gevonden. Economen hanteren daarmee een benadering "ex ante", 
terwijl Juristen hoofdzakelijk een benadering "ex post" hanteren. Wij 
kunnen dus concluderen dat de econoom en de jurist voor wat het 
produktaansprakehjkheidsrecht betreft niet op eenzelfde vraag een 
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verschillend antwoord geven. Veeleer hebben wij te maken met een 
verschil in vraagstelling. 
Efficientie versus rechtvaardigheid 
Wij kimnen de verschillende invalshoek van jurist en econoom ook als 
volgt formuleren. Het uitgangspunt van de econoom is de stalling dat 
het produktaansprakelijkheidsrecht het beste begrepen kan en moet 
worden op grond van een economische redenering die is gebaseerd op 
het efficientie-criterium. De expliciete juridische benaderingis veelal 
gebaseerd op begrippen als rechtvaardigheid en billijkheid. Denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan de Robin-Hood-achtige gedachtengang die stelt dat 
de beste manier om het schaderisico toe te bedelen erin bestaat de 
schade te leggen op diegene die ze het best kan dragen, dat is degene 
die de sterkere economische machtspositie bekleedt. 
De hierboven geschetste tegenstellingen tussen econoom en jurist - ex 
ante/ex post; efficientie/rechtvaardigheid - zijn echter minder strin-
gent dan zij op het eerste gezicht lijken. Zo kan de jurist, bij zijn 
beslissing over de verdeling van de schadelasten, het effect op toekom-
stig gedrag van deze beslissing - gegeven de precedentwerking - niet 
buiten beschouvving laten. Om dezelfde reden is de econoom ook 
gei'nteresseerd in de beslissing inzake de verdeling van de schadelas-
ten. 
4.4 Efficientie van produktaansprakelijkheidssystemen 
4.4.1 Inleiding 
In deze paragraaf beoordelen wij verschillende produktaansprakelijk-
heidssystemen op hun bijdrage aan de maatschappelijke efficientie. 
Bij onze analyse zullen wij allereerst uitgaan van de veronderstellin-
gen van risico-neutrahteit en van het ontbreken van transactiekosten. 
Risico-neutraliteit (vergehjk paragraaf 3.2.3) impliceert dat het 
verwachte nut van verschillende onzekere inkomensposities over-
eenkomt met het nut van het verwachte inkomen. Anders gezegd, 
betrokkenen zijn niet bereid een risico-premie te betalen om een stuk 
onzekerheid kwijt te raken; ze hebben geen behoefte zieh te verze-
keren. Voor onze analyse betekent dit dat we ons (voorlopig) niet 
hoeven te bekümmeren om de risico-houding van de betrokkenen, en 
kunnen volstaan met aandacht voor verwachte kosten en opbrengsten. 
De veronderstelde afwezigheid van transactiekosten impliceert 
(vergehjk paragraaf 2.3.3) dat alle betrokkenen kosteloos over alle 
relevante informatie kunnen beschikken, en dat ze zonder kosten 
contracten kunnen afsluiten en de naleving daarvan verzekeren. In 
concreto betekent dit dat we er (voorlopig) van zullen uitgaan dat alle 
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betrokkenen over volledige üiformatie beschikken, en dat de tertiaire 
ongevalskosten nul zijn. 
In latere subparagrafen zullen we de gemaakte veronderstellingen 
verzachten. In paragraaf 4.4.4 laten we de veronderstelling van risico-
neutraliteit vaÜen. En in paragraaf 4.4.5 gaan we in op de transactie-
kosten die met de verschallende produktaansprakelijkheidssystemen 
verbonden zijn. 
Voorts gaan we er in eerste instantie vanuit dat alleen de producent, 
via de door hem betrachte zorgvuldigheid bij ontwerp en fabricage van 
het produkt, invloed kan uitoefenen op de kans op een ongeval met het 
produkt. In paragraaf 4.4.6 zullen we nader stilstaan bij de mogelijk-
heid' dat ook de consument invloed heeft op de ongevalskans. 
In paragraaf 4.4.7 besteden we aandacht aan overwegingen van 
billijkheid en risico-spreiding. 
In een aparte sectie, paragraaf 4.4.8, bekijken we tenslotte de 
mogelijkheid om af te zien van een produktaansprakehjkheidsregeling 
en in plaats daarvan de schade als gevolg van ongevallen inet gebrek-
kige Produkten te dekken via een sociale zekerheidsregeling. 
4.4.2 Afbakening van de efficientie-analyse 
Bij een analyse van de bijdrage van de produktie en het gebruik van 
risico-volle Produkten aan de maatschappelijke efficientie is een 
tweetal aspecten in het geding. In de eerste plaats is dat de omvang van 
de produktie. Daarbij gaat het om de afweging van het nut van (extra 
eenheden van) het produkt tegenover de kosten. Omwille van de 
efficientie (vergelijk hoofdstuk 2) dienen in deze afweging alle rele-
vante kostenaspecten meegenomen te worden; naast de directe 
produktiekosten dienen dus ook alle ongevalskosten in de beschou-
wing betrokken te worden. Als niet alle kosten in de afweging worden 
betrokken lijkt het produkt goedkoper dan het feitelijk is, en wordt er 
van het produkt meer geproduceerd en geconsumeerd dan met het oog 
op efficientie goed is. 
In de tweede plaats is voor efficientie vereist dat, ongeacht de 
omvang van de produktie, steeds zodanig te werk wordt gegaan dat de 
(totale) kosten op het laagst bereikbare niveau terechtkomen. Zo niet, 
dan is er sprake van verspilling. Voorts zal het produkt duurder zijn 
dan eigenlijk nodig is, zodat er minder van wordt geconsumeerd dan 
eigenlijk mogelijk en gewenst is. Er is dan sprake van inefficientie. 
De vraag die wij ons bij elk produktaansprakelijkheidssysteem nu 
zullen stellen is of de regeling ervoor zorgt dat in de afwegingen 
rondom produktie en aankoop van een produkt alle relevante kosten in 
de beschouwing worden betrokken, en of dat zodanig gebeurt dat de 
totale kosten worden germmmaliseerd. Indien dat het geval is zal in 
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een goed werkende markteconomie (vergelijk hoofdstuk 1) ook de 
keuze van de omvang van de produktie en afzet efficient geschieden. 
Dit laatste aspect hoeven we dan verder niet expliciet aan de orde te 
stellen. 
Centraal staat dus in het vervolg de vraag of produktaansprakelijk-
heidsregehngen er voor zorgen dat bij risico-volle produkten alle 
kosten worden meegewogen, en of die kosten op het laagst haalbare 
niveau uitkomen. Als we deze vraag positief kunnen beantwoorden, is 
voldaan aan de voorwaarden voor efficientie. 
4.4.3 Produktaansprakelijkheid en het Coase-theorema 
Een getalienvoorbeeld 
Welk systeem van produktaansprakelijkheid verdient vanuit een 
oogpunt van efficientie de voorkeur? Om het antwoord op deze vraag 
te krijgen werken wij ons eerste voorbeeld over het "exploderende" 
flesje tomatenketchup uit de inleiding verder uit. We kleden het 
voorbeeld daartoe met getalien aan (zie tabel 4.1). 
Het is aannemehjk te veronderstellen dat het mogelijk is - tegen 
hogere kosten - flessen te ontwerpen respectievelijk te produceren 
waarvan het explosiegevaar geringer is. Omwille van de eenvoud 
beperken we ons in eerste instantie tot twee niveaus van zorg. ZI is het 
oorspronkelijke niveau van zorg en ZU staat voor het verhoogde niveau 
van zorg. 
Tobel 4.1 Twee niveaus van zorg 
Niveau Produktie- Kans op een Geldelijke Verwachte Volledige 
van kosten per ongeval schade bij schade kosten per 
zorg eenheid ongeval eenheid 
produkt 
ZI f0,20 1/100.000 f 100.000,- f 1,00 f 1,20 
ZU f0,25 1/200.000 f 100.000,- f0,50 f0,75 
De tabel brengt tot uitdrukking dat de directe produktiekosten toene-
men, indien een verhoogd niveau van zorg en contrôle wordt aange-
houden tijdens het ontwerpen en de fabricage van een flesje. Door de 
betrachte grotere zorgvuldigheid wordt evenwel de kans op exploderen 
van een flesje gehalveerd, zeg van 1/100.000 naar 1/200.000. Indien we 
er verder van uit gaan dat de schade die wordt aangericht bij het 
exploderen van een flesje, kan worden begroot op f 100.000,-, kan bij 
beide niveaus van zorg de verwachte schade worden berekend. Optel-
len van de produktiekosten en de verwachte schade geeft de totale 
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kosten per eenheid produkt. De totale kosten blijken bij niveau van 
zorg ZU lager te zijn (f 0,75) dan bij ZI (f 1,20); de produktiekosten zijn 
weliswaar 5 cent hoger, maar de verwachte schade valt 50 cent lager 
uit. Vanuit efficientie-oogpunt verdient ZU dus de voorkeur. 
Het effect van het produktaansprakeiijkheidssysteem 
Laten we nu achtereenvolgens eens bekijken wat er zal gebeuren bij 
een produktaansprakehjkheidssysteem gebaseerd op risico-aanspra-
kehjkheid, een systeem gebaseerd op schuldaansprakehjkheid, en een 
situatie waarbij de producent in het geheel geen aansprakelijkheid 
draagt. Let wel, wij doen dit onder de beide verondersteUingen van 
risico-neutrahteit en het ontbreken van transactiekosten (met name 
wordt het bestaan van volledige informatie aangenomen). 
Bij een systeem van risico-aansprakehjkheid draait een producent 
bij ieder ongeluk voor de schade op. De producent wordt daarom bij 
ieder niveau van zorg met de volledige kosten geconfronteerd. Gezien 
de kosten uit onze tabel zal bij besluiten bij een niveau van zorg ZU te 
produceren. Aldaar zijn zijn kosten het laagst. ledere producent die op 
niveau ZI gaat produceren zal door producenten die op niveau ZU 
produceren uit de markt worden geconcurreerd. 
Stel dat in geval van een systeem van schuldaansprakehjkheid de 
producent aansprakelijk is bij een niveau van zorg ZI. Dat klinkt 
redelijk omdat de producent wel degelijk grotere zorgvuldigheid had 
kunnen betrachten. We nemen verder aan dat bij ZU de producent geen 
blaam treft. Wat betekent dit voor de afweging van de producent? Zijn 
kosten per eenheid produkt bedragen bij ZI f 1,20 (de produktiekosten 
plus de verwachte schade in verband met zijn aansprakelijkheid) en bij 
ZU f 0,25 (alleen de produktiekosten; geen aansprakelijkheid). De 
producent zal dus in beginsel opteren voor ZU. De marktwerHng zorgt 
er vervolgens voor dat de prijs van het produkt op de markt f 0,25 
wordt. De consumenten zullen - onder de aanname van volledige 
informatie - voor het met zorg ZU geproduceerde produkt de volledige 
prijs berekenen. Omdat ze weten dat de producent niet aansprakelijk 
is voor eventuele schade, zullen ze naast de marktprijs van f 0,25 ook 
rekening houden met de verwachte ongevalskosten van f 0,50. De läge 
marktprijs zal hen er dus niet toe verleiden te veel van het produkt te 
kopen. 
Indien de producent in het geheel niet aansprakelijk is voor de 
aangerichte schade, komen alleen de directe produktiekosten voor zijn 
rekening. Hij zal dus een zekere voorkeur hebben voor produktie met 
een zorgniveau ZI. Bij afwezigheid van een systeem met produkt-
aansprakelijkheid weten de consumenten dat zij zelf geheel voor de 
schade opdraaien. Onder de aanname van volledige informatie zullen 
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zij toch de volledige prijs calculeren. Ze onderkermen dat voor een met 
zorg ZI geproduceerd flesje in de winkel weliswaar een lagere prijs 
betaald hoeft te worden, maar dat alles te zamen genomen het gebruik 
van een dergelijk flesje duurder uitkomt dan van een met zorg ZII 
geproduceerd produkt. Er zal kortom alleen vraag zijn naar flesjes van 
zorgniveau ZII. Dat gegeven zijnde zullen producenten alleen flesjes 
met zorgniveau ZII produceren. 
Overzien wij nu het voorgaande, dan blijkt ongeacht de keuze van het 
systeem van produktaansprakelijkheid het uiteindeHjke resultaat 
hetzelfde te zijn (keuze van zorgniveau ZII); het resultaat correspon-
deert bovendien met de efficiente oplossing. 
Wij zien bier, kortom, het Coase-theorema uit hoofdstuk 2 weer 
terug. 
Het efficiente niveau van zorg 
Wij hebben ons tot nu toe beperkt tot een eenvoudig getallenvoorbeeld 
met twee niveaus van zorg. We kunnen de analyse ook veralgemeni-
seren en een continuum aan zorgmogelijkheden veronderstellen. Zie 
figuur 4.1. De met ZI en ZII aangeduide niveaus van zorg correspon-
deren met die van tabel 4.1. 
De betrachte zorgvuldigheid in de produktie - preventie van onge-
vallen - wordt als een percentage gezien. Een nul-percentage van 
zorgvuldigheid betekent dat er geen aandacht wordt geschonken aan 
de gevolgen - in de zin van berokkende schade - van het op de markt 
brengen van het produkt. Een percentage van honderd procent in de 
betrachte zorgvuldigheid betekent dat er geen kosten uit de gevolgen 
van het op de markt brengen van het produkt kunnen voortvloeien, die 
niet te voorkomen waren geweest. De eerste situatie - een nul-percen-
tage van zorg - brengt slechts betrekkelijk geringe (produktie)kosten 
voor de producent met zieh mee, terwijl het tweede geval - honderd 
procent zorg - zeer hoge kosten voor de producent met zieh mee brengt. 
Dit is tot uiting gebracht in de curve "kosten van zorg". De kosten'van 
schade hebben een spiegelbeeldig verloop. Naarmate grotere zorgvul-
digheid wordt betracht bij de fabricage van het produkt, zal de 
ongevallenkans en daarmee de verwachte schade afnemen. De totale 
kosten bestaan uit de kosten van zorg en de kosten van schade. De 
optelling van de beide afzonderlijke kostencurven leidt tot de U-
vormige totale kostencurve. 
Het optimale niveau van zorg is ZII. Het laagste niveau van de totale 
kosten bepaalt het efficiente niveau van zorg: meer zorg uitoefenen 
betekent weliswaar minder verwachte schade, maar hogere kosten 
van zorg; minder zorg uitoefenen betekent weliswaar lagere kosten 
van zorg, maar grotere verwachte schade. Efficient is dat niveau van 
zorg dat de laagste totale kosten met zieh brengt. 
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Figuur 4.1: Het efficiente niveau van zorg 
De betrachte zorgvuldigheid in de produktie van een in potentie gevaarlijk produkt 
is als eenpercentage afgezet op de horizontale as. Naarmate grotere zorgvuldigheid 
wordt betracht nemen de kosten voor de producent van ontwerp en fabricage van 
het produkt toe (de "kosten van zorg"-curve); tegelijk nemen de ongevallenkans en 
- daarmee - de verwachte schade als gevolg van het gebruik van het produkt af (de 
"kosten van schade"-curve). Efficient is dat niveau van zorg waarbij de totale kosten 
(zorg plus schade) minimaal zijn. Dat is bij ZU. 
Nogmaals het Coase-theorema 
Met behulp van de bij het getallenvoorbeeld gehanteerde logica valt 
eenvoudig na te gaan dat ook in het meer algemene geval van figuur 4.1 
de uiteindehjke keuze van producenten en consumenten zal vallen op 
het efficiente zorgniveau (ZU), ongeacht het geldende systeem van 
produktaansprakelijkheid. 
Bij risico-aansprakehjkheid weet de producent dat de kosten van 
zorg en de kosten van schade, anders gezegd: de prirnaire en de 
secundaire ongevalskosten, voor zijn rekening komen. Het rninimum 
van de totale kosten voor de producent wordt bereikt bij zorgniveau 
ZU; zie figuur 4.1. De marktprijs van het produkt zal gebaseerd zijn op 
het bijbehorende kostenniveau, zodat de consument een correct sig-
naal krijgt omtrent de (minimale) volledige kosten van het produkt. 
Bij schuldaansprakehjkheid hoeft de producent alleen maar de 
kosten van schade te vergoeden, indien hij onvoldoende zorg heeft 
betracht. Vanaf zorgniveau ZU treft de producent geen blaam voor 
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eventuele ongelukken. Het kostenplaatje voor de producent wordt nu 
weergegeven door figuur 4.2. Tot ZII komen de kosten van zorg en van 
schade voor rekening van de producent, vanaf ZII alleen nog maar de 
kosten van zorg. Het minimum van de totale kosten voor de producent 
wordt bereikt bij ZU. De producent kiest voor zorgniveau ZII. Het 
(minimum) kostenniveau bedraagt f 0,25, en dat zal onder volledig 
vrije mededinging ook de marktprijs worden. De volledig geinfor-
meerde consumenten kennen echter de kosten van schade, en weten 
dat die voor hun rekening komen; zij kennen dan de volledige prijs van 
het produkt, en zullen er niet te veel van kopen. 
kosten 
Figuur 4.2: Het kostenplaatje voor de producent bij schuldaansprakelijkheid 
Bij schuldaansprakelijkheid hoeft de producent alleen maar schade te vergoeden 
in dien bij onvoldoende zorgvuldigheid heeft betracht, met andere woorden tot ZII. 
Vanaf ZII is de schade voor rekening van de consument. 
Tot ZII bestaan de totale kosten voor de producent dus uit de kosten van zorg plus 
de kosten van schade. Vanaf ZII bestaan de totale kosten voor de producent alleen 
nog maar uit de kosten van zorg. 
Het minimum van de totale kosten voor de producent wordt bereikt bij ZII. 
Tenslotte, bij afwezigheid van enigerlei vorm van aansprakelijkheid 
heeft de producent alleen te maken met de kosten van zorg. Het 
kostenminimum voor de producent wordt dan bereikt bij zorgniveau 0. 
Volledig geinformeerde consumenten zullen echter niet alleen afgaan 
op de op de kosten van zorg gebaseerde prijs van het produkt, maar 
daar de kosten van schade bij optellen die voor hun rekening komen. 
Zij zullen de met zorgniveau 0 geproduceerde eenheden produkt dan 
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ook links laten liggen, en alleen maar met zorg ZII geproduceerde 
eenheden vragen. Bij zorgniveau ZU zijn namelijk de volledige kosten 
voor de consumenten minimaal. Producenten kunnen de met weinig 
zorg en läge kosten geproduceerde eenheden produkt aan de straat-
stenen niet kwijt, en zullen overstappen op het wat duurdere zorg-
niveau ZII waarvoor wel een afzetmarkt bestaat. 
4.4.4 Risico-aversie 
In het voorgaande is aannemelijk gemaakt dat onder de gemaakte 
veronderstellingen (risico-neutraHteit en het ontbreken van transac-
tiekosten) het uiteindehjke resultaat efficient is, ongeacht de keuze 
van de produktaansprakelijkheidsregeling. Wij laten in deze subpara-
graaf allereerst de veronderstelling van risico-neutraliteit vallen. 
Verzekeringen 
Welke consequenties heeft het loslaten van de veronderstelling van 
risico-neutraliteit voor het gedrag van producenten en consumenten? 
Laten we veronderstellen dat beiden risico-avers zijn. 
We weten uit hoofdstuk 3 dat risico-averse personen zieh graag 
willen verzekeren tegen risico. Ze zijn bereid daarvoor een premie te 
betalen die even hoog is als het verwachte schadebedrag; de premie 
mag eventueel zelfs wat hoger liggen. Indien er geen bijzondere 
(informatie)problemen zijn, zal volledigvrije mededinging op de verze-
keringsmarkt er voor zorgen dat de verzekering ook wordt aangeboden 
en dat de premie (in ieder geval op de lange termijn, en afgezien van 
administratiekosten bij de verzekeraar) gelijk wordt aan het ver-
wachte schadebedrag. 
Laten we deze kennis uit hoofdstuk 3 nu toepassen in onze efficiën-
tie-analyse van de verschillende produktaansprakelijkheids-
systemen. We nemen daarbij figuur 4.1 weer als uitgangspunt. 
Uniforme premie 
Bij risico-aansprakehjkheid zullen risico-averse producenten zieh 
wensen te verzekeren tegen eventuele schadeclaims. Laten we in 
eerste instantie aannemen dat de verzekeringspremie gebaseerd is op 
de gemiddelde ongevallenkans in de bedrijfstak en de daarbij beho-
rende verwachte schade (zeg f 0,50 per eenheid produkt). Het kosten-
plaatje voor de producent wordt dan weergegeven door figuur 4.3. De 
"kosten van schade"-curve uit figuur 4.1 is verdwenen en vervangen 
door een "verzekeringspremie"-hjn. De producent betaalt een bepaalde 
verzekeringspremie per eenheid produkt; de eventuele schadeclaims 
worden gedekt door de verzekering. 
Welke gedragslijn zal de producent nu volgen? Heel eenvoudig: de 
producent zal zorgniveau 0 kiezen. Zijn totale kosten zijn dan het 
laagste. Doordat het produkt met weinig zorg wordt gefabriceerd, 










100 niveau van zorg (in procenten) 
Figuur 4.3: De producent verzekert zieh tegen schadeclaims 
Een risico-averse producent zal zieh bij risicc-aarisprakelijkheid willen verzekeren 
tegen eventuele schadeclaims. Indien de verzekeringspremie - bijvoorbeeld geba-
seerd op de gemiddelde ongevallenkans in de bedrijfstak - geen rekening houdt met 
de door de producent betrachte zorgvuldigheid, zal de producent Mezen voor niveau 
van zorg 0. Zijn totale kosten zijn dan minimaal. (De schadeclaims komen voor 
rekening van de verzekeraar.) 
neemt het aantal schadeclaims van consumenten fors toe. Aangezien 
de consumenten echter volledig schadeloos worden gesteld door de 
verzekeraar, zullen zij het produkt rüstig blijven kopen. 
De Problemen mögen nu duidelijk zijn. In de eerste plaats komt er 
geen efficient resultaat tot stand; het betrachte niveau van zorg is 6-in 
plaats van ZU. In de tweede plaats lijdt de verzekeraar grote verliezen 
omdat de premie-opbrengsten onvoldoende zijn om de kosten van 
schade te dekken. Beide Problemen hangen ten nauwste samen en 
worden veroorzaakt door het optreden van moreel risico. Indien de 
producent volledig verzekerd is tegen een vaste premie, heeft hij er 
geen belang meer bij om tegen hoge kosten van zorg zorgvuldigheid te 
betrachten. 
De hierboven geschetste situatie is natuurlijk geen lang leven 
beschoren. De verzekeraar zal als reactie op zijn verliezen zijn beleid 
moeten aanpassen. Hij zou kunnen overwegen de premie te verhogen. 
Dat leidt tot stijgende premie-opbrengsten, zodat het verlies inder-
daad zou kunnen worden weggewerkt. De inefficientie van het gekozen 
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niveau van zorg wordt daarmee echter niet uit de weg geruimd. Zolang 
de premie een vast bedrag per eenheid produkt is, blijft voor de 
producent gelden (vgl. figuur 4.3) dat het in zijn belang is het niveau 
van zorg te reduceren tot nul. 
In een wereld van volledig vrije mededinging en volledige informatie 
blijft het ook bier niet bij. In de eerste plaats zullen er, naarmate de 
verzekeringspremies stijgen, producenten opstaan die besluiten zieh 
maar niet te verzekeren en zorgniveau ZII aan te houden. Per saldo 
kunnen de (risico-averse) producenten dan zoveel goedkoper uit zijn, 
dat zij het zelf moeten dragen van risico voor lief nemen. In de tweede 
plaats zal er in de kringen van de verzekeraars als reactie op het 
optreden van moreel risico wat veranderen. Het ligt voor de hand dat 
zij Iran premies afhankehjk zullen maken van de door de producenten 
betrachte zorg (vgl. paragraaf 3.5.1). Er treedt premiedifferentiatie 
op. Naarmate producenten meer zorg betrachten, zodat de verwachte 
schade lager wordt, wordt de te betalen premie per eenheid produkt 
verlaagd. Idealiter - dat wil zeggen, onder volledig vrije mededinging 
op de verzekeringsmarkt, en indien verzekeraars inzicht hebben in het 
feitelijk door de verzekeringsnemers betrachte niveau van zorg - wordt 
de premie zelfs precies gelijk aan de verwachte schade. 
Volledige premiedifferentiatie 
Laten we verder aannemen dat de markt voor verzekeringen goed 
werkt, zodat bij ieder niveau van zorg de te betalen premie gelijk is aan 
de verwachte schade. Tot welke conclusies leidt ons dat? 
De "kosten'van schade"-curve in figuur 4.1 gaf aan wat de verwachte 
schade is van eventuele ongelukken met het produkt; afhankelijk van 
de produktaansprakeHjkheidsregeHng komt de schade van een on-
geluk voor rekening van de producent of de consument. Verzekeren 
tegen dit risico kan, zoals we net hebben aangenomen, tegen een 
premie die afhankehjk is van het niveau van zorg en gelijk is aan.de 
verwachte schade. De verzekeraar zal bij deze premiesteUing noch 
winst, noch verlies maken. Afhankehjk van wie aansprakelijk is, zal de 
risico-averse producent respectievelijk consument zieh tegen deze 
premie graag verzekeren. 
De uiteindehjke keuze van het niveau van zorg door producenten en 
consumenten zal dan gebaseerd worden op de "kosten van zorg"-curve 
uit figuur 4.1 en een "verzekeringspremie"-curve (voorzover van töe-
passing, afhankehjk van wie aansprakelijk is). Deze "verzekerings-
premie"-curve valt echter, gezien de prerm^stelling, volledig samen 
met de "kosten van schade"-curve. Maar daarmee zijn we volledig 
terug bij de uitgangspunten van de efficientie-analyse van de ver-
schalende produktaansprakelijkheidssystemen in de vorige subpara-
graaf. De conclusie zal dan ook dezelfde zijn, namelijk dat ongeacht het 
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produktaansprakelijkheidssysteem geproduceerd wordt op zorg-
niveau ZU. 
Samenvattend hebben we in deze subparagraaf laten zien dat ook bij 
risico-aversie, mits de markt voor verzekeringen goed werkt, het 
uiteindelijke resultaat efficient is ongeacht de keuze van de produkt-
aansprakehjkheidsregel. 
4.4.5 Transactiekosten 
We laten nu ook de veronderstelling van het afwezig zijn van transac-
tiekosten vallen. Naast het optreden van tertiaire ongevalskosten 
(waarover later meer), is voor onze analyse met name van belang dat 
we er niet langer van kunnen uitgaan dat alle betrokkenen volledig 
zijn geïnformeerd. 
Dit betekent in de eerste plaats dat een verzekeraar waarschijnhjk 
niet exact kan weten welk niveau van zorg een producent feitelijk 
betracht, respectievelijk niet precies kan doorzien tot welke risico-
groepen verschillende eenheden van een bepaald produkt behoren. 
Daarmee zijn we bij het uit hoofdstuk 3 bekende probleem van adverse 
selectie, en moet worden betwijfeld of een volledige verzekering tegen 
produktaansprakehjkheidsrisico's zal kunnen bestaan. Door in het 
vervolgrisico-neutraliteit te veronderstellen kunnen we dit probleem 
buiten beschouwing laten (maar zie paragraaf 4.4.7). 
In de tweede plaats betekent onvolledige informatie dat met name 
de consument geen of onvoldoende kennis heeft om de ongevallenkans 
en de te verwachte schade van een met een bepaalde mate van 
zorgvuldighe.id geproduceerd produkt te doorgronden. 
Zoekprocessen 
De transactiekosten die betrekking hebben op het verkrijgen van 
informatie over een produkt door de consument zijn relatief hoog. 
Natuurlijk kent de producent zelf, beter dan ieder ander, de eigen-
schappen van zijn produkt. De consumenten zijn grotendeels van hem 
afhankehjk wat de informatieverstrekking betreft. De producent zal 
echter de neiging hebben om met name de positieve aspecten van zijn 
produkt te benadrukken. Veel kosten dienen dan ook door de con-
sument te worden gemaakt om zieh een volledig beeld van het produkt 
te kunnen vormen. Wij kunnen het zoekproces van de consument naar 
informatie grafisch weergeven. Zie figuur 4.4. 
De figuur brengt tot uitdrukking dat het verzamelen van informatie, 
het zoeken van het beste produkt tijd en dus geld kost. Daar staat 
tegenover dat naarmate de consument meer informatie vergaart en 
langer zoekt, hij een meer verantwoorde keuze zal kunnen maken; hij 
zal minder gauw een miskoop doen, minder gauw met een schadepost 
worden geconfronteerd. Het zoeken en vergaren van informatie levert 
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tijd gelnvesteerd in 
zoeken en 
informatie vergaren 
Figuur 4.4: Optimale zoektijd 
Het vergaren van informatie teneinde een verantwoorde produktkeuze te maken 
kost tijd en geld. Aan de andere kant neemt de kans op het kopen van onbruikbare, 
gebrekkige, en gevaarlijke produkten af; dat betekent een voordeel voor de consu-
ment. De zoektijd is optimaal, daar waar het verschil tussen de opbrengsten en de 
kosten van zoeken maximaal is, dat wil zeggen bij T. 
dus ook wat op, namelijk een venrunderd verlies als gevolg van 
miskopen en schade. Het lijkt redelijk te veronderstellen dat de eerste 
uren die worden besteed aan zoeken, de consument van de ergste 
miskopen zullen weerhouden. Additionele zoekactiviteiten zullen 
verhoudingsgewijs rninder nieuwe, belangrijke feiten aan het licht 
brengen, en dus minder opleveren. 
Uit de figuur kunnen we het antwoord afleiden op de vraag hoe lang 
het nog lonend is om informatie te vergaren. De optimale tijdsduur van 
zoeken in verband met produktrisico's ligt - zoals bij ieder ander goed 
of dienst - daar waar het verschil tussen de totale opbrengsten en de 
totale kosten zo groot mogelijk is. Anders geformuleerd: het optimale 
punt ligt daar waar de kosten van een extra zoekinspanning gelijk zijn 
aan het daarmee verkregen voordeel in de vorm van een verminderd 
verlies door miskopen, schade e.d. In figuur 4.4 is de optimale 
zoektijd T. 
Uit bovenstaande analyse volgt dat van een rationele consument 
zeker verwacht kan worden dat hij wat tijd en geld zal steken in het 
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vergären van informatie en het zoeken van een geschikt produkt. We 
mögen echter niet verwachten dat de consument volledig geinformeerd 
zal zijn over alle eigenschappen van de door hem gekochte produkten. 
De kosten van het verwerven van de ontbrekende informatie overtref-
fen de mogelijke opbrengsten. 
Efficientie-analyse 
Laten we er nu vanuit gaan dat de consument geen of weinig kennis 
heeft van de ongevallenkans en de te verwachten schade van het door 
hem te kopen produkt. Wat heeft dat voor consequenties voor onze 
efficientie-analyse van de verschillende produktaansprakelijkheids-
systemen? 
Bij risico-aansprakelijkheid verändert er eigenhjk niets. De producent 
is volledig aansprakelijk; hij zal alle bij hem ingediende schadeclaims 
dienen te honoreren. Van deze producent mag redelijkerwijs worden 
aangenomen dat hij wel over alle relevante informatie met betrekking 
tot zijn eigen produkt beschikt. Hij zal dan ook, uitgaande van de door 
hem te dragen kosten van zorg en kosten van schade (vgl. figuur 4.1), 
kiezen voor het laagste totale kostenniveau. Hij opteert dus voor 
zorgniveau ZU, het efficiente zorgniveau. En doordat de marktprijs de 
volledige kosten van het produkt weerspiegelt, zal de consument een 
vanuit efficientie-oogpunt correcte afweging maken met betrekking 
tot de te kopen hoeveelheid. 
Bij schuldaansprakehjkheid verändert er wel iets, zij het niet voor de 
producent. De producent is aansprakelijk tot zorgniveau ZU, en houdt 
tot dat zorgniveau rekening met de kosten van zorg en de kosten van 
schade. Vanaf zorgniveau ZU is de producent niet aansprakelijk, en 
heeft hij alleen met de kosten van zorg te maken. Kortom, voor de 
producent blijft figuur 4.2 van kracht. Hij opteert voor ZU, het effi-
ciente zorgniveau. Bij ZU is de producent niet aansprakelijk; zijn 
kosten bestaan alleen uit de kosten van zorg. De marktprijs van het 
produkt zal onder volledig vrije mededinging dan ook alleen deze 
kosten van zorg weerspiegelen. 
Het probleem ligt nu bij de consumenten. Zij kennen wel de markt-
prijs van het produkt. Indien zij echter niet volledig gemformeerd zijn 
omtrent alle eigenschappen van het produkt, zullen zij zieh onvol-
doende de te verwachten schade als gevolge van ongevallen en ge-
breken realiseren. De consumenten onderschatten, met andere woor-
den, de volledige kosten van aankoop en gebruik van het produkt. 
Vanuit efficientie-oogpunt zullen de consumenten dan te veel eenhe-
den van het produkt kopen. 
Samenvattend zal het in de produktie betrachte zorgniveau efficient 
zijn; de omvang van de consumptie is daarentegen inefficient. 
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Tenslotte bekijken we het geval dat de producent in het geheel geen 
aansprakelijkheid draagt voor eventuele schade. De producent heeft 
alleen te maken met de primaire ongevalskosten, de kosten van zorg. 
Deze kosten zijn minimaal bij niveau van zorg 0. Op zieh zullen 
producenten dus voor dit inefficiënte zorgniveau kiezen. De marktprijs 
van het produkt zal dan om twee redenen laag zijn: èn omdat de kosten 
van schade niet voor rekening van de producent komen, èn omdat 
weinig zorg betracht is bij de fabricage. 
De vraag is nu of en in hoeverre consumenten in staat zijn de 
produktiebeslissing van de producenten bij te sturen. Bij volledige 
informatie hoefde dat geen probleem te zijn zoals we in paragraaf 4.4.3 
hebben geconstateerd. Bij onvolledige informatie hgt dat anders. De 
consumenten zullen waarscriijnhjk onvoldoende inzicht hebben in de 
ongevallenkans en de te verwachten schade van het aangeboden 
produkt. En zij zullen weinig kennis hebben van de alternatieve 
produktiemethoden. Daardoor zullen consumenten zieh onvoldoende 
realiseren dat een met grotere zorgvuldigheid (en dus met hogere 
kosten van zorg) gefabriceerd produkt weliswaar qua aanschafprijs 
wat duurder zal zijn dan het aangeboden produkt, maar per saldo 
(inclusief de kosten van schade) goedkoper zal uitvallen. En in de 
tweede plaats zullen consumenten, doordat ze de volledige kosten van 
het aangeboden produkt onderschatten, hiervan meer kopen dan 
vanuit efficiëntie-oogpunt goed is. 
Kortom, indien de producent in het geheel geen aansprakelijkheid 
draagt voor zijn produkt, zal zowel het bij de produktie aangehouden 
niveau van zorg als de omvang van de consumptie inefficient zijn. 
In tegenstelling tot hetgeen we eerder hebben geconcludeerd is in geval 
van onvolledige informatie de efficiëntie van het uiteindehjke resul-
taat wel afhankelijk van het gekozen produktaansprakelijkheidssys-
teem. Alleen onder risico-aansprakelijkheid blijken het niveau van 
zorg en de omvang van de consumptie te voldoen aan het efficiëntle-
criterium. Onder schuldaansprakelijkheid zal de omvang van de 
consumptie inefficient zijn, en bij afwezigheid van aansprakelijkheid 
van de producent zijn zowel het zorgniveau als de omvang van de 
consumptie inefficient. 
Tertiaire ongevalskosten 
Bovenstaande efficiëntie-analyse leidt tot een voorkeur voor risico-
boven schuldaansprakelijkheid; over afwezigheid van aansprake-
lijkheid hebben we het maar niet eens. Deze voorkeur wordt nog 
versterkt als we bedenken dat in een wereld met transactiekosten de 
tertiaire ongevalskosten (kosten van procesvoering, administratie 
e.d.) niet buiten beschouwing mögen worden gelaten. Deze kosten zijn 
nihil indien de producent geen enkele aansprakelijkheid draagt; pro-
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cederen is zinloos. Ze zijn betrekkelijk gering onder risico-aansprake-
lijkheid, omdat de producent weet dat hij toch gehouden is tot vergoe-
ding van de schade; alleen de hoogte van de claim kan ter discussie 
staan. De tertiaire ongevalskosten zijn daarentegen zeer hoog onder 
schuldaansprakelijkheid, waar de producent pas gehouden is tot 
compensatie wanneer kan worden aangetoond dat hij onvoldoende 
zorgvuldigheid heeft betracht. Bij schadeclaims zal de producent het 
dan vaak op een proces laten aankomen, met alle kosten van dien 
(proceskosten, advocatenkosten, deskundigenkosten). 
Het möge duidelijk zijn dat hoge proceskosten (op zieh) geen bijdrage 
leveren aan het maatschappelijk welbevinden. Ook om deze reden lijkt 
risico-aansprakelijkheid dus de voorkeur te verdienen boven 
schuldaansprakelijkheid. 
4.4.6 Zorg van de consument 
Voordat wij tot een afrondingvan onze efficientie-analyse van produkt-
aansprakelijkheidssystemen kunnen komen, dienen wij eerst nog stil 
te staan bij de mogehjkheid dat niet alleen de producent maar ook de 
consument invloed heeft op de ongevaüenkans. Want hoezeer ook 
bepaalde ongelukken zieh onttrekken aan iedere beinvloeding door het 
slachtoffer, er kan toch gesteld worden dat vele ongelukken voorkomen 
hadden kunnen worden. 
In een van de beroemdste gevallen van produktaansprakehjkheid, 
de - inmiddels uit de handel genomen - ontploffende Exotafl.es, speelde 
het beroep op onzorgvuldig gedrag van de consument een centrale rol. 
In de zomer van 1967 raakte de toen eenjarige Wimmie Meijer gewond 
aan een oogtoen naast hem op de grond een fles Exota explodeerde. Het 
kind moest een oog missen en de vader besloot de limonadefabrikant 
aansprakelijk te stellen voor de schade. De fabrikant zocht de schuld 
voor de explosie overal behalve bij zichzelf. De explosie zou, zo sugge-
reerde hij, zijn veroorzaakt doordat de moeder van Wimmie de fies.na 
de aanschaf in een hobbelende kinderwagen had vervoerd en deze 
vervolgens onder een bank in de koelte had neergezet. 
Om terug te komen op ons voorbeeld van de tomatenketchup; daar 
nam de rechter aan dat niet de producent maar de consument zelf er 
iets geks mee had gedaan waardoor de ketchupfles was ontploft. Reden 
om in dat geval geen schadevergoeding toe te kennen. Ook in ons 
voorbeeld van de lekkende beddekruik Steide de fabrikant Jumbo zieh 
aanvankelijk op het standpunt dat er aan zijn kruik niets mankeerde, 
maar dat de kraamverzorgster die gewoon niet goed had dichtgedraaid 
en de gebruikelijke voorzorgsmaatregelen niet had genomen. 
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Invloed van de consument op de ongevallenkans 
Zijn wij tot nu toe vooral argumenten tegengekomen die suggereren 
dat het systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid efficient zou zijn, anders 
wordt het als we ook rekening houden met de mogelijkheid van moreel 
risico aan de kant van de consument. 
Zolang de consument zelf op moet draaien voor eventuele schade, zal 
hij ongetwijfeld de nodige zorgvuldigheid betrachten. Dat is het geval 
indien de producent in het geheel geen aansprakelijkheid draagt, maar 
ook onder een systeem van schuldaansprakelijkheid omdat de produ-
cent er dan voor kiest, zoals we eerder hebben geconstateerd, om een 
niveau van voldoende zorg aan te houden. 
Bij een systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid, daarentegen, is de 
producent volledig aansprakelijk voor schade. Omdat eventuele 
schade toch vergoed wordt, heeft de consument geen prikkel meer om 
zieh de moeite te getroosten voorzichtig te zijn. De consument zal de 
neiging krijgen bepaalde risico's te aanvaarden die hij zou mijden als 
ze voor eigen rekening kwamen. Er is, met andere woorden, sprake van 
moreel risico. 
Als gevolg van de verminderde zorgvuldigheid zal het aantal on-
gelukken en schadegevallen (onnodig) toenemen. Dat is niet efficient. 
Omdat het aantal schade-uitkeringen toeneemt, zal de producent 
verder gedwongen worden de prijs van zijn produkt te verhogen. Dat 
remt het gebruik van het produkt (onnodig) af, en ook dat betekent 
efficientie-verlies. 
De conclusie moet zijn dat voor wat betreft het zorgniveau van de 
consument een systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid leidt tot ineffi-
cientie. 
Het moreel-risico-probleem aan de kant van de consumenten kan 
worden opgelost door - in ieder geval een deel van - de aansprake-
lijkheid bij deze groep te leggen. Men kan dan denken aan een systeem 
van schuldaansprakelijkheid, maar dat leidt weer op andere punten 
tot inefficienties (zie boven). 
Men zou ook aan de regel van risico-aansprakelijkheid de clausule 
kunnen toevoegen dat de consument voldoende zorg dient te hebben 
betracht. De consumenten zullen waarschijnlijk het belang van vol-
doende zorg wel onderkennen, en voldoende zorgvuldig optreden. De 
producenten zijn dan verder aansprakelijk zoals onder risico-aanspra-
kelijkheid, met alle voordelen vandien. Ook deze regeling is echter niet 
zonder Problemen, omdat de tertiaire ongevalskosten omvangrijk 
zullen zijn. Producenten zullen bij schadeclaims namelijk geneigd zijn 
om de rechter te laten toetsen of de consument inderdaad voldoende 
zorg heeft betracht. 
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Nu we zover gekomen zijn met onze analyse dat we moeten conclu-
deren dat elk produktaansprakelijkheidssysteem voor- en nadelen 
heeft in termen van efficientie, lijkt het verstandig om de keuze van de 
produkteansprakehjldieidsregeling nog van een aantal andere kanten 
te belichten. In paragraaf 4.4.7 staan we stil bij overwegingen van 
billijkheid en van risico-allocatie. In paragraaf 4.4.8 bekijken we of 
voor produkt-risico's in plaats van een produktaansprakelijkheidssys-
teem een sociale zekerheidsregeling ingevoerd zou kunnen worden. 
4.4.7 Billijkheid en risico-spreiding 
In het nu volgende bezien wij de vraag of inderdaad - zoals onder een 
systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid - de schade terecht moet komen 
bij de producent. Wij bespreken allereerst een traditioneel juridisch en 
vervolgens een economisch argument. 
Billijkheid 
Een juridisch voor de hand liggende reden om de schade bij de 
producent te leggen zou de billijkheid kunnen zijn. De beste manier om 
de schade toe te rekenen zou erin bestaan de schade te leggen op 
diegene die haar het beste kan dragen, dat is degene die de sterkere 
economische machtspositie bekleedt. We zouden ook kunnen zeggen 
dat het billijk is dat de producent de kosten moet dragen van de schade 
die bij veroorzaakt. Een econoom kan hier echter de volgende 
kanttekening bij plaatsen. Als het er kennelijk om gaat een inkomens-
herverdelende maatregel te nemen - in de zin van het leggen van de 
lasten op de sterkste schouders -, dan dient dit te geschieden door beter 
daartoe aangepaste technieken. Het Instrument van de belastinghef-
fingis hiertoe natuurlijk uitermate geschikt. Want wat zal er naar alle 
waarschijnhjkheid gebeuren? De ondernemer zal trachten de aldus 
opgelopen kosten in de prijs van het produkt door te berekenen. Er zal 
dus een inkomensherverdehng plaatsvinden, maar gedeeltelijk tussen 
de consumenten onderling, hetgeen niet was bedoeld. 
Risico-spreiding 
Een economisch gefundeerde reden waarom de schade terecht zou 
moeten komen bij de producent is dat deze bij uitstek degene is die voor 
een verdere verdeling van de schade kan zorgen en wel over al de 
afnemers van zijn produkt. 
Onder een stelsel van schuldaansprakelijkheid blijft de schade in 
principe daar waar ze valt, tenzij zij veroorzaakt wordt door een 
onrechtmatige daad van een derde. In dat geval wordt de schade op 
deze laatste gelegd. Bij risico-aansprakelijkheid zal de producent de te 
verwachten schade per eenheid produkt (of, indien hij zieh kan 
verzekeren, de premie per eenheid produkt) verwerken in de bepaling 
van de prijs van het produkt. Er is sprake van risico-spreiding. De 
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prijsstijging weerspiegelt als het wäre de verzekeririgsprernie die de 
koper moet betalen. 
Het argument van de risico-spreiding kan met name een rol speien 
als er geen verzekeringen voor produktrisico's bestaan, en de con-
sumenten risico-avers zijn. De consument zal van een produkt veelal 
maar een betrekkelijk gering aantal eenheden kopen; bij een gebrek of 
ongeval wordt bij onevenredig zwaar getroffen. De producent zal 
vermoedelijk, en vooral als het om de onpersoonhjke figuur van een 
vennootschap gaat, rriinder risico-avers zijn dan de gemiddelde con-
sument. Verder zal een producent, naarmate het om grotere aantallen 
produkt gaat, gemakkehjker als zijn eigen verzekeraar kunnen optre-
den. Uit de opslag op de prijs van iedere eenheid produkt kan de 
producent een fonds vormen waaruit hij de voorkomende schade-
uitkeringen financiert. Indien het om een massa-produkt gaat zullen 
de inkomsten van dit fonds goed gelijk oplopen met de uitkeringen. 
Het maatschappelijk welbevinden lijkt bij de onder risico-
aansprakelijkheid optredende verdeling van de risico's goed gediend. 
De risico-averse consumenten hoeven geen risico te dragen. De pro-
ducenten dragen wel risico, maar zij zijn waarschijnhjk minder risico-
avers en kunnen, zeker bij massa-fabricage, als hun eigen verzekeraar 
optreden. 
Wij kunnen ons overigens wel afvragen welke gevolgen een omslag van 
compensatiekosten over alle gebruikers kan hebben ten aanzien van 
levensnoodzakehjke Produkten, zoals sommige genees- en levensmid-
delen. In verband met de grote risico's die een producent loopt bij 
aanwezigheiä van gebreken in deze produkten, zou een omslag van 
kosten als hiervoor bedoeld tot hoge prijzen voor de produkten kunnen 
leiden. Dit kan maatschappelijk gezien - we zijn dan weer terug bij het 
(niet-economische) bilHjkheidsargument - ongewenst worden geacht. 
Men zou namelijk kunnen stellen dat compensatiekosten van der-
gelijke levensnoodzakehjke produkten niet mögen rüsten op de gröep 
consumenten van de produkten, maar door de gemeenschap als geheel 
behoren te worden gedragen, dat wil zeggen dat de overheid de 
desbetreffende producent zou dienen te vrijwaren voor aanspraken 
wegens produktschade. Wij zouden bij dit laatste kunnen denken aan 
een vorm van collectieve verzekering, zoals deze op dit moment 
bijvoorbeeld in Nieuw-Zeeland bestaat. 
4.4.8 Aansprakelijkheid als sociale zekerheid 
Voortdenkend in de richting van minimaHsatie van de individueel 
geleden schade door een maximale spreiding van het risico, valt het 
niet a priori in te zien waarom de spreiding niet tot een nog grotere 
groep zou zijn uit te breiden. Waarom het risico niet te spreiden over 
de gehele bevolking naar het voorbeeld van wat met risico's gebeurt in 
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een stelsel van sociale zekerheid? Met dit laatste systeem wordt in 
vergelijking met risico-aansprakelijkheid niet alleen het schuldsys-
teem maar het gehele aansprakelijkheidssysteem verlaten. De alloca-
tie van de ongevalskosten zou in een dergehjk stelsel niet meer 
gevalsgewijs en ex post op de producent neerkomen maar collectief en 
ex ante worden geregeld. Door middel van het instellen van een fonds, 
dat wordt gevoed door de bijdragen van producenten en consumenten, 
zouden de gelden waarmee de produktslachtoffers betaald moeten 
worden, verkregen kunnen worden. Het gaat hierbij niet om een 
theoretisch model. Sinds 1974 is dit systeem in werking in Nieuw-
Zeeland. 
Welke kosten zijn vanuit een economisch gezichtspunt aan een 
dergehjk stelsel verbonden? Voor een algemene beschouwing van het 
stelsel van sociale zekerheid verwijzen wij naar hoofdstnk 6 in dit boek. 
In dit hoofdstnk betrekken wij de kenmerken van een dergehjk stelsel 
slechts in zoverre zij van belang zijn voor ons onderwerp van pro-
duktaansprakehjkheid. 
Allereerst kunnen wij verwijzen naar hetgeen wij eerder over de 
verhouding preventie en compensatie te berde hebben gebracht. Aan 
de reductie van de secundaire ongevalskosten is, zoals wij zagen, geen 
exclusieve betekenis toe te kennen. Was dit wel het geval dan zou 
inderdaad een of andere vorm van sociale verzekering de aangewezen 
weg kunnen zijn. Daarbij valt tevens te constateren dat de tertiaire 
ongevalskosten verbonden aan het beheer van sociale fondsen per 
uitgekeerde gülden veel lager zijn dan onder een schuldaan-
sprakelijkheidssysteem. De laatste kosten zijn hoog door de hoge 
proceskosten--die nodig zijn om de onrechtmatigheid te bewijzen. 
De reden waarom ook de primaire ongevalskosten een rol speien is 
gelegen in het karakter van de hier besproken risico's. OngevaUenrisi-
co's hebben dit gemeen dat zij doorgaans aan een identificeerbare 
oorzaak toe te schrijven zijn en dat zij derhalve beter vermeden kunnen 
worden dan andere, moeilijker localiseerbare risico's, zoals het ziek-
terisico. Naarmate de vermijdbaarheid een grotere rol speelt komt ook 
meer belang toe aan de preventie, aan de reductie van de primaire 
ongevalskosten. Waar het kan is het beter te voorkomen dan te 
genezen. 
Wat kunnen wij zeggen over de vraag naar en het aanbod van Produk-
ten onder dit stelsel waar de belastingbetaler als het wäre aansprake-
lijk is? Het valt immers onder een dergehjk systeem te verwachten dat, 
daar noch de producent, noch de consument zieh over aansprake-
lijkheid hoeven te bekommeren, onzorgvuldig gedrag met betrekking 
tot het ontwerp en gebruik van produkten relatief goedkoop wordt voor 
deze personen. Als consequentie zullen zowel de vraag als het aanbod 
van onveilige produkten toenemen. Nu de consument niet meer zelf 
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aansprakelijk is, worden gebrekkige produkten voor hem minder 
onaantrekkelijk, terwijl ook de kosten om gebrekkige produkten te 
verkopen zullen dalen en daarmee het aanbod zal toenemen. Er zal een 
verschuiving optreden in de richting van de produktie en het gebruik 
van meer onveilige produkten. Daarmee hjkt het idee van maximale 
risico-spreiding zijn doel voorbij te Schieten. 
4.4.9 Samenvatting en conclusie 
In deze paragraaf hebben we verschillende produktaansprake-
hjkheidssystemen op hun bijdrage aan de maatschappelijke efficiëntie 
onderzocht. We hebben daarbij aandacht besteed aan het door produ-
centen en consumenten betrachte niveau van zorg, aan de omvang van 
de consumptie, aan de allocatie van de risico's, en aan de tertiaire 
ongevalskosten. 
In eerste instantie hebben we het geval bekeken dat aan een aantal 
stringente voorwaarden is voldaan. Met name hebben we veronder-
steld 1. dat de transactiekosten nul zijn (volledige informatie; geen 
tertiaire ongevalskosten), en 2. dat alle betrokkenen risico-neutraal 
zijn (respectievehjk dat de markt voor verzekeringen goed werkt en 
iedereen zieh kan verzekeren tegen produktrisico's). Onder deze om-
standigheden bleek de keuze van het produktaansprakehjkheidssys-
teem (risico-, schuld- of geen aansprakelijkheid van de producent) niet 
van invloed op de efficiëntie van het uiteindelijke resultaat. 
De gemaakte veronderstelhngen zijn zeker niet realistisch. Consu-
menten zijn niet volledig geïnformeerd over de kwaliteiten van de door 
hen gekochte produkten; proceskosten zijn niet nul; verzekeringen 
tegen produktrisico's bestaan niet of maar ten dele; en de gemiddelde 
consument is risico-avers, en meer risico-avers dan de gemiddelde 
producent. 
Laten we de eerder gemaakte veronderstelhngen vallen, dan bhjkt 
geen van de produktaansprakelijkheidssystemen op alle onderzochte 
aspecten even bevredigend te functioneren. Bij geen aansprake-
lijkheid zal het door de producent gekozen niveau van zorg te laag zijn, 
zal de omvang van de consumptie vanuit efficiëntie-oogpunt te hoog 
zijn, en zullen de consumenten het produktrisico moeten dragen. Er 
zijn ook pluspunten: de consument zal voorzichtigheid betrachten, en 
de tertiaire ongevalskosten zijn nihil. 
Bij schuldaansprakehjkheid zal het door producent èn consument 
aangehouden niveau van zorg efficient zijn. De omvang van de con-
sumptie zal echter te hoog zijn, het produktrisico komt voor rekening 
van de consumenten, en de tertiaire ongevalskosten zijn hoog. 
Bij risico-aansprakehjkheid, tenslotte, zal de producent een efficient 
zorgniveau aanhouden, zijn de tertiaire ongevalskosten laag, en 
draagt de producent het produktrisico. Minpunten zijn dat, voorzover 
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de consument door zijn gedrag de ongevallenkans kan beinvloeden, het 
niveau van zorg van de consument te laag zal zijn evenals de omvang 
van de consumptie van het goed. 
In algemene zin gesproken is het dus niet mogelijk e6n produktaan-
sprakehjkheidssysteem zonder meer als het beste, het meest efficiente 
aan te wijzen. 
Daarbij komt dat het vervangen van produktaansprakehjkheid door 
een sociale zekerheidsregeling voor produktschade geen geslaagd idee 
hjkt. De risico-spreiding is dan wehswaar maximaal en de tertiaire 
ongevalskosten zijn minimaal. Maar daar staat tegenover dat zowel de 
zorg van producenten als van consumenten onvoldoende zal zijn, en de 
omvang van de consumptie van gebrekkige en risico-volle produkten te 
hoog. 
Gegeven dat niet een produktaansprakehjkheidssysteem er uit-
springt, bhjven we met het keuzeprobleem zitten. Dat zou welhcht op 
te lossen zijn door een nadere kosten-batenafweging te maken van de 
verschillende onderzochte aspecten. Het maken van een dergelijke 
kosten-batenafweging is echter een, zo al niet onmogehjke, dan toch in 
ieder geval heel moeilijke taak, waar wij ons hier verder niet mee 
zullen inlaten. 
Een meer praktische, zij het onvolmaakte, benadering zou zijn om 
naar een aantal belangrijke elementen te kijken, een inschatting te 
maken van hun effecten, en de aansprakehjkheid bij die partij te 
leggen die het beste in staat hjkt de som van alle kosten laag te houden, 
die het eenvoudigste kosten kan vermijden. Belangrijke elementen die 
een rol zouden moeten speien, zijn: het informatieniveau van con-
sumenten (kan van consumenten redehjkerwijs worden verwacht dat 
ze voldoende zijn gei'nformeerd?); de omvang van de produktie (kan de 
producent redehjkerwijs als zijn eigen verzekeraar optreden?); de 
invloed van de consument op de ongevallenkans (kan de consument 
met het produkt erg veel fout doen?); en de tertiaire ongevalskosten 
(kan het voeren van Processen worden vermeden?). Ook bij deze meer 
praktische benadering is echter niet gezegd dat het oordeel eenslui-
dend zal zijn. 
In de volgende paragraaf kijken we naar wat toepassingen. 
4.5 Toepassing van de economische analyse van 
produktaansprakelijkheid 
In het voorgaande zijn met behulp van de economische theorie ver-
schillende produktaansprakehjkheidssystemen op hun bijdrage aan 
maatschappelijke efficientie beoordeeld. Interessant is nu omte bezien 
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of bij de ontwikkeling/beweging in het recht argumenten met betrek-
king tot economische efficiëntie een rol spelen. 
In deze paragraaf besteden wij daartoe wat uitvoeriger aandacht 
aan ons tweede voorbeeld uit de inleiding, de lekkende kruik. Hiertoe 
gaan wij als volgt te werk. Tijdens de procesgang van Rechtbank via 
Hof naar Höge Raad kwamen, op grond van verschillende motieven, 
verschillende uitspraken inzake de aansprakelijkheid van de pro-
ducent tot stand. Wij stellen ons nu de vraag of deze uitspraken in 
overeenstemming zijn met een, zo niet exphciete dan toch minstens 
imphciete, achterhggende economische logica. 
Vervolgens bekijken wij of de algemene ontwikkeling inzake pro-
duktaansprakehjkheid van een aansprakehjkheid die is gebaseerd op 
schuld, naar een aansprakehjkheid die is gebaseerd op risico, ook een 
economische achtergrond kan hebben. 
4.5.1 De lekkende beddekruik: het Jumbo-arrest 
Rechtbank 
We bespreken de totstandkoming en achtergronden van het arrest van 
de Höge Raad van 2 februari 1973, Jumbo of lekkende beddekruik (NJ 
1973,315) en beginnen daartoe bij de uitspraak van de Rechtbank. 
De Rechtbank achtte de kruikenfabrikant niet aansprakehjk. Het 
lekken van de kruik was in de visie van de Rechtbank te wijten aan de 
nog onvolkomen stand, van de techniek. Het verschijnsel dat 
kruiken soms lekken, en dan met name het soort kruiken waar het hier 
om ging met een zogenaamde patentsluiting, was volgens de Recht-
bank een feit van algemene bekendheid. 
We kunnen ons bij deze motivering de vraag stellen of het eco-
nomisch efficient is de producent niet voor schade uit een eventueel 
ongeval aansprakehjk te stellen. Wij hebben van doen met een'in-
herent gevaarhjk produkt. Gegeven de stand van de techniek is de 
gevaarlijke eigenschap onverbrekelijk verbonden met de eigenschap 
die het produkt nuttig maakt in de ogen van de consument. Dit gevaar 
is de consument bekend, respectievelijk de kosten om deze kennis te 
vergaren zijn voor de consument gering. De preventiekosten zijn voor 
de consument dus bijzonder laag. Voor de producent overtreffen de 
preventiekosten - bijvoorbeeld in de zin van meer research naar 
veiligere kruiken - al gauw de reductie in de verwachte schadekosten. 
De kans op een ongeval is volgens de rechtbank namelijk bijzonder 
laag. Deze kans wordt bepaald door de läge kans dat de kruik zelf gaat 
lekken en - aangezien een ieder biermee op de hoogte is - de zorgvuldige 
wijze van omgaan met kruiken door de gebruikers. Gegeven deze 
situatie is het ontbreken van aansprakehjkheid optimaal. Het ver-
laagt bovendien de administratieve kosten inzake procesvoering (ter-
tiaire ongevalskosten); er valt immers niets te claimen. 
176 Part UJ. The Austrian perspective on consumer policy 
ProduktaanspraJielykheid 153 
Ook de allocatie van de middelen wordt door de aansprakelijkheid op 
deze wijze te regelen verbeterd ten opzichte van bijvoorbeeld een 
systeem van risico-aanspräkelijkheid. De consumenten ktinnen zich-
zelf namelijk in groepen onderverdelen al naar gelang htm verschallen 
in verwachte schadekosten of preventiekosten. Grosso modo zijn er 
twee groepen te onderscheiden. In de meeste gevallen is het gevaar dat 
door lekken van een kruik brandwonden ontstaan niet groot. De 
gebruiker merkt tijdig dat de kruik lekt en trekt zieh terug. Dit wordt 
echter anders wanneer de kruik gelegd wordt bij een baby of bij iemand 
die zieh niet kan terugtrekken. We lichten dit nader toe aan de hand 
van een voorbeeld; zie tabel 4.2. 
Tobel 4.2 Twee groepen van consumenten 
Groep van Waarde (nut) Verwachte Produktie-
oonsumenten van het produkt schade kosten 
A f 1,40 f0,50 f0,20 
B f l ,40 f 1,50 f0,20 
Er zijn zoals gezegd twee groepen van consumenten van, naar we 
zullen aannemen, gehjke grootte, A en B. Groep A heeft lage te 
verwachten schadekosten (de volwassen gebruikers die zich terug 
kunnen trekken bij lekkage). Groep B heeft hoge te verwachten 
schadekosten (baby's en mensen die zich niet terug kunnen trekken). 
Als de producenten niet in staat zijn tegen redelijke kosten te bepalen 
voor welke groep, AofB, de gekochte kruiken bestemd zijn, rekenen de 
producenten onder een systeem van risico-aansprakelijkheid iedere 
consument dezelfde prijs van f 1,20. Deze prijs bestaat uit f 0,20 
produktiekosten en f 1,00 om de te verwachten schadeclaims uit te 
betalen (0,50 x f0,50 + 0,50 x f 1,50). De consumenten in beide groepen 
kopen het produkt. Voor beide is er een positief verschil tussen het nut 
(de waarde voor de consument is f 1,40) en de prijs (f 1,20) van het 
produkt. 
Toch is dit resultaat inefficient. Het zou maatschappelijk gezien 
beter zijn als alleen groep A en niet groep B de kruik zou kopen. De 
sociale kosten van het produkt voor de consumenten uit de laatste 
groep bedragen namehjk f 1,70 (f 0,20 + f 1,50) en niet f 1,20. Deze 
sociale kosten overtreffen de baten van het produkt a f 1,40. 
In het geval dat de producent geen aansprakelijkheid draagt, daalt 
de prijs naar f 0,20. Groep Ablijft het produkt kopen, misschien zelfs 
meer, terwijl groep B de consumptie zal staken. Zij zijn immers -
althans bij dit produkt - volledig op de hoogte van de gevaren aan het 
gebruik van een kruik verbonden. Dit leidt tot het gewenste resultaat, 
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omdat groep B in feite een netto-verlies van f 0,30 op het produkt leidt. 
Groep B kan voor het beoogde doel beter naar een ander produkt 
omzien. 
Intermezzo - Het ontwikkelingsrisico 
In het bovenstaande hadden wij te maken met een produktgebrek, 
waarover de consumenten bij het op de markt komen van het produkt 
al kennis hadden. We spreken over een onvolkomen stand van de 
techniek. AI zal de producent er nog een hele dobber aan hebben om bij 
voortduring van alle ontwikkehngen op de markt op de hoogte te 
blijven. Hoe staat het echter met die gebreken aan een produkt 
waarover wij pas geruime tijd na introductie van dat produkt op de 
markt kennis krijgen? 
In het oorspronkehjke EG-voorstel inzake de richthjn over produkt-
aansprakelijkheid was het voor de ondernemer niet mogelijk zieh te 
beroepen op - wat Amerikanen noemen - "the state of the art defence". 
Anders gezegd, er was aansprakelijkheid voor het ontwikke-
lingsrisico. Het gaat daarbij om het risico dat achteraf blijkt dat 
nieuw ontwikkelde Produkten, al bij hun introductie op de markt, 
schadeverwekkende eigenschappen bezaten. Dit komt echter pas door 
de voortschrijdende wetenschappehjke en technische kennis aan het 
licht. Deze kwestie was een van de grootste twistappels bij de onder-
handehngen over de richthjn. Zo kan er bijvoorbeeld - bij het niet 
uitsluiten van aansprakelijkheid van ontwikkelingsrisico's - gewezen 
worden op de nadelige effecten op investeringenin de medische sector 
met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van nieuwe medicijnen en me-
dische apparatuur. Het risico en de kosten verbunden aan het ont-
wikkelen van nieuwe produkten zouden zo hoog worden dat onderne-
rningen liever bij de oude vertrouwde produkten blijven. 
Dit is ook de reden waarom veel staten binnen de VS latere verbete-
ringon in een produkt weigeren te aanvaarden als bewijsmiddel voor 
het bestaan van een gebrekkig produkt. De gedachte hierachter is dat 
dit de fabrikanten zou ontmoedigen om verbeteringen door te voeren. 
Zo geldt ook in de EG-richtlijn dat een verscherpingvan de veiligheids-
normen, bijvoorbeeld door middel van wettelijke voorschriften, nädat 
het produkt in het verkeer is gebracht, het produkt als zodanig niet 
gebrekkig maakt. 
Tevens kan met betrekking tot het ontwikkelingsrisico overwogen 
worden dat de aansprakelijkheid niet zover behoeft te gaan, dat de 
producent in feite een verzekeraar wordt van alle hem bekende en 
onbekende nadelen, die uit een normaal gebruik van het produkt 
voortvloeien. De EG-richtlijn heeft immers niet verzekering maar 
aansprakelijkheid als onderwerp. 
Tenslotte hebben de innovatievriendehjke pleitbezorgers van uit-
sluiting van het ontwikkelingsrisico binnen de Europese Gemeen-
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schap aan het längste eind getrokken. En wordt er dus een uitzonde-
ring op het beginsel van de risico-aansprakehjkheid gemaakt. Ook het 
BW heeft zieh hierbij aangesloten: artikel 1407a lid 1 sub e, zij het met 
een zware bewijslast voor de producent. 
Hot 
Terug naar de beddekruik. Na de Rechtbank was het de beurt aan het 
Hof om zieh uit te spreken over de aansprakelijkheid van de fabrikant. 
Anders dan de Rechtbank legde het Hof in zijn afwijzing de nadruk 
op de wijze van gebruik van het produkt. De kraamverzorgster had 
zorgvuldiger kunnen handelen. Zo was het mogelijk geweest de kruik 
met minder warm water te vullen, de kruik op een nog veiliger afstand 
te leggen en regelmatigte controleren. Deze maatregelen dringen eens 
te meer daar wij hier met een groep personen te maken hebben voor wie 
de kruik bestemd is, namelijk baby's, die zieh niet licht zullen terug-
trekken bij lekkages. 
De vraag vanuit een economisch gezichtspunt luidt wie het goed-
koopste een ongeluk kan vermijden. Dat is in dit geval duidelijk de 
kraamverzorgster. Als kruiken inherent gevaarhjk zijn geldt dit zon-
der meer en bij een produktiefout, gegeven de al betrachte zorgvuldig-
heid door Jumbo, idem. De producent doet in deze situatie als het ware 
een beroep op de door ons in paragraaf 4.4.6 geformuleerde 
geclausuleerde risico-aansprakelijkheidsregel. 
Höge Raad 
Toen de kwestie van de aansprakelijkheid van de producent uiteinde-
lijk aan de Höge Raad werd voorgelegd, kwam deze tot een aan 
Rechtbank en Hof tegenovergestelde uitspraak. De Höge Raad achtte 
de fabrikant wel aansprakelijk. 
De Höge Raad ging in op het feit dat het hier een concreet gebrek 
betrof. De schroefdraad van de dop paste niet geheel op die van de 
kruik. Er was sprake van een fout in een van de onderdelen van de 
kruik. 
De consument kan weinig doen om de fout, van dit onderdeel van het 
door hem gekochte produkt, te onderkennen; hiervoor is een grote mate 
van technische kennis vereist. De producent kan dit echter wel, en in 
ieder geval makkelijker en goedkoper; bij bescbikt over de noodzakelij-
ke expertise. Het is dus efficient om de producent aansprakelijk te 
stellen. Dit geeft de producent tegelijk de Stimulans om research-
inspanningen te ontplooien om defecte onderdelen beter op te kunnen 
sporen. 
Het voorgaande overziende kunnen we constateren dat aan de uitspra-
ken van Rechtbank, Hof en Höge Raad een economische logica niet kan 
worden ontzegd. Indien verondersteld mag worden dat de consument 
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voldoende gemformeerd is of zou kurinen zijn over de onvolmaaktheid 
van een produkt, dan wel indien de consument door het betrachten van 
normale voorzichtigheid ongelukken kan voorkomen, is het alleszins 
redehjk de producent niet zonder meer aansprakehjk te houden. 
Indien echter de consument niet geacht kan worden over die informa-
tie te beschikken, of indien het om een fabricagefout van de producent 
gaat, ligt het voor de hand om de producent aansprakehjk te houden, 
zoals uiteindehjk ook gebeurde. 
In aansluiting op het bovenstaande voorbeeld stellen we in de rest 
van deze paragraaf de meer algemene kwestie van de overgang van 
schuld- naar risico-aansprakelijkheid aan de orde. 
4.5.2 De ontwikkeling van schuld- naar risico-aansprakelijkheid 
Tot slot van dit hoofdstuk bezien wij de vraag of de ontwikkeling van 
schuld- naar risico-aansprakehjkheid - zoals deze zieh in Nederland en 
de rest van de wereld voltrekt - in zijn algemeenheid op basis van een 
economische redenering valt te beschrijven. 
Deze ontwikkeling kan verklaard worden vanuit de groeiende 
complexiteit van het goederenaanbod. In de vorige eeuw waren de 
meeste consumptiegoederen eenvoudig van aard, in de zin dat hun 
kwahteit tegen läge kosten was vast te stellen. Het betrof meestal 
goederen bestemd voor dagelijks gebruik. In deze situatie was het even 
goedkoop voor de consument als voor de producent om een ongeluk te 
voorkomen. Het had dan ook weinig zin om de producent aansprakehjk 
te stellen. 
De tegenwqordige consument heeft echter te maken met technisch 
veel gecomplieeerdere arükelen en een verhoudingsgewijs geringe 
technische kennis. Vergelijk de tijd dat de mensen grotendeels op de 
boerderij leefden en zelfvoorzienend waren. Toen hadden de meeste 
mensen nog kennis van de paar dingen die zij buiten het eigen bedrijf 
om kochten. De tegenwoordige consument koopt echter niet alleen 
meer goederen die dagelijks gebruikt worden maar ook duurzame 
consumptiegoederen. Van beide is de technische complexiteit groot. 
Ook de dagelijkse, simpele goederen van weleer worden veelal in-
geblikt, voorzien van kleurstoffen en conserveringsmiddelen, ver-
kocht. De asymmetrie die daardoor is ontstaan in de (kosten van) 
informatievoorziening wijst in de richting om de aansprakelijkheid 
daar te leggen waar de kosten om ongevallen te voorkomen ook het 
laagst zijn, te weten bij de producenten. 
Overigens kan hier ook aan een veel gehoorde andere economische 
motivering worden gedacht. Deze redenering luidt dat opkomende 
industrieen - bij voorbeeld in ontwikkehngslanden - hun schadelast 
nog niet volledig kunnen dragen en met een systeem van schuld-
aansprakehjkheid zijn gediend. Het omgekeerde geldt voor indus-
trieen in geindustrialiseerde landen; aldaar is er geen grond meer 
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aanwezig om de industrie te beschermen - en aldus indirect te subsi-
diären - tegen het dragen van haar volledige kosten. 
4.6 Samenvatting 
1. Recht is in beweging; het produktaansprakehj'kheidsrecht beves-
tigt die regel wel zeer in het bijzonder. In dit hoofdstuk behchten 
wij de ontwikkelingen in het produktaansprakehj'kheidsrecht 
vanuit een economisch gezichtspunt. 
2. Wij spreken van produktaansprakehjkheid als wij een producent 
aansprakehjk willen stellen voor de schade die voortvloeit uit de 
omstandigheid dat hij een ondeugdehjk produkt op de markt heeft 
gebracht. Wij kunnen daarbij een onderscheid maken in een 
systeem van schuld- respectievehjk van risico-aansprakehjkheid 
van de producent. 
3. In een economische benadering van schade zijn drie kos-
tencategorieen van belang: het voorkomen van schade (primaire 
ongevalskosten), het vergoeden van schade (secundaire ongevals-
kosten) en tenslotte de bijkomende kosten als gevolg van admini-
stratie, procesvoering e.d. (tertiaire ongevalskosten). 
4. Als wij het hebben over een reductie van de schade springt het 
onderlinge verband tussen de kostencategorieen in het oog. Een 
reductie van de compensatiekosten (secundaire ongevalskosten) 
gaat veelal gepaard met een stijging van de preventiekosten 
(primaire ongevalskosten). Economen spreken dan ook over de 
optimalisatie van het risico. 
5. Het produktaansprakehjkheidssysteem dat - gegeven de restric-
tie van de tertiaire kosten - de schadelast zö toewijst dat de som 
van de compensatiekosten (secundaire ongevalskosten) en de 
preventiekosten (primaire ongevalskosten) het laagst is, leidt tot 
het efficiente niveau van zorg. Vanuit efficientie-oogpunt is verder 
de omvang van de consumptie van belang (zijn in de afwegingen 
omtrent de te produceren en te consumeren hoeveelheid van het 
produkt wel de volledige kosten meegenomen?). Tenslotte ver-
dient de allocatie van het risico aandacht (bestaat er een verzeke-
ring tegen produktrisico's; zo niet, wie draagt dan het risico, en 
wie is het minst risico-avers, de producent of de consument?). 
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6. Bij nadere beschouwing blijkt het heel moeilijk, zo niet onmoge-
lijk, om aan te geven welk van de produktaansprakehjkheids-
systemen (het meest) efficient is. Meer praktisch is de regel dat 
het recht diegene die de som van schade- en preventiekosten het 
laagst kan houden, aanmoedigt deze maatregelen ook te nemen, 
door aan hem de schadelast toe te wijzen. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 11: PRODUCTAANSPRAKELIJKHEH) 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
Chapter 11 is about products liability, and gives the mainstream neoclassical view. In the 
Netherlands, products liability was and is a point of interest. There is a certain discontent 
with the way it functions and with the European Union guidelines for its harmonization. 
The system of liability that functioned before the middle of the 80s had, on the one hand, 
high administrative costs and, on the other hand, the disadvantage that victims often got no 
compensation if negligence of the producer could not be proven. As well as the poor 
compensation the victims received, a further reason was that different products liability 
systems in the Union are detrimental to a free flow of goods between the countries: the 
creation of one internal market. The chapter first it introduces two different concepts of 
products liability and three cost concepts—and the relation between them—that are relevant 
for the prevention and compensation of damages. Further it describes the different ways an 
economist and a lawyer look at products liability. The next part describes the neoclassical 
efficiency perspective on products liability, first by making the restrictions of risk 
neutrality and the absence of transaction costs. The third part looks at products liability if 
the consumers are not risk neutral and there are transaction costs. The final part gives an 
economic explanation for the development in the Dutch system of products liability. 
The development in the Netherlands was from a system of negligence to one of strict 
liability. The aim was to improve the position of the consumer on the market. Under strict 
liability, the consumer does not have to prove negligence on the part of the producer. 
Accidents give rise to three sort of costs: primary costs which are those involved in 
preventing an accident; secondary costs which are those of compensating the victim; and 
tertiary costs which are the juridical costs of running the liability system. An efficient 
liability system tries to minimize the total sum of the costs. If costs are minimized, a 
relation can be seen between them. To reduce primary (prevention) and secondary 
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(compensation) costs at the same time can be a problem. For instance, full compensation 
(that is a complete insurance of accident costs) can lead to moral risk. Moreover, the aim 
cannot be a complete reduction of risk, that is of accident costs. For some activities the 
benefits are far greater than the costs. There is an optimum amount of risk. For instance, 
though a big car is generally safer than a smaller one, a smaller one can still be more 
efficient. The benefits of its lower price and fuel efficiency are greater than the costs of an 
injury in the case of an accident. 
In general the economist and the lawyer have a different perspective on products 
liability. For the latter, liability primarily has to do with the compensation of the accident 
costs of the victim. If the lawyer asks the economist for advice it is for instance about the 
amount of the accident costs. If the economist looks at liability, however, he looks at the 
prevention of accidents. His question is how to reduce the accident costs. But he also looks 
at the benefits of the risky activity. In other words, for the economist, products liability has 
to do with efficiency. For the jurist it has to do with equity and justice. An example of the 
latter is the deep pocket rule. However, the difference between exante (prevention) versus 
expost (compensation), and efficiency versus justice is not as strict as it seems at first sight. 
By using rather strong restrictions, it is possible to look at different systems of liability 
from the point of view of efficiency. Assume risk neutrality, the absence of transaction 
costs (full knowledge, no tertiary accident costs, the market for insurances works optimal), 
and only the producer being able to influence the chance of an accident. For the 
neoclassical, production is efficient if all costs are part of the decision process. First, I look 
at the costs of prevention and compensation. If there is full knowledge it does not matter 
which system of liability is chosen. Either risk, negligence, or even no liability at all lead 
to the same optimal result, which is the one predicted by the Coase theorem. Total costs in 
all three systems are as low as possible. If there is no assumption of full knowledge, the 
choice of a system of liability becomes important, from an efficiency point of view. If 
there is risk liability the optimal result does not change. With a negligence rule, however, 
the amount of consumption is inefficient. Consumers can buy too much of a good. If there 
is no liability at all, both the level of care of the producer and the amount of consumption 
are inefficient. 
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The economist's preference for strict liability is enforced if tertiary costs are also taken 
into account. If there is no liability at all they are, of course, zero. If there is risk liability 
they are low. Only the amount of compensation is a point of discussion. If there is a 
negligence rule they are in general very high. For every case it has to be proven that the 
producer did not take the necessary amount of precaution. 
In general, if the restrictions are dropped, none of the systems of liability works 
optimally. This as far as the level of care taken by producers and consumers, the amount of 
consumption, the allocation of risk, and tertiary accident costs go. If there is a no-liability 
rule, on the one hand producers do not take enough care and consumption will be too high. 
On the other hand, however, consumers will take precautions and there will be no tertiary 
accident costs. If there is a negligence rule, producers and consumers will take the efficient 
level of care. There will, however, be too much consumption and tertiary costs will be 
high. If there is a system of risk liability, the producer will take the efficient level of care, 
and tertiary accident costs will be low. If, however, the consumer can influence the chance 
on an accident, he will take less prevention than is optimal. 
Since, in general, no system is efficient in all aspects, a practical solution would be to 
look at the different costs: (1) to guess what elements are relevant in a particular situation; 
(2) to look at their effects; and (3) make that party liable for ways of lowering the costs, or 
preventing them, who can actually do it. Elements to look at would be whether consumers 
are being properly informed, whether the producer can insure his production, whether the 
consumer can take his own precautions using the product, and whether juridical costs be 
can be minimized. 
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Chapter 12. Austrian Thoughts on Products Liability 
Chapter 1 2 was presented at the Fifth International Congress of the International Society 
for mtercorrrmunication of New Ideas, Mexico City, Mexico, August 18-21, 1999. In an 
abbreviated form is was published in Economic Issues and Globalization: Theory and 
Evidence (Edgar Ortiz and Alejandra Cabello, eds). Mexico: Universidad National 
Autonoma de Mexico, 1999, pp. 91-100. 
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1 2 . AUSTRIAN THOUGHTS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
1 2 . 1 The neoclassical way: strict liability 
Products liability, part of tort law, deals with harms arising from commercial products. It 
is mostly about physical injuries to the consumer's life and property, caused by defective 
or unreasonably dangerous products. The previous chapter looked at the development of 
products UabiUty from the neoclassical point of view. In this chapter I want to answer the 
question of what does an Austrian system of products liability looks like. For the 
neoclassical, the development seemed to be driven by a cost-benefit calculus based on 
standard criteria of efficiency. Mainstream law and economics in its positive dimension 
supposes that the liability system itself and every change in it are efficient, or that in its 
normative dimension it addresses the issue of how legal rules might be formulated to 
maximize the value of production. The judge, using one of the most famous formulas in 
the economic analysis of law, the so-called Hand Formula after Judge Learned Hand (cp. 
Cooter and Ulen, 1988, pp. 360-362), balances expected accident costs against the costs of 
making the product safer. A defendant is guilty of negligence if P times L is greater than 
B. Where P is the probability, a loss will occur, L is the value associated with the loss, and 
B the cost associated with preventing it. 
What was the development in liability the neoclassicals can explain? For the United 
States, Richard Epstein in his 1980 book on modern products liability law distinguishes 
three stages. From roughly 1850 till the end of the first World War the burden was upon 
the consumer. He had to ferret out and correct all manner of product weaknesses and 
deficiencies. Otherwise, there was the fear of grave administrative complications. The 
courts threatened to be overwhelmed by the sheer task of going through a full post-accident 
inquest, in an ever-growing number of cases on how all the parties performed. There also 
was the fear of adverse social consequences: the economic ruin of the producer. Till the 
end of the 60s the burden of loss was evenly distributed between producer and consumer. 
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There was a balance between the dual constraints of substantive justice and administrative 
need. A negligence rule imposed an obligation to satisfy a legal standard of care, usually 
defined as a reasonable level of care. Today the producer bears the burden. The 
philosophical premises underlying the notion of liability have changed fundamentally. 
Adrmnistrative necessities and contractual models for setting liability are now not given 
much weight. Liability is a matter of public law models of regulation, such as risk 
spreading (producers act as insurers by spreading the cost of the accident across consumers 
through higher product prices) or deep pockets. In this third stage strict liability dominates. 
It makes the injurer bear the cost, regardless of the extent of his precautions. No legal 
standard of precaution is relevant to the assignments of costs. 
It has been said that the notion of strict liability is a misnomer. The Hand Formula is 
still often used to determine liability. See, for instance, the design defect test. Since the 
1970s, courts instead of focusing on whether a product has isolated mmufacturing defects, 
ask whether the products themselves are defective in design. The cost-benefit analysis asks 
if the benefits to the user of an improved safer design exceed the costs of providing such a 
safer design. If this condition is met, then the firm should be liable for an inadequate level 
of safety. In general the change in the system of liability has worked to expose the 
manufacturer, distributor, and retailer to ever greater liability. The consumer, once regarded 
as an essential and responsible link in the chain of product use, is now more the object of 
legal protection and less a bearer of independent responsibilities (Epstein, 1980, p. 6). 
Suppose the mainstream way of looking at torts in general and products liability in 
particular is the only one. Then, in a certain sense, the same analogy applies as that what 
Hayek said about the neoclassical notion of perfect competition (see Part I). He said that 
full knowledge is not a defining element of perfect competition but of the situation when it 
has run its full course. Here too, in a sense, the neoclassical position is self-defeating. Tort 
cannot be committed in general equilibrium. Perfect knowledge of the future rules torts 
out. "Even an intentional tort could not occur, for a perfectly foreseen tort could surely be 
avoided by the victim" (Rothbard, 1979, p. 93). In other words, with full knowledge, the 
market (prices) leads to the efficient outcome, no matter whether there is or is not a system 
of products liability (Velthoven and Van Wijck, 1997, p. 208: cp. Rizzo, 1980, p. 291; and 
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Wonnell, 1986 p. 514). What then of the real consumer who acts in a world of genuine 
surprise? What does an Austrian system of products liability look like? 
1 2 . 2 The Austrian way: strict liability revisited 
Austriarts (Christainsen, 1990; Cordato, 1992; Rizzo, 1985; Rothbard, 1982, Teijl and 
Holzhauer, 1997, p. 157) are said to prefer a system of strict liability. Why? Austrians 
prefer abstract rules: stable rules the government cannot change at will. Rules enhance the 
chances of an order in which individuals pursue and attain their goals. "[I]n order to pursue 
goals and make plans it is necessary to have a system of property rights that is clearly 
defined and that each individual can count on into his foreseeable future. Any involuntary 
alteration of a given property rights structure will necessarily interfere [...]"(Cordato, 1980, 
p. 402). Property rights are the spheres of freedom of action by each individual. Two 
axioms are basic to the system of property rights. One, every man is a self-owner. He has 
the absolute jurisdiction over his own body (the axiom of self-ownership). And two, each 
person justly owns whatever previously unowned resources he appropriates or "mixes" his 
labor with (the axiom of "homesteading") (Rothbard, 1982, pp. 60-61). 
Strict liability, indeed, circumscribes an explicit cost-benefit analysis of the judge. The 
injurer bears the cost of accidents he causes, regardless of the extent of his precaution. No 
legal standard of precaution is relevant to the assignment of costs. But, says Steve Hanke 
(1985), it brings it back later. For a cost-benefit analysis is not used at the time liability is 
assigned, it is an integral part again in seeking the form of compensation to be paid 
(Hanke, 1985, p. 894). The judge has to determine whether damage payment or specific 
performance—the promiser has to perform as promised—is the appropriate remedy. For an 
Austrian, however, specific performance, as far as subjectivism goes, will always be 
preferred. Rights are to be honored independent of utilitarian cost-benefit considerations. 
No judge-made efficient breach of contracts is possible. Moreover, as far as compensation 
goes, Austrian subjectivism is useless. Someone else cannot decide on subjective cost. 
Compensation is an issue of corrective justice and rests on ethical premises of just 
compensation—principles of right and wrong (Cordato, 1992, p. 106; cp. Rizzo, 1979a). 
Ethics is no value-free "positive" discipline. 
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To sum up, for an Austrian, liability is "analyzed in terms of institutional efficiency—the 
certainty and stability that these rules impart to the social framework" (Rizzo, 1980a, p. 
291). Strict liability fits in naturally. Costs and benefits do not have to be balanced. 
Negligence, however, always needs a balancing of interests. We need a particular hierarchy 
of means and ends. For the Austrians, tort is based on ethics not economics (Rothbard, 
1979, p. 95; cp. Arnold, 1982). He who causes harm should compensate the victim. 
Austrians reject dynamic change in the law on the basis of economic efficiency; they 
prefer a static, stable system. Appropriate rules of the game, i.e. on products liability, 
however, are necessary. As Hayek said: "Competition is a procedure of discovery [...]. To 
operate beneficially, competition requires that those involved observe rules" (1988, p. 19). 
Competition is not unconditional, but is conditional competition subject to certain 
constraints. So the question becomes how competition and entrepreneurship can be 
conditioned in their working properties by alternative rules for products liability. 
Is strict liability the only Austrian approach possible? I want now to highlight the 
Austrian elements of subjectivism and entrepreneurship and see where they take us. 
12.3 Contracts: back to the future 
For liability to be Austrian it should be able to cope with subjectivism and 
entrepreneurship. These cannot be ignored, although some believe that it is impossible to 
incorporate them in a system of liability. Subjectivism should lead to a system in which all 
compensation is astronomically high. Why not punish someone who makes a scratch on my 
car with capital punishment (De Geest, 1994, p. 496, cp. p. 491)? But what is the 
alternative? Notions of objective specificity and precision widely used in the natural 
sciences have no place into a science of human action. Facts deployed in social science are 
merely opinions: they never exist as a consistent and coherent body. It is better to adhere 
to Hayek who said "it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in 
economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent 
application of subjectivism" (1952, p. 31). 
It is said (De Geest, 1994, p. 497) that certain things, such as encouraging 
entrepreneurship seem to follow in the Austrian tradition almost as if they belong to a 
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logical category. Without there being any discussion or motivation, as if no other costs, 
such as transaction costs exist at all, or are important. In a sense, this is true; it is 
praxeology we are talking about. But that does not mean it is not a reasoned conclusion, 
reached by verbal-deductive logic. To speak of Austrianism means to speak of 
individualism and subjectivism. Human action is based on individual purposes; gains and 
losses are personal, non-comparable, and non-additive. Cost comparisons done by an 
outside observer are impossible. How can this element be incorporated into a system of 
liability. Fortunately, "[jjust as most intentional assaults involve assailants and victims who 
already know each other well, most unintended injuries occur in the context of commercial 
acquaintance [...]" (Huber, 1988, p. 5). Accidents are part of the realm of human 
cooperation, and not of unchosen relationship and collision. In other words, accidents are 
part of consent (private choice) not of coercion (public choice). If this is the situation, what 
comes to the fore as the element to focus on is the implicit or explicit contract made. It 
"allows us to weight the risks and benefits of our actions in the objective coolness of the 
beforehand rather than in the emotional heat of the aftermath" (Huber, 1988, p. 226). The 
best protection against accidents are not measures taken after an accident happens but "in 
the freedom to make considered, binding choices beforehand" (Huber, 1988, p. 18). Private 
choice and individual consent—both deliberately made—are what it is all about. We make 
a distinction between harmful acts and tortious ones. What makes the difference is consent, 
or lack of it. Not all harmful acts are torts. No harm is done to one who is willing. A 
person who comes willingly to a risky situation assumes the risk of his activities and 
cannot blame someone else later for the accident. Parties allocate risks and responsibilities 
in any way they choose. First party insurance, specified compensation, and assumption of 
risk prevail over liability-driven compensation. 
However, are not transaction costs too high to make contracts? First, transaction costs 
are costs like any other. We live in a world of costs. Everybody wants them lower, just as 
every consumer wants prices to be as low as possible. Second, of course people cannot 
contract with every firm individually. Firms will compete in offering different packages of 
liability. As standard contracts are developed, transaction costs go down. Third, it is surely 
not possible to find a measure of efficiency—as the neoclassicals are inclined to do—from 
a world without transaction costs. What judges are asked to do is to allocate when 
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transaction costs are prohibitive high. But that is the same as the hypothetical markets I 
spoke of earlier in the so-called calculation debate (O'Driscoll, 1980, p. 356; Rizzo, 1979b, 
p. 87; cp. Huber, 1988, p. 220). Indeed, it is the old problem again: "Can we do without 
the market?" Austrians emphasize the division of knowledge and its growth. Freedom of 
contract is necessary, not because it produces perfect efficiency, but because it produces 
more efficient outcomes than judicial intervention does. The system encourages the full use 
of human knowledge. 
Next to subjectivism, Austrianism also implies entrepreneurship. It has to be stimulated. 
If contract is the norm, people suffer or enjoy the consequences of their decisions. One is 
alert; entrepreneurship is encouraged. New things can be discovered, and we can be 
genuinely surprised. Strict liability implies coercion and less choice. But what is needed is 
not less but more choice (Huber, 1988, p. 224). A system of tort says no. The only 
freedom left is not to discover, not to innovate. Contract gives the individual the freedom 
to make his own private choices. It stands against the judge's public choice under a system 
of strict liability. 
People have the freedom to take or limit liability through exante agreements. They have 
the opportunity through voluntary exchanges (the contracting process) to use their property 
rights. Circumstances change and people are different. That is why an exchange, if 
voluntary, always benefits the exchanging parties. Strict liability in modern product law, 
however, negates any attempt to limit liability through agreements. "[...T]he concept is 
associated with the nearly complete abandonment of contract and the idea that the plaintiff 
should never bear the costs of his or her actions" (Cordato, 1992, p. 101). The world, 
however, is one of error and risk: genuine surprise. How can a contract with its implied 
distribution of liability be just if it is based on the erroneous valuation of one or both of 
the partners? But the market process is all about the correction of error. Entrepreneurship 
depends on error, of which we are never fully aware. The question is, "Is the error—yes or 
no—induced by one party, either positively or tacitly, on the basis of which consent is 
fraudulently obtained?" (cp. Kirzner, 1979, p. 217). Genuine error, however, is completely 
different. Genuine error and its counterpart genuine surprise are unexpected. Such a 
possibility is never imagined. The correction of these errors should be seen as a gain; as 
something that was not there before—for better or worse. The possibility of genuine error 
192 Part III. The Austrian perspective on consumer policy 
is the spark that switches on entrepreneurial alertness. For both consumer and producer it is 
the core of the market process (Kirzner, 1989, p. 107). 
The solution of Christainsen (1990), however, for incorporating entrepreneurship will not 
do. He wants the courts to carry out the process of discovery. Not a governmental 
monopoly, but a private legal process of discovery. Courts have to compete to attract 
customers. "[JJudges use the knowledge embedded in customs and precedents, knowledge 
that is dispersed among millions of people and tested by centuries of experience" 
(Christainsen, 1990, p. 497). The consumer, however, cannot hire an entrepreneur and let 
him do the work. Entrepreneurship is no scarce resource in the usual sense. If so, indeed, 
potential entrepreneurs must be rewarded to offset the costs of exercising entrepreneurship. 
Until, however, "an opportunity has been discovered, no one knows how much to offer as 
an incentive for its discovery [...] (Kirzner, 1989, p. 28). "To hire an 'entrepreneur' is to 
be an entrepreneur—simply shifting the problem back to the incentives that might 
galvanize this latter entrepreneur into action" (Kirzner, 1989, p. 27). Still, the notion of 
discovery is correct, but let the individuals do it themselves. Why not bring liability back 
to the law of contracts—back, so to speak, to Epstein's stage one? Why not a contractual 
solution? This is the route I take in this thesis. 
12.4 The hapless victim: caveat emptor 
But this brings back the old notion of caveat emptor, "Let the buyer beware!" The rule that 
has prevailed since time immemorial, or at least since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
(Huber, 1988, p. 22). However, since the seller was bound by the terms of the deal too, the 
rule would more correctly have read caveat emptor et vendor. Also the whole idea of 
contract law of making people keep to their agreements and promises, is rooted in a notion 
of consumer protection. 
We have an innate sympathy, however, against the notion of caveat emptor. Indeed 
Adam Smith spoke of sympathy as one of the driving forces of the market. The invisible 
hand produces order. It manifests itself in two ways: first, in our sympathy for our 
fellowman and, second, in competition among producers and consumers. Both forces 
control our self-interest. And indeed, the most powerful agent in the change in tort law, 
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from caveat emptor to the notion that the buyer should never bear the costs of his action, 
has been sympathy (Huber, 1988, p. 190). "Who can fail to be angered by the devastating 
injury to a young child, or by the maiming of a woman in the prime of her life, or by the 
slow suffocation of a retired factory worker? Every accident was recharacterized as an 
assault, the victim then being invited to make a bid for our sympathy in court" (Huber, 
1988, p. 191). 
Contract law, however, seems to be returning to the dark days of the Middle Ages; back 
in time to when capitalism started. It negates the fundamental trend in todays society, that 
forms the basis of liability, of a growing innate sympathy. Perhaps sympathy was too 
expensive in the old days, but today society can afford to help its fellowmen. Contract law 
places a heavy burden on the weak, ordinary consumer: the hapless victim of an accident. 
Who is he? Everyone. People are ignorant of most dangers and no experts on products 
liability. It cannot be only the dullards who need protection. For "then the question 
becomes: How can one justify a comprehensive ban rather than a ban applicable to the 
dullards alone?" (Higgs, 1994, p. 8). But then, who and on what basis will select the 
dullards? 
How then does the market protect us? First, suppose we know we are ignorant. If the 
producer knows more, the development of goodwill (and fear to lose it) of the producer 
can be an answer. The producer protects us out of self interest; he wants to see us again, 
we pay him more. Personal relations can be the solution—not the problem. A solution not 
found in the neoclassical ideal of perfect competition (cp. Wonnell, 1986, p. 522. For other 
ways of how the market protects people, see the first two chapters of Part III). Second, 
what about the standard contracts I just mentioned? Of course, no one has to start from 
scratch and do all the work himself. But what about weak bargaining power, especially if 
no standard contracts are available? In a market economy this will never be a problem. As 
Bo'hm-Bawerk demonstrated in his article "Control or Economic Law?" ([1914] 1962), 
competition provides an alternative to bargaining: the range of indeterminacy where 
bargaining is necessary tends to narrow as competition becomes more vigorous (cp. 
Wonnell, 1986, p. 538). The weak consumer is protected by the competitive process; his 
bargaining skills are not that important. Or perhaps the market is not all that close to 
bargaining. As Kirzner says, the market, first and foremost, is a process in which not 
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bargaining but the alert grasping of new profit opportunities followed by the erosion of 
them takes centre stage. Third, the world will change. At this moment "[w]e no longer 
have a functioning law to encourage and enforce the settlement of accidents before hand, 
through deliberate choice, private insurance, and specified compensation or assumption of 
risk" (Huber, 1988 p. 222). But this does not mean that the situation cannot change. 
Is there no easier way to get the same result: the protection of the consumer? Jevons 
already said that no "consumer wants to buy putrid sausages, poisonous pickles, dangerous 
guns, or fraudulent plate" (1882, p. 43). He concluded that consumer protection should rely 
on the government inspector who is a far better judge than the individual purchaser. 
"Laissez faire policy might still be maintained if everybody understood his interests. But 
the very point of the matter is that ignorant people cannot take precautions against dangers 
of which they are ignorant" (1882, p. 42). For Jevons there were no hard-and-fast rales, 
every case had to be treated in detail upon its merits. It is all very well, he said, "to argue 
about what people ought to do; but if we learn from unquestionable statistical returns that 
thousands of hapless persons do, as a matter of fact, get crushed to deaths, or variously 
maimed, by unfenced machinery, these are calamities which no theory can mitigate" (1882, 
p. 2). And so, "the first step is to throw aside all supposed absolute rights or inflexible 
principles" (Jevons, 1882, p. 9). If the consumer is not the best judge of what he wants, the 
result will be that "[b]y degrees inspectors will make their way into our houses to see that 
our drains are in good order, our rooms well ventilated, our kitchen boilers safe, our 
cisterns clean, our children at school" (1882, p. 40). Although, he was aware that a lot of 
the laws supposed to protect the consumer "were mere class laws, intended to support the 
pride of an aristocracy by restraining the tastes of the lower classes" (1882, p. 40). 
Carl Menger (1994), however, at about the same time, in his lectures to Crown Prince 
Rudolf of Austria, gave priority to the market. For him, the government never knows best. 
It is better to rely on the dispersed wisdom of even the most ordinary people. "Government 
cannot possibly know the interest of all citizens, and in order to help them it would have to 
take account of each of the diverse activities of everybody" (Menger, 1994, p. 111). Even 
in the case of a severe famine, the best the government can probably do to help is to alert 
people "to the impending danger with informative brochures in plain language" (Menger, 
1994, p. 195). 
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But still if society knows less and the government knows more, why not take a short-cut 
and let the government ban dangerous products right away? In other words, if we posses 
imperfect information and have a limited capability of processing complex 
information—which no doubt we have—would it not be expedient to let the government 
ban dangerous products? Is working through markets really necessary? The problem is to 
decide what will guide the government in its decision making. Next to all sorts of public 
choice failures—regulators, for instance, usually assume the worst in each situation (Higgs, 
1994, p. 7)—there are also noted Austrian failures of social cost-benefits analysis. Social 
aggregation is impossible. The consumers themselves evaluate their welfare and 
demonstrate it in their actions. 
But there is more. Consumers exchange goods to improve their position. Goods, 
however, have a risk dimension, just as they have colour and quality. Life's risks cannot be 
avoided, but have to be coped with one way or another. To restrict choice to goods without 
(for the sake of the argument let us suppose this is possible) or a lower risk dimension 
makes no one better off, and some or all worse off. Why? First, people who prefer risk are 
worse off. We all make a different trade-off between price, quality, and risk. Second, no 
one will be better off. Choice is always prospective. Even if someone is disappointed with 
the product later on, and regrets having bought it, at the moment of choice his range of 
freedom shrinks. He is worse off. It is through disappointment that the market works; that 
is how we learn. Choosing not only implies regret, but also being surprised by correcting 
genuine errors. 
To let an expert choose is no solution. It would mean the end of the market economy. 
Indeed, some know more than others. But "[i]f consumer choice were to be permitted only 
to consumers whose knowledge, whether of risk or any other dimension, equalled or 
exceeded that of all other persons, then persons in general would not be permitted to 
choose anything for themselves, and no genuine market order could exist" (Higgs, 1994, p. 
7). Who deterrnines who knows best, not just of one but of all qualities of a product? Who 
can give the comprehensive judgement of a good? The market cannot be surpassed. 
Actions show the preferences and knowledge of the individuals. 
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12.5 The utter stranger: negative externalities 
For the sake of the argument, we could say that parties in an exchange can contract all 
damages between themselves. But what about the innocent bystander, the utter stranger? He 
certainly cannot; he is no partner in the exchange. As I showed earlier, as far as products 
liability goes, the stranger is the exception to the rule. It is unnecessary to build our whole 
system of products liability around him, as some Austrians, by advocating a system of 
strict liability, are inclined to do. But still he is the exception we have to look for. In other 
words, what about negative externalities? For the neoclassical, negative externalities arise 
because the private and the social net product differ. The normative conclusion follows that 
with positive or negative externalities, the market leads to sub-optimal results. If 
externalities are positive, output is less than the Pareto optimal amount. If they are 
negative, output is greater than it. Through the provision of subsidies or the imposition of 
taxes, the policy remedy is to try to induce the market to conform to the optimal amounts. 
The optimal situation is the one that results from a competitive equilibrium in the absence 
of transaction costs. 
As I have already pointed out Austrians disagree with this Pareto norm of optimality. 
First, the market is an open-ended process in time. A static, timeless Pareto optimum is no 
meaningful measure of performance for actual market processes. In Part I of this thesis I 
argued that the market is first and foremost a process, not a state or an institution that 
facilitates exchange. Second, all costs and benefits are inherently private. It is impossible to 
say that externalities generate a divergence between private and social cost or benefits. As 
with all costs, externalities are experienced subjectively; they cannot be added together to 
arrive at a measurement of social cost (Cordato, 1992, p. 7). Third, the regulator does not 
have the necessary information to calculate a divergence between social and private costs. 
If he could get the information without the actual market process, the process of discovery 
would no longer be needed (cp. Rizzo, 1980b, p. 641). But there is no efficient non-market 
resource allocation. This was the insight the Austrians tried to bring to the fore in the 
socialist-calculation debate, that began with the question "Is an efficient non-market 
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resource allocation possible?" Market based prices are necessary to signal scarcity, to 
transmit knowledge, and to stimulate discovery. 
For Austrians, policy relevant externalities are those that involve a conflict of property 
rights that are not clearly defined or enforced. External costs "are failures to maintain a 
fully free market, rather than defects of that market" (Rothbard, 1962, p. 944). For Mises, 
all negative externality problems "could be removed by a reform of the laws concerning 
liability for damages inflicted and by rescinding the institutional barriers preventing the full 
operation of private ownership" (Mises, 1966, p. 658). The problem is that resources are 
allocated by non-owners. The same is true for example for the problem of air pollution. No 
one has a right to clean air; no law protects against pollutants emerging from natural 
processes. But there is a right not to have air invaded by pollutants generated by an 
aggressor. For an Austrian, terms as "reasonable" air pollution or balancing of equities are 
out of the question. If someone causes pollution, he is an aggressor. Damages should be 
paid in accordance with strict liability, unless the polluter was there first (the principle of 
homesteading) and had already polluted the air before the other property was developed 
(Rothbard, 1982, p. 77). 
Positive externalities do not in general involve a conflict in the use of property. So, for 
Austrians, positive externalities are not the inversion of negative ones. External benefits are 
not viewed as either market or institutional failure. They are an unintended benefit of the 
market. I cannot conclude that the resulting prices and quantities are sub-optimal. "These 
outcomes simply reflect the freely made decisions of market participants to trade or not to 
trade under one of an infinite number of cost-benefit relations" (Cordato, 1992, p. 19). If 
someone takes an action to his own advantage and a third party benefits, he does not have 
the right to ask others to subsidize him. In the extreme this will result in the good, such as 
a public good as consumer information, not being produced at all. Free riders reduce the 
effective demand almost to zero. For the neoclassical, an excise subsidy must encompass 
the market output. But, as well as asking that no property rights be violated, the Austrian 
would ask how much free information is enough before allowing individuals to make their 
own decisions. Who decides then when consumers are well enough informed? 
This makes it look as if the Austrian and Coasian traditions have much in common. 
Both, indeed, blame the standard Pigouvian analysis for ignoring the importance of 
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property rights. But the similarity is superficial. For Coase, prices are equilibrium prices. If 
the transaction costs are high, the judge should mimic the Coasian theorem results. If the 
transaction costs are low, regardless of who bears the costs ex ante, parties will bargain. 
The result will maximize the combined value of the product they produce. 
As already shown the Austrian objections to this procedure are (1) knowledge is 
decentralized, (2) values are subjective, and (3) not all prices are equilibrium prices. But 
the way the Austrian regards property rights differs from the Coasian one too. The judge 
should not decide who should have the property rights—but who already has them. For 
Coase, rights are a variable to be granted by the judge on the basis of who stands to 
benefit most or to lose least from a particular rights assignment (Cordato, 1980, p. 401). 
For Austrians, what is necessary is not cost-benefit analysis, but for instance a closer look 
at contractual arrangements. If the owner of a right is known then strict liability comes to 
the fore, strictly enforcing property rights. Not the internalization of costs, as the Pigouvian 
goal would be, gives rise to this rule. For Austrians, strict liability is based on the prima 
facie notion of he who causes harm is liable. Causation is an integral part of strict Uability. 
For Coase, however, the notion of causation is almost irrelevant. The optimal allocation is 
achieved by whoever has the property rights. 
For the innocent bystander who has—no doubt—a right to his life and just property, 
strict liability fits in naturally. The property right is one of integrity for physical violence. 
Every one has a right to have the physical integrity of his life and property inviolated. No 
property rights are violated if, for instance, a better and cheaper product comes onto the 
market. The consumer as well as the producer who possesses the old product cannot ask 
for any damages. "[N]o one has the right to protect the value of his property, for that value 
is purely the reflection of what people are willing to pay for it. That willingness solely 
depends on how they decide to use their money. No one has a right to someone else's 
money [...]" (Rofhbard, 1982, p. 62). In this theses, however, we look at physical violence. 
To sum up. Since people are in contact with each other beforehand, for most product 
related accidents, contract law will do. The general rule is buyer and seller beware. If 
people are not in contact beforehand (the case of the utter stranger) then a wrong, a tort, is 
done, and strict liability is the answer. At no stage in dealing with accidents a third party 
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have to calculate (subjective) costs. At no stage does the market process of discovery 
(entrepreneurship) have to be stifled. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I examined the place of the competitive-entrepreneurial consumer in Austrian 
economic thought. For a neoclassical economist, competition among consumers is hard to 
find. For an Austrian economist, however, it is a necessity. The introduction puts forward 
the problem that although an Austrian economist believes that everyone—the consumer 
included—acts entrepreneurially, in his elucidation of the market process he gives the role 
of entrepreneur to the producer only. 
In Part I, "The Consumer in Austrian Economics" I looked at the questions (1) What is 
Austrian economics? (2) What is the Austrian methodology? and (3) What about the 
consumer in Austrian economics? The first chapter explains the name Austrian. Although it 
indeed began in Austria, today it has nothing to do with that country. The term Austrian 
means a way of looking at the subject and the method of economic science. The perfectly-
competitive model of mainstream economics is replaced by the notion of the 
entrepreneurial-competitive market process. The second chapter looks at the method of 
Austrian economics: praxeology. It is the verbal elaboration of the logical implication that 
men act. The title of Mises's book "Human Action" sums it up. Purposes direct all 
conscious human action. Every human act exchanges something possessed for something 
preferred. All human action attempts to change the future. The chapter examines what this 
means for the Austrian perspective on some basic economic notions of human action and 
non-action (valuation and indifference curves), and economic laws (the law of decreasing 
returns). Economists use their minds to deduce conclusions; experience in human action is 
history and only history. There is a sharp difference between Austrian and mainstream 
neoclassical economics; the latter is often mathematically moulded and econometrically 
tested, the former never. 
Chapter Three looks at the reason why the consumer is missing from Austrian 
economics. By emphasizing the importance of (often hidden) dispersed knowledge and the 
feasibility of the producer being able to calculate—as against a government's ability to 
calculate and collect all the necessary data—the consumer got lost. This all took place in 
204 Summary and conclusion 
the so-called socialist-calculation debate that raged between the two world wars. The 
consumer was never to be found again in Austrian economics. He is absent in the 
elucidation of the market as a dynamic process of entrepreneurial discovery, as well as, in 
the analysis of the possibility of economic calculation in monetary terms. The latter is 
discussed only in terms of production, and in the former modern Austrian economics uses 
the methodological makeshift of an entrepreneurial producer and a non-entrepreneurial 
consumer. Just like the classical economists before them, the Austrians neglect the 
rationality of the consumer. 
In Part II, "The Consumer: Entrepreneurial and Calculative", I examined the question 
"What does the calculative and entrepreneurial consumer look like?" I have attempted to 
recompose market phenomena in terms of the typical components of everyday decision 
making. This is done for the ordinary businessman, as well as for the average consumer. 
Chapter Four discusses a lesser-known theme of the Austrians. Menger in his Grundzätze, 
gave four characteristics of goods as answer to the question of what makes something a 
good. Böhm-Bawerk in his Rechte und Verhältnisse added a fifth: individuals should also 
know how to use a thing. I used this fifth characteristic to throw light on the consumer: his 
form of alertness and entrepreneurship inside the market process. With the help of Ryle, I 
looked at a notion of alertness that suits the producer and at one that suits the consumer. 
Alertness is a form of knowing-how that can be differentiated for the producer as a 
capacity (competence) and for the consumer as a tendency (proneness). According to Ryle, 
although both can be simulated, we use the abusive word 'charlatan' for the fraud who 
pretends to be able to bring things off, and the abusive word 'hypocrite' for the one who 
effects motives and habits. 
Chapter Five draws on the work of Schönfeld-Illy. Kirzner distinguishes maximization 
inside a given ends-means framework from the determination of the framework. The 
Robbinsian maximizer can perform only the first role. Mises's homo agens can do both. In 
Kirzner's methodological makeshift, the consumer acts as a pure Robbinsian maximizer. 
However, inside a Robbinsian framework of given ends and means, the consumer needs the 
same element of alertness that Kirzner locates in the determination of the framework. The 
consumer avoids the problem of the immeasurability of utility and shortens the calculation 
process with the help of three principles. The first is the separate utility of a good. Though 
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the consumer's aim is to reach the greatest utility, he does not and cannot calculate total 
utility as such, but only the changes in total utility, changes brought about by adding goods 
to the ones already used. These changes give the total utility of each good separately. The 
second principle is quid pro quo. Changes in total utility do not give the consumer 
numbers in which he can calculate. What he can do is compare the changes with other 
changes. The third is economic relevance. The price relevant for the marginal part has an 
economic relevance for all other units of the stock of goods. These three principles form 
the basis of Schonfeld-Illy's theory on the role of prices (that is alertness) in the 
calculation process of the consumer. 
Chapter Six expands on the calculation process of the consumer addressing the question 
of how the maximizing process of the consumer can be described from a subjective point 
of view, that is in terms of the components of everyday decision-making. The mafhematical 
mould of neoclassical theory means that for the neoclassical the problem is a mathematical 
one: the solving of a Lagrangean function. From a theoretical point of view, a consumer 
has a lot of work to do in computing the marginal utilities. First, he has to line up all the 
alternative combinations of goods available, then he has to assess the needs successive units 
of the various goods can satisfy, and finally he has to find out at what point in the row of 
units satisfaction breaks off. It is impossible, however, to make all the necessary 
calculations. In reality the consumer has to take a short-cut. The notion of taking a short-
cut can be formalized inside the neo-classical model by focusing on the notion of marginal 
utility: the way it functions in equilibrium and disequilibrium. Saving and consumption 
patterns are explained for two groups of consumers: (1) the well-established consumers, the 
ones we know from traditional economic theory, and (2) the trendsetting consumers, who 
are in disequilibrium by choice. The latter are either short-sighted or far-sighted. 
Chapter Seven looks at the notion of marginal utility to answer the question of how a 
consumer calculates the total value of a divisible amount of goods. Wieser's 
Multiplicationstheorem des Wertes says that to get the total value, all units of a stock of 
good have to be multiplied by the attained marginal utility. BShm-Bawerk's 
Integrationstheorem des Wertes says that the total value of a stock of goods is the sum of 
the utilities of the different units. Because Wieser underestimated the total utility of a stock 
of goods, his formulation found few followers. Schonfeld-Illy's interpretation of marginal 
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utility, that of the economic relevance of a margin for the whole, gives an answer as to 
why Wieser's description could be true. SchOnfeld-Illy solves an inconsistency in the 
thinking of Wieser, who took the description of marginal utility from the situation in which 
the calculation was already completed. However, he draws the description of the function 
of marginal utility from the situation in which calculation begins. Sch6nfeld-IUy wonders 
whether the last stage of calculation contains all the things used during the actual 
calculation process and, that consequently are contained in a conceptual description grafted 
upon the final stage. 
In Part 111, "The Austrian Perspective on Consumer Policy", I looked at consumer policy 
in general, and advertising (the way it functions and can be used to introduce a new 
product) and products liability (from a neoclassical and Austrian perspective) in particular. 
Chapter Eight introduces the notion of consumer policy and its link with creativity and 
entrepreneurship. It especially addresses the question of how the Austrian vision on the 
market process relates to consumer policy. In other words, what the impact of consumer 
policy is upon the perception by consumers and producers of the available array of 
opportunities. To describe the ways consumer policy hampers discovery I used Kirzner's 
four notions of the undiscovered, the unsimulated, the stifled, and the wholly superfluous 
discovery process. I concluded that the Austrian notion of the market provides a novel 
angle for a critique of the regulated consumer. Regulatory restrictions interfere with the 
spontaneous discovery process the unregulated market tends to generate. Consumer policy 
stifles the incentive that converts a socially desirable opportunity (an opportunity that 
transcends an existing framework of perceived opportunities) into a personally gainful one. 
Chapter Nine demonstrates that there is room for the praxeological method in 
economics. Empirical facts cannot discriminate between two opposing hypotheses on 
advertising. (1) Advertising is partly deceptive and partly manipulative. Without 
government regulation this situation will continue. (2) Advertising is a good like any other 
good. The consumer gets the type and quality of advertising he wants and is willing to pay 
for. Advertising is an essential part of the competition process, making the product known 
to the consumers. Consumers are not passive actors but by-and-large act in their own self-
interest. Chapter Ten expands on advertising by looking at pricing a real novelty. 
Competition among consumers can be used to spread the news. Where trends are conceived 
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consumers compete, creating the market for the producer. Trends are not sold by 
competing producers but are bought by competing consumers. 
Chapters Eleven and Twelve look at products liability (that is harms arising from 
commercial products) from the mainstream neoclassical point of view and from the 
Austrian one respectively. For a neoclassical, costs are objective and are known to the 
judge, who, by using the so-called Hand Formula, balances expected accident costs against 
the cost of making the product safer. A defendant is guilty of negligence if P times L is 
greater than B. Where P is the probability, a loss will occur, L is the value associated with 
the loss, and B the cost associated with preventing it. For an Austrian, however, since costs 
are subjective and knowledge cannot be centralized, contract law seems to be the best. In 
other words, it is the old rule of caveat emptor, "Let the buyer and seller beware". The 
parties can then arrange the expected costs and benefits beforehand from their own 
subjective point of view and entrepreneurial insights. The utter stranger (who is no partner 
in the exchange) whose property rights are violated—there are so-called negative 
externalities—can claim compensation. The amount of compensation is for the judge on 
ethical grounds, and not the economist, to decide. 
On the basis of the first three parts of this thesis, what have neoclassical and Austrians 
to say to each other? What is the outcome on the consumer in Austrian economics and the 
Austrian perspective on consumer policy (cp. Kirzner, 1997, and De Soto, 1998, pp. 78-
79)? 
The methodological analysis in Part I shows that neoclassicals and Austrians do not have 
much to say to each other. Theories that do not need testing and are always true are out of 
the question in the standard neoclassical methodology of empirical falsification. Verbal 
logic, aprioristic-deductive reasoning leaves room for subjectivism and entrepreneurship, 
both of which the market process depends on. In other words, the claim of the Austrians 
that prediction is impossible—because what happens depends on knowledge yet to be 
created in an entrepreneurial process (to find out things we are not even aware of that we 
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don not know them: to correct genuine errors)—stands against quantitative prediction as a 
sought and known objective of the neoclassical. The analysis of consumer behavior in Part 
n shows that neoclassical and Austrians do not have to say much to each other. For an 
Austrian, the consumer is a creative entrepreneur who stands in the midst of a dynamic 
process. For a neoclassical, he is a homo economics who makes rational choices based on 
constraint maximization in a given and known ends-means relation. The analysis of 
consumer policy in Part III shows that neoclassical and Austrians do not have to say much 
to each other. For an Austrian, the knowledge the government should act on is subjective, 
dispersed, and changes all the time. Objective scientific knowledge alone is not enough; 
there is also the practical and purely subjective knowledge of place and time. For an 
Austrian, the government's role is to protect the property rights of the individual. If his 
property rights are involved, the judge decides on ethical grounds; economics is not 
involved. For a neoclassical, however, there is a complete knowledge of means and ends, 
though decorated with known uncertainty. Costs are objective and can be measured by a 
third party. 
But is there nothing positive to be said about the neoclassical-Austrian connection? The 
Austrian revolution was and still is part of a larger tradition (see Chapter 1). It not only 
started in the 1870s with Menger, but with Jevons and Walras too. All three wanted to 
theorize. All three wanted to explain market regularities as the outcome of the rational 
choices of individuals subject to constraints. All endorsed the existence of economic laws 
showing systematic consequences to our actions. For Mises the notion of economic law is 
not only the core of classical economics but of neoclassical economics too. All 
neoclassicals want to explain the undesigned regularities of the market order as the 
outcome of the meaningful choices of individuals. Therefore Austrians are still part of the 
economic orthodoxy of neoclassical economics, although they are no longer part of the 
mainstream Walrasian and Marshallian branch. In other words, to a certain extent we can 
say that the language differs: formalistic precision in mainstream neoclassical versus verbal 
elaboration in Austrian economics. The latter reinforces most of the former's conclusions. I 
would argue that it is partly a difference in methodology: a different road is taken to reach 
the same conclusions (see for instance the law of decreasing returns in Part I). Of course, 
an Austrian would say that it is not only the language that differs, but the problem 
Summary and conclusion 209 
situation too. For him, subjective assessment and entrepreneurship are part of the richness 
of the empirical world. Both, however, crowd out formalism with its implied form of 
narrow rationalism and supposition of full availability of information, whether deterministic 
or probabilistic. Subjectivism and entrepreneurship cannot be analyzed with formal tools 
without fransforming their essence. Simplification has its price. 
Therefore, what the neoclassical can learn from the Austrian is that there is more in the 
world of the theoretical economist than only the economics of perfect competition. There is 
the competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery (see Part I). A neoclassical tends to 
underestimate the learning capacity of individuals (see Part II), while, at the same time, 
overestimating the economic knowledge of the government. Negative externalities for 
instance are part of ethics not economics (see our Part III). Nevertheless, a neoclassical 
economist would counter this by saying that although what an Austrian says on 
subjectivism and entrepreneurship is very interesting, unless it is stated in formal proof it 
remains just that—an interesting idea and no more. 
Applied welfare analysis (see Part III), however, unlike theoretical economics does not 
belong to a field where the Austrian and mainstream economist meet all that easily. For the 
Austrian, if subjective value and the open-ended market process are taken seriously, 
individual rankings cannot be fused together, and there is no end-state to mimic. There is 
no norm (taken from a pattern of imagined omniscience) for assessing policies. For the 
Austrian since sheer ignorance is not incorporated, mainstream welfare economics has no 
place for those acts of entrepreneurship the equilibrative discovery process depends on. Not 
only allocative efficiency but speed and accuracy with which the economy identifies and 
overcomes waste and discoordination are important too. However, compared to more 
heterodox forms of economics, Austrians and neoclassical share the importance both give 
to laissez faire. The Austrian belief in it, compared to mainstream neoclassical economics, 
is strong. This study's emphasis on subjectivism and entrepreneurship reinforces this belief. 
The tendency towards greater awareness that leads to equilibrium is fuelled by producers as 
well as consumers (see Part II). Profit opportunities provide the incentive for both. There is 
a tendency for entrepreneurial errors to be corrected—not to be made. There is a tendency 
to be right. There is more to gain from greater awareness than from diminishing awareness; 
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a tendency a changing government policy often frustrates. A certain environment of 
stability is necessary to overwhelm the forces of disequilibrium. 
In other words, Austrian economics reinforces the mainstream belief in a spontaneous 
equiUbrium. Not to the extreme of there always being an equilibrium, but certainly more 
than there never being an equiUbrium. The consumer corrects errors too. Since the 
consumer is no producer, the Kirznerian notion of entrepreneurship as something correcting 
an already existing situation waiting to be discovered, fits him. He too gets his "profit" for 
overcoming ignorance through alertness. 
If the just-said is true, the biggest problem for the Austrians is not that their theory is 
unrealistic or irrelevant, that it gives an inaccurate description of the social world or 
misunderstands the forces at work. No, their biggest problem is to explain why economists 
disagree. If theorizing is based on apodictally true premises, only to be stated to be seen as 
true, the rest being pure deduction, why do not all economists—including the 
neoclassicals—agree? But even Austrians differ. This is one problem the neoclassical and 
Austrians share. As the former emphasize prediction and the latter verbal logic, both have 
questions to answer. The neoclassical has to explain why if he is so clever in making 
predictions, he is not rich. And the Austrian has to show why, someone so clever at 
making deductions does not have all economists agreeing with him. 
Finally, is there really no point where Austrians and neoclassicals fully meet as far as 
the consumer goes? Yes there is. If the neoclassical is right, it follows that with the 
appropriate policy, consumers can be satisfied. Full knowledge excludes errors in buying: 
the consumer's nirvana However, if the Austrian is right, this would mean the end of 
human action (and economics). The basic premise of the Austrians is "man act". We act if 
we are dissatisfied; when satisfied, action stops. "Some people sometimes say that they 
would like to know [...] what the prices are going to be in the stock market next weak. 
Actually, we do not want to know the future. If you, or I, or anyone could know the 
future, this would mean it was set and we could no longer act to change it. All human 
activity is an attempt to change the future. [...] if we had everything we wanted, there 
would be no reason to live. When the day comes that you have everything you want, let 
me know, I shall make arrangements to come to your funeral, because you will be dead" 
(Greaves, 1984, p. 6). 
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A perfect public policy would therefore solve the problem of the consumer for both 
neoclassical and Austrian. Either he would be in the consumer's nirvana or be vegetating in 
a state of non-action like a plant. Which does not make much of a difference: in both cases 
he would be dead. 
We are back at the essence of Austrian economics I began with: the subjectivistic 
character of choice. For a neoclassical, a fully informed and satisfied consumer is possible. 
For an Austrian, since choice is essentially purposeful and entrepreneurial, it is an 
impossibility. Human choices, if real (that is inherently creative) could have been different 
and have different effects. A situation of full knowledge, a given framework of ends and 
means, excludes. "[I]ndividual choice," says Kirzner, "is always made with one's antennae 
alertly switched on to notice opportunities (that already 'exist', or that may be created) 
worth pursuing even through the mists of an uncertain future" (1982, p. 21). 
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SAMENVATTING EN CONCLUSIE 
De introductie brengt ons van waar we staan naar waar de these over gaat. Het 
onderwerp is de concurrerende-ondernemende consument in het Oostenrijkse economisch 
denken. Voor een neoklassieke economist is concurrentie hissen consumenten in de huidige 
maatschappij moeilijk te vinden. Voor een Oostenrijkse economist daarentegen is het een 
noodzakehjkheid. De introductie stelt het probleem, dat, hoewel voor een Oostenrijker 
iedereen, inclusief de consument, ondernemend handelt, de Oostenrijker in zijn beschrijving 
van het marktproces dit slechts toeschrijft aan de producent. 
Deel I van de these heeft als titel "De consument in het Oostenrijkse economisch 
denken". In de drie hoofdstukken waaruit het deel bestaat, worden de vragen beantwoord: 
(1) Wat is het Oostenrijkse economisch denken? (2) Wat is de Oostenrijkse méthodologie? 
en (3) Wat is de roi van de consument in het Oostenrijkse economisch denken? 
Het eerste hoofdstuk van deel I verklaart het voorvoegsel Oostenrijks. Inderdaad het 
begon in Oostenrijk. Vandaag de dag heeft het echter niets meer met dit land van doen. 
Oostenrijks bedoelt te verwijzen naar een manier van kijken naar het onderwerp en de 
méthode van de economische wetenschap. Het marktmodel van volkomen concurrentie uit 
de standaard économie wordt vervangen door dat van de markt als een ondernemend-
concurrerend procès. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk brengt ons naar de Oostenrijkse méthode van économie 
beoefening: de praxeologie. Het is de verbale uitwerking van de logische implicaties van 
het feit dat mensen handelen. De titel van het boek van Mises Human Action geeft dit ook 
weer. Doeleinden bepalen al het bewuste menselijk handelen. In elke handeling ruilen we 
altijd iets wat we hebben voor iets waar we de voorkeur aan geven. AI het menselijk 
handelen poogt de toekomst te veranderen. We kijken naar wat dit betekent voor (1) het 
Oostenrijkse perspectief op enige fundamentele begrippen van menselijk handelen en niet-
handelen (het waarderen van goederen combinaties in zijn algemeenheid en het indifferent 
zijn ten opzichte van bepaalde goederencombinaties in het bijzonder), en (2) economische 
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wetten (de wet van de afnemende meeropbrengsten). In de economie kunnen we slechts 
ons verstand gebruiken om conclusies af te leiden; in de leer van het menselijk handelen is 
de ervaring, de empirie, slechts geschiedenis. Er bestaat een scherp onderscheid hissen het 
Oostenrijkse en het neoklassieke economisch denken. Het laatste wordt vaak wiskundig 
vorm gegeven en econometrisch getest. Voor de eerste, daarentegen, is dit niet nodig dan 
wel onmogelijk. 
Hoofdstuk drie kijkt naar de oorzaak van het ontbreken van de consument in het 
Oostenrijkse denken. Door het benadrukken van het belang van (vaak verborgen) kennis 
die verspreid aanwezig is en de mogelijkheid van calculeren door de producent—beide ten 
opzichte van de potentie van de overheid tot het verzamelen van alle noodzakelijke 
gegevens en de mogelijkheid tot calculeren—verdween de consument uit het beeld. Dit 
alles vond plaats tijdens het socialistisch-calculatie debat zoals dat woedde tussen de beide 
wereldoorlogen. De consument werd later nooit meer terug gevonden. De consument is 
afwezig in de beschrijving van de markt als een dynamisch ondernemend 
ontdekkingsproces. Hij is ook afwezig in de analyse van de mogelijkheid van calculeren in 
termen van geld. Dat laatste wordt slechts bekeken vanuit de productiekant. Voor het eerste 
gebruiken de Oostenrijkers de methodologische hulpconstructie van een ondernemende 
producent en een niet-ondernemende consument. De Oostenrijkers verwaarlozen, evenals de 
klassieke economen voor hen, de rationaliteit van de consument. 
Deel II heeft als titel " De calculerende en ondernemende consument". In de vier 
hoofdstukken waaruit het deel bestaat, wordt de vraag beantwoord: "Hoe ziet de 
ondernemende en calculerende consument eruit?" We proberen marktverschijnselen te 
herleiden tot componenten van alledaagse besluitvorming. Dit wordt gedaan voor zowel de 
zakenman als consument. 
Hoofdstuk vier bespreekt een minder bekend thema uit het Oostenrijkse denken. Menger 
in zijn Grundzätze geeft vier goederenkarakteristieken. Dit om de vraag te beantwoorden 
"Wat maakt van een ding een goed?" Böhm-Bawerk in zijn Rechte und Verhältnisse 
voegde er een vijfde aan toe: individuen moeten ook weten hoe het ding te gebruiken. 1k 
gebruik deze vijfde karakteristiek om de rol van de consument te verduidelijken: zijn vorm 
van alertheid en ondernemerschap in het marktproces. Met behulp van Ryle kijk ik naar 
een begrip van alertheid dat geschikt is voor de producent en een die geschürt is voor de 
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consument. Alertheid is een vorm van kennen die er voor de producent uit bestaat over een 
daadwerkelijke mogelijkheid te beschikken en voor de consument tot het hebben van een 
neiging (bijvoorbeeld het kunnen genieten van klassieke muziek). Beide kunnen worden 
gesimuleerd. We gebruiken echter het negatieve woord charlatan voor de fraudeur die 
pretendeert iets tot stand te kunnen brengen, terwijl we het negatieve woord hypocriet 
gebruiken voor iemand die pretendeert over bepaalde motieven of neigingingen te 
beschikken. 
Hoofdstuk vijf maakt gebruik van het werk van Schönfeld-Illy. Kirzner maakt een 
onderscheid tussen het maximaliseren binnen een gegeven kader van doeleinden en 
middelen en de bepaling van dat kader zelf. Robbins' maximaliseerder kan alleen het eerste 
doen. Mises' homo agens kan beide. In Kirzners methodologische hulpconstructie handelt 
de consument slechts als een Robinsiaanse maximaliseerder. Het blijkt echter dat binnen 
het kader van Robbins (van gegeven doeleinden en middelen) de consument hetzelfde 
élément van alertheid nodig heeft als Kirzner plaatst in de bepaling van dat kader. De 
consument lost het probleem van het onmeetbare nut op en verkort tevens het 
calculatieproces met behulp van drie principes: het principe van (1) het afzonderlijke nut 
[Hoewel het doel van de consument het bereiken van het hoogste nut is, kan hij niet het 
totale nut op zieh zelf berekenen maar slechts de verandering daarin. Veranderingen 
ontstaan door goederen toe te voegen aan de al gebruikte goederen. Deze veranderingen 
geven het nut van ieder goed afzonderlijk.]; (2) quid pro quo, [Veranderingen in het totale 
nut geven de consument geen getallen waarmee hij kan rekenen. Wat hij wel kan, is de 
veranderingen met elkaar vergelijken.]; en (3) de economische relevantie [De prijs die 
relevant is voor de marginale eenheid heeft een economische relevantie voor alle andere 
eenheden van de voorraad goederen]. De drie principes zijn de basis voor de théorie van 
Schönfeld-Illy over de rol van prijzen—dat wil zeggen alertheid—in het calculatieproces 
van de consument. 
Hoofdstuk zes werkt het calculatieproces van de consument verder uit. Het behandelt de 
vraag "Hoe valt het maximalisatieproces van de consument te beschrijven vanuit een 
subjectivistisch perspectief?" Dat wil zeggen "Hoe het valt maximalisatieproces te herleiden 
tot de elementen van het alledaagse besluitvormingsproces?" Omdat de neoklassieke théorie 
wiskundig wordt vormgegeven, is het probleem voor de neoklassiek wiskundig van aard: 
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het oplossen van een Lagrange vergelijking. Vanuit een puur theoretisch perspectief moet 
de consument veel doen om alle marginale nutten te berekenen. Hij moet alle mogehjke 
goederen combinaties op een rij zetten. Vervolgens moet hij de behoeften die de 
verschillende eenheden kunnen bevredigen op een rij zetten. Ten slotte moet hij bepalen tot 
waar de bevrediging doelmatig is. Het is echter onmogelijk om alle noodzakelijke 
calculaties in de praktijk ook daadwerkelijk uittevoeren. De consument verkort het 
rekenproces. Dit verkortingsproces kan binnen een neoklassiek kader worden 
geformaliseerd. Daartoe kijk ik naar het marginale nutsbegrip: de manier waarop het 
functioneert in het evenwicht en daar buiten. Spaar- en consumptiepatronen worden 
verklaard voor twee groepen van consumenten: (1) de al gesitueerde consumenten. (De 
consumenten die we al kennen vanuit de traditionele theorie), en (2) de trendsettende 
consumenten. (Trendsetters die zieh door eigen keuze buiten het evenwicht bevinden. Deze 
laatsten beschikken over een al of niet vervooruitziende planningshorizon.) 
Hoofdstuk zeven kijkt naar het marginaal nutsbegrip om de vraag te beantwoorden "Hoe 
berekent een consument de totale waarde van een aantal eenheden van een zelfde goed?" 
Het Multiplicationstheorem des Wertes van Wieser stelt dat de totale waarde berekend kan 
worden door alle eenheden met het bereikte marginale nut te vermenigvuldigen. Böhm-
Bawerks Integrationstheorem des Wertes stelt daarentegen dat de totale waarde van een 
voorraad goederen de som is van het nut van de afzonderlijke eenheden. Omdat Wiesers 
theorema de totale waarde van een voorraad goederen onderschat, heeft zijn theorema 
weinig navolgers gevonden. Schönfeld-Illy's interpretatie van het marginale 
nutsbegrip—zijn begrip van economische relevantie: de relevantie van een marge voor het 
geheel—geeft een interpretatie die er voor zorgt dat Wieser wellicht toch gelijk kan hebben 
gehad. Schönfeld-Illy lost met zijn interpretatie een inconsistentie in het denken van Wieser 
op. Wieser haalt de beschrijving van het marginale nutsbegrip uit een situatie waarin de 
calculaties al zijn geschied. De funetie van het marginale nutsbegrip haalt hij echter uit een 
situatie waarin het calculeren nog moet beginnen. Schönfeld-Illy vraagt zieh af of de laatste 
fase van calculatie wel al die elementen bevat die zijn gebruikt tijdens de daadwerkelijke 
calculatie, en vervolgens dus ook zijn vervat in de begripsmatige omschrijving van die 
laatste fase. 
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Deel III heeft als titel "Het Oostenrijkse perspectief op het consumenten beleid". 
In de vijf hoofdstukken waaruit het deel bestaat, wordt gekeken naar het 
consumentenbeleid in het algemeen en in het bijzonder naar reclame (de wijze waarop 
reclame functioneert en kan worden gebruikt om een nieuw product te introduceren) en 
productaansprakehjkheid (vanuit een neoklassiek en Oostenrijks perspectief). 
Hoofdstuk acht introduceert het consumentenbeleid en het verband daarvan met 
creativiteit en ondernemerschap. Het gaat in het bijzonder in op de vraag "Hoe hangt de 
Oostenrijkse visie op het marktproces samen met de mogehjkheid van een 
consumentenbeleid?" Meer in het bijzonder "Wat is de invloed van het consumentenbeleid 
op de perceptie door consument en producent van de beschikbare alternatieven?" Met 
behulp van vier begrippen die Kirzner ook gebruikt (het onontdekte, het niet na te bootsen, 
het tegengewerkte en het volkomen overbodige ontdekkingsproces), beschrijf ik de manier 
waarop het consumentenbeleid het ontdekkingsproces tegenwerkt. Ik besluit met te 
concluderen dat het Oostenrijkse idee van de markt ons een nieuwe invalshoek verschalt 
voor een kritiek op de gereguleerde consument. Regeigeving Staat op gespannen voet met 
het spontane ontdekkingsproces welke een ongereguleerde markt oproept. 
Consumentenbeleid werkt de prikkel tegen welke een sociaal gewenste verandering (een 
mogehjkheid die een gegeven kader van waargenomen mogelijkheden overstijgt) vertaalt 
naar een persoonlijk winstgevende mogelijkheid. 
Hoofdstuk negen toont aan dat er ruimte is voor de praxeologische methode in de 
economische wetenschap. Empirische feiten discrimineren niet tussen hypothesen die het 
tegenovergestelde beweren over reclame. (1) Reclame is (gedeeltelijk) misleidend en 
manipulerend. En (2) reclame is een goed zoals ieder ander goed. De consument krijgt het 
type en de kwaliteit van reclame waarvoor hij kan en bereid is te betalen. Adverteren is 
een essentieel onderdeel van het concurrentie proces. Zij maakt het goed bekend bij de 
consument. Consumenten zijn geen passieve actoren maar handelen grosso modo in hun 
eigen belang. 
Hoofdstuk tien werkt adverteren verder uit door naar de prijsstelling van een volkomen 
nieuw product te kijken. Concurrentie tussen consumenten kan worden gebruikt om het 
nieuws te verspreiden. Waar nieuwe trends worden ontdekt, concurreren consumenten. Zij 
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ontdekken, creören de markt voor de producent. Trends worden niet verkocht door 
concurrerende producenten; zij worden gekocht door concurrerende consumenten. 
De hoofdstukken elf en twaalf kijken naar productaansprakelijkheid: schade die ontstaat 
door het gebruik van consumptiegoederen. In hoofdstuk elf vanuit het gezichtspunt van de 
neoklassieke economist en in hoofdstuk twaalf vanuit het gezichtspunt van de Oostenrijker. 
Voor een neoklassiek zijn kosten objectief en bekend bij de rechter. De rechter, die de 
zogenoemde Hand-formule gebruikt, vergelijkt de verwachte ongevalskosten met de kosten 
die nodig zijn om het product veiliger te maken. Een beklaagde is schuldig aan nalatigheid 
als P keer L groter is als B. Hier Staat P voor de kans dat een ongeluk plaatsvindt, L voor 
de hoogte van de verwachte schade en B voor de kosten die moeten worden gemaakt om 
het ongeluk te voorkomen. Voor een Oostenrijker daarentegen—daar kosten subjectief zijn 
en kennis principieel niet gecentraliseerd kan worden—is het contractrecht de aangewezen 
plaats om schade te regelen. Hier geldt de aloude regel van caveat emptor, laat de koper op 
zijn hoede zijn! In het contractrecht kunnen de partijen zelf, vooraf, vanuit eigen 
ondernemende inzichten en subjectieve inschattingen, de verwachte voor- en nadelen met 
elkaar vergelijken. En in zoverre een volkomen vreemde schade lijdt (hij die geen partner 
in het koopproces is) en zijn eigendomsrechten worden geschaad—met andere woorden er 
zijn negatieve externaliteiten—kan hij een schadevergoeding eisen. In die situatie geldt de 
regel van strikte aansprakelijkheid. Hoe hoog de schadevergoeding echter dient te zijn, 
dient de rechter primair op ethische niet op economische gronden te besüssen. 
Wat is het resultaat—in zoverre de neoklassiek en de Oostenrijker elkaar iets te zeggen 
hebben—van de voorafgaande drie delen over de consument in het Oostenrijkse denken en 
het Oostenrijkse perspectief op het consumentenbeleid (cp. Kirzner, 1997, and De Soto, 
1998, pp. 78-79)? 
Uit de methodologische analyse in deel I blijkt dat neoklassieken en Oostenrijkers elkaar 
niet veel te zeggen hebben. Theorieën die niet getoetst behoeven te worden en altijd waar 
zijn, zijn ondenkbaar in de standaard neoklassieke théorie met haar eis van empirische 
falsificatie. Verbale logica laat ruimte voor subjectivisme en ondernemerschap. Beide 
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karakteristieken zijn essentieel voor het marktproces. Met andere woorden, de claim van de 
Oostenrijkers dat voorspellen onmogelijk is—wat er gebeult hangt irnmers af van kennis 
die nog gecreeerd moet worden in een ondernemend proces (het ontdekken van dingen 
waarvan we niet eens weten dat we ze niet weten)—Staat haaks op het doen van 
kwantitatieve voorspellingen als een gezocht en bekend doel van de neoklassieken. 
Uit de analyse van het consumentengedrag in deel II blijkt dat neoklassieken en 
Oostenrijkers elkaar niet veel te zeggen hebben. Voor de Oostenrijker is de consument een 
creatieve ondernemer die Staat in het midden van een dynamische proces. Voor de 
neoklassiek is hij een homo economicus die rationele keuzes maakt. Keuzes die zijn 
gebaseerd op een proces van maximalisatie binnen een gegeven kader van doeleinden en 
middelen. 
Uit de analyse van het consumentenbeleid in deel Hl blijkt dat neoklassieken en 
Oostenrijkers elkaar niet veel te zeggen hebben. Voor een Oostenrijker is de kennis op 
basis waarvan de overheid zou moeten handelen subjectief, verspreid en aan een 
voortdurende verandering onderhevig. Objectieve wetenschappelijke kennis alleen is niet 
voldoende; er is ook de praktische en volkomen subjectieve kennis van plaats en tijd. Voor 
een Oostenrijker bestaat de rol van de overheid eruit de eigendomsrechten van het individu 
te beschermen. Of en wiens eigendomsrechten er geschonden worden, beslist de rechter op 
ethische gronden; de economic heeft hier weinig mee van doen. Voor een neoklassiek, 
daarentegen, beschikken we over een volledige kennis van doeleinden en middelen, en 
voorzover dit het geval is, is deze kennis omgeven door bekende onzekerheid. Kosten zijn 
objectief en kunnen worden gemeten door een derde partij. 
Maar laat ons de feiten nog eens op een rijtje zetten. Valt er niets positiefs te zeggen 
over het verband tussen een neoklassieke en een Oostenrijkse economist? De Oostenrijkse 
revolutie in het economisch denken, waar het eerste hoofdstuk van deel I mee begon, was 
en is immers nog steeds een deel van een en de zelfde grotere traditie. Het begon in de 
1870s niet alleen met Menger maar ook met Walras en Jevons. Alle drie de grondleggers 
wilden theoretiseren; alle drie wilden marktverschijnselen verklaren als het resultaat van 
individuele keuzes gebonden aan beperkingen. Allen onderschreven het bestaan van 
economische wetten: er zijn systematische consequenties van onze handelingen. Voor Mises 
was het bestaan van economische wetten niet alleen kenmerkend voor de klassieke maar 
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ook voor de neoklassieke economic Alle neoklassieken willen de niet van te voren 
geplande regelmaat van de markteconomie verklaren als het resultaat van bewuste keuzes 
van individuen. Daarom vormen de Oostenrijkers nog steeds een deel van de economische 
Orthodoxie van de neoklassieke économie. Hoewel zij niet langer deel uitmaken van de 
Walrasiaanse en Marshalliaanse hoofdstroom. 
Met andere woorden, tot op zekere hoogte kunnen we stellen dat slechts de taal 
verschillend is: formalistische precisie van de neoklassieke versus verbale deductie van de 
Oostenrijkse economist. De laatste versterkt de meerderheid van de conclusies van de 
eerste. Gedeeltelijk is het dus een verschillende méthodologie: een verschillende weg om de 
zelfde conclusies te bereiken (Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de wet van de afnemende 
meeropbrengsten in deel I). 
Hoewel een Oostenrijker aan deze overeenkomst natuurlijk onmiddellijk zou toevoegen 
"Het is niet slechts de taal die verschilt, maar de probleemsituatie doet dat ook." Voor hem 
maken subjectivisme en ondernemerschap beide deel uit van de rijkheid van onze wereld. 
Beide echter laten geen ruimte voor formalisme met het daaraan verbunden eng 
rationalisme en de veronderstelling van de volledige beschikbaarheid van informatie hetzij 
volledig dan wel omgeven met bekende onzekerheid. Het is onmogelijk om subjectivisme 
en ondernemerschap met formele gereedschappen te analyseren zonder niet tegelijk hun 
essentie te veranderen. Simplificatie heeft haar prijs. 
Wat de neoklassiek van de Oostenrijker kan leren is dat er meer in de wereld van de 
theoretisch economist is dan het model van volkomen concurrentie. Er is eerst en vooral 
het concurrerend-ondernemend procès van ontdekking (Zie Deel I). Een neoklassiek heeft 
de neiging om de leercapaciteit van het individu te onderschatten (Zie deel II), maar 
overschat daarentegen de economische kennis van de overheid. De hoogte van een 
schadevergoeding, zo deze achteraf dient te worden vastgesteld, is een ethisch niet een 
economisch probleem (Zie deel III). 
Het antwoord van de neoklassiek op de zojuist genoemde conclusies zou zijn, "Het is 
alles zeer interessant wat een Oostenrijker over subjectivisme en ondernemerschap zegt, 
maar, tenzij formeel bewezen, blijft het slechts een interessant idée—niets meer." 
Toegepaste welvaartsanalyse daarentegen (deel III) is niet een terrein—zoals de 
theoretische économie—waar de Oostenrijker en neoklassiek elkaar makkelijk de hand 
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zouden kunnen schudden. Voor een Oostenrijker, die subjectieve waarderingen en het open 
marktproces serieus neemt, kunnen individuele waarderingen niet bij elkaar worden 
opgeteld en is er ook geen uiteindelijke evenwichtssituatie die door de overheid kan 
worden nagebootst. Er is geen norm—genomen uit een idee van volledige kennis—om het 
beleid aan te toetsen. Voor een Oostenrijker—daar echte onkunde niet is gemcorporeerd— 
is er binnen de traditionele welvaartseconomie geen plaats voor die handelingen van 
ondernemerschap waar het evenwichtsproces juist op steunt. Niet alleen allocatieve 
efficientie maar ook de snelheid en nauwkeurigheid waarmee problemen worden 
geTdentificeerd, verspilling worden bestreden en een gebrek aan coördinatie wordt oplost, 
zijn belangrijk. 
Vergeleken met heterodoxe stromingen binnen de economie delen de Oostenrijkers en de 
neoklassieken het belang dat zij beide hechten aan laissez faire. Het Oostenrijkse 
vertrouwen daarop is vergeleken met de neoklassieken sterk. Een vertrouwen dat deze 
Studie met haar nadruk op subjectivisme en ondernemerschap versterkt. De tendentie tot 
kennis die bijdraagt aan het evenwichtsproces wordt gevoed door zowel de producent als 
de consument (Deel II). Winstmogelijkheden zijn voor beide de Stimulans. Er is een 
tendentie dat echte fouten worden hersteld—niet worden gemaakt. Er is een tendentie om 
het bij het juiste eind te hebben. Er valt meer te winnen van een grotere dan van een 
kleinere kennis. Deze tendentie wordt door een al maar veranderend overheidsbeleid 
tegengewerkt; een zekere omgeving van stabiliteit is nodig om de krachten die een 
evenwicht oproepen hun werk te laten doen. 
De Oostenrijkers, met andere woorden, versterken het traditionele geloof in een spontaan 
evenwicht: niet het extreem van evenwicht altijd, maar zeker sterker dan het 
tegenovergestelde van evenwicht nooit. De consument herstelt echte fouten. Daar hij geen 
producent is, is Kirzners idee van ondernemerschap—een al bestaande situatie van onkunde 
wordt gecorrigeerd, wacht er op om ontdekt te worden—perfect op hem van toepassing. De 
consument krijgt ook zijn "winst" als hij onkunde door alertheid overwint. 
Als het voorafgaande juist is, is het grootste probleem voor de Oostenrijkers niet dat hun 
theorie unrealistisch of niet relevant is: een inaccurate beschrijving van de sociale 
werkelijkheid geeft of de maatschappelijke krachten miskent. Het grootste probleem is 
"Hoe komt het dat niet alle economisten hiermee instemmen?" Als de meorievorrning is 
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gebaseerd op apodictisch wäre premissen, die slechts uitgesproken behoeven te worden om 
direct als waar te worden aanvaard—en het vervolgens slechts pure deductie is—waarom 
stemmen dan niet (inclusief de neoklassieke) alle economisten met elkaar in? Maar zelfs de 
Oostenrijkers verschillen onderling. Deze situatie delen de Oostenrijkers met de 
neoklassieken. Daar de eersten verbale deductie en de laatsten het doen van voorspellingen 
benadrukken, hebben beiden de volgende vraag te beantwoorden. Voor de neoklassiek, "Als 
je zo slim bent in het maken van voorspellingen hoe komt het dan dat je niet rijk bent?" 
Geparafraseerd voor de Oostenrijker, "Als je zo slim bent in het maken van verbale 
deducties hoe komt het dan dat niet alle economisten het met je eens zijn?" 
Tenslotte, is er dan werkelijk geen punt waar de Oostenrijker en neoklassiek 
overeenstemmen voorzover het de consument betreft? Dat is er wel. Als een neoklassiek 
gelijk heeft, volgt dat met het juiste beleid de consument tevreden gesteld kan worden. 
Volledige kennis sluit fouten bij de aankoopbeslissing uit: het nirwana van de consument. 
Als dit zo is, betekent dit echter voor de Oostenrijker dat al het menselijk handelen en 
daarmee de economie zou ophouden te bestaan. Het fundamentele uitgangspunt van de 
Oostenrijker is immers dat mensen handelen. We handelen omdat we ontevreden zijn. Als 
we volledig bevredigd zouden zijn, zou al het menselijk handelen stoppen. "Soms zeggen 
mensen dat ze graag de prijzen [...] op de aandelenmarkt van de volgende week zouden 
willen weten. In feite willen we de toekomst helemaal niet kennen. Als jij, of ik, of ieder 
ander de toekomst zou kennen, zou dit betekenen dat deze al bepaald is en we niet langer 
kunnen handelen om deze te veranderen. AI het menselijk handelen is een poging om de 
toekomst te veranderen. [...]. Als we alles zouden hebben wat we willen, zou er geen reden 
zijn om te leven. Als de dag komt dat je alles hebt wat je wilt, laat het me weten, dan zal 
ik voorbereidingen treffen om naar je begrafenis te komen, omdat je overleden zult zijn" 
(Greaves, 1984, p. 6). 
Een perfect overheidsbeleid zou dus de problemen oplossen voor zowel de neoklassieke 
als Oostenrijkse economist. We zouden ons volgens de neoklassiek in het nirvana van de 
consument dan wel volgens de Oostenrijker in het rijk der vegeterende planten bevinden 
(een toestand van niet-handelen). Wat niet veel uitmaakt—in beide gevallen zijn we dood. 
We zijn weer terug bij de kern van de Oostenrijkse manier van economie beoefening: 
het subjectieve karakter van de keuze. Voor een neoklassiek is een volledig geinformeerde 
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en bevredigde consument een mogelijkheid. Voor een Oostenrijker—daar een keuze in 
essentie doelgericht en ondernemend is—is het een onmogelijkheid. Menselijke keuzes 
zouden, als ze echt zijn—dat is creatief—zouden ook anders kunnen zijn geweest en tot 
andere resultaten kunnen hebben geleid. Een situatie die volledig kennis—een gegeven 
kader van doeleinden en middelen—uitsluit. "De keuze van een individu," zegt Kirzner, 
"wordt altijd gemaakt met de antenne alert gericht op het ontdekken van mogehjkheden 
(die er al zijn, of die nog gecreëerd moeten worden) die het waard zijn om nagestreefd te 
worden zelfs in het licht van een onzekere toekomst" (1982, p. 21). 
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